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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I know no better 
stance to adopt from within the secular/religious, evangelical traditions of U.S. politics. 
-Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto” 
This is a hymn for the hymnless, kids with no religion 
Yeah, we keep on sinning, yeah, we keep on singing 
-Kesha, “Hymn” 
 For better or worse, religion has been a driving force in the United States since the 
founding era. Classic works like Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America treat it as 
the soul of citizenship—both a moral vision that keeps people attuned to the public good 
and a moral community that sanctions excessive self-interest or deviance (also see 
Erikson 1966). Others emphasize more pragmatic benefits, like how religious texts 
informed arguments about statecraft, or how stable church networks laid the foundation 
for institutions dedicated to education and public safety in the frontier society (e.g. Heclo 
2007; Wuthnow 2011).  
 Today, religion is also a deeply ambiguous force in U.S. politics. Faith-based 
networks provide both ideological motivations and an organizational infrastructure for 
social movements, spurring engagement on the left and the right (e.g. Bean 2014; 
Braunstein 2017; Delehanty 2016; Markofski 2015). Religious commitments can foster 
an inclusive vision of the political community dedicated to the wellbeing of all citizens, 
but they can also foster social exclusion by raising the stakes of political conflict, 
especially when people link their policy positions to deeply-held religious identities and 
moral worldviews (Appleby 2000; Brubaker 2015; Stewart et al. 2018; Williams 1996, 
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2013). Religious commitments are like a nuclear reaction at the center of political culture, 
offering seemingly boundless energy and an elevated risk of serious accidents. Social 
science research helps us better understand how political actors harness—or weaponize—
that power.  
 But the religious landscape of the country is also changing, and many people are 
now opting out of religious organizations altogether. Since the 1990s, the number of 
religiously-unaffiliated people in the U.S. has steadily grown from about ten percent of 
the population to twenty-three percent in 2018—now equal in size to evangelical 
Protestants. Just under forty percent of Americans under the age of thirty have no 
affiliation, either. Figure 1.1 shows the magnitude of this change over the last forty years 
of the General Social Survey. Disaffiliation from religious groups is a rapid cultural 
change for a nation that maintained deep historical ties to religious institutions, even as it 
remained formally separate from them in law. 
 Research offers two explanations for the rise of the unaffiliated (often called “the 
nones” in popular media). The first explanation is that religious disaffiliation is primarily 
an act of political backlash. In this theory, people holding liberal and progressive political 
views and moderate religious commitments see the close relationship between 
conservative politics and conservative faith forged by the Religious Right through the 
1980s and 1990s and decide that religion simply is not for them (Hout and Fischer 2002, 
2014; Margolis 2018; Putnam and Campbell 2012; Schnabel and Bock 2017; Sherkat 
2014; Zuckerman 2011). The backlash theory sees disaffiliation as a symptom of stronger 
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political alignment where social identities are increasingly falling in line with partisan 
preferences—a change that is similar to other trends in affective polarization and partisan 
sorting (e.g. Baldassari and Gelman 2014; DellaPosta et al. 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 
2015; Mason 2018). Figure 1.2 illustrates the potential for the backlash hypothesis; trends 
in party affiliation among unaffiliated respondents in the GSS over the last forty years 
show this group become more strongly affiliated with the Democratic Party.  
 The second explanation focuses on drift from social institutions. While many 
people make the choice to leave religious groups, a growing number of people simply 
stop attending or never join them in the first place. For some scholars, religious 
disengagement is a symptom of a broader trend toward reduced civic engagement as 
people spend less time in community groups as they adapt to other structural changes in 
social life, such as precarious labor and solitary living (Kalleberg 2018; Klinenberg 2013; 
Putnam 2001; Pugh 2015). For others, the drift account is more about socialization. More 
people in the U.S. are being raised outside of religious groups and growing up with more 
secular peers, such that each birth cohort appears less religious than the last (Manning 
2015; Thiessen and Wilkins-Laflamme 2017; Voas and Chaves 2016). These cohort 
changes are slowly bringing the U.S. closer to trends in secularization over time similar 
to Western Europe (Voas and Chaves 2016 cf. Schnabel and Bock 2017). Across both of 
these sets of literature, the drift theory sees religious disaffiliation as an outcome of 
social-structural changes in institutions like the market and the family, rather than 
ideological changes in the population.   
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 This dissertation focuses on the relationship between religious engagement and 
political life in this changing social context. In a nation where religion has historically 
been central to public life, what are the political implications of religious disaffiliation? 
Answering this question highlights how the backlash and drift theories are in tension with 
each other. Backlash theories see disaffiliation as part of a trend toward political 
investment and polarization, while drift theories see it as a symptom of disengagement. Is 
the cultural power of religion at the center of U.S. politics waning, perhaps passing a 
half-life, or is a new coalition in the electorate—a new isotope—emerging?  The answer 
is not a simple either/or proposition as the backlash and drift theories would suggest. 
Both explanations have insights to offer, but alone they are incomplete. I develop a new 
theory that synthesizes these perspectives in order to better explain how and why 
different expressions of nonreligion have a divergent relationship with political 
engagement.  
 My argument is based on the fact that people leave religious groups for many 
different reasons (Zuckerman 2011), and so the traits that support either backlash or drift 
accounts often overlap for any given person. Research has identified many different 
nonreligious experiences, including staunchly committed atheists who stand against 
religion in the public sphere (LeDrew 2015), nonbelievers who prefer to call themselves 
“spiritual but not religious” (Edgell et al. 2017; McClure 2017), “unchurched believers” 
who still think about god, but leave religious groups (Baker and Smith 2015; Hout and 
Fischer 2002), and even people who “belong without believing” in religious groups as 
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they seek community (Kasselstrand 2015). People express their religious commitments in 
many different ways, and researchers make sense of this complexity using theories from 
cultural sociology that explain how people take a variety of religious expressions and 
package them together into different repertoires of religious engagement (e.g. Chaves 
2010, Edgell 2012, Wilcox 2009; Wilde and Glassman 2016). More work is necessary to 
explain how people develop different repertoires of nonreligion from these varied 
experiences and map those repertoires onto different kinds of political engagement.   
 Repertoires are collections of available beliefs, identities, and practices that 
people use to make sense of social life and perform for others across different social 
contexts. Using the language of repertoires provides a better framework to understand 
religious disaffiliation more accurately, because it leads research to focus on how people 
access many different combinations of nonreligious expressions in social life. People 
express different kinds of nonreligion in their personal lives through beliefs, affinities, 
and practices, and they express different kinds of nonreligion in their public lives through 
assumptions about community, citizenship, and political authority. My empirical work in 
this project supports two claims. First, we can distinguish different personal and public 
repertoires of nonreligion and measure them separately. Second, while research is used to 
focusing on measures of personal nonreligion, public repertoires of nonreligion are doing 
most of the work in political matters. The specific personal and public repertoires that I 
measure here have a divergent relationship with political behavior; a public repertoire 
focused on secular authority in the public sphere associates with stronger political 
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engagement, while a personal repertoire focused on autonomy from religious groups and 
practices associates with weaker political engagement. 
 These divergent repertoires show up in many different aspects of political life. In 
terms of political behavior, I find patterns in voter turnout among the nonreligious that 
run counter to the classic expectation that lower religious engagement corresponds with 
lower political engagement. In public opinion, I demonstrate how a public nonreligious 
repertoire provides a stronger source of attitudinal constraint on a variety of policy issues 
than a personal nonreligious repertoire. Finally, in terms of lobbying and advocacy work, 
I show how strict adherence to a personal nonreligious repertoire, rather than a cultivation 
of multiple repertoires, limits the political efficacy of many nonreligious organizations.  
 This case study of nonreligion has important implications for the way we think 
about many aspects of political life across the social sciences. For researchers interested 
in civic engagement, this work advances our understanding about the nature of 
disengagement, especially how opting out of one set of institutions does not necessarily 
lead people to opt out of others. For researchers interested in public opinion and ideology, 
these findings show the importance of taking culture seriously in the study of public 
opinion. They also demonstrate how we can improve our theories and measurement 
strategies to assess the specific role of cultural repertories in attitudinal constraint. For 
scholars interested in culture and organizations, my results illustrate how choosing 
different cultural repertoires is not only an individual process, but also one that can 
produce distinct advantages and challenges at the organizational level as well. Finally, for 
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scholars of religion, these patterns illustrate the importance of considering publicly-
oriented religious expression as a key factor in religious experience—one that cannot be 
explained simply by focusing on personal religious commitments alone.  
What is Nonreligion?  
 Religious dissent has long been a part of social life in the United States, especially 
among the educated elite. But religious dissent means different things to different people. 
Since the founding era, skepticism and freethought have informed a range of social 
groups, political coalitions, and artistic movements across the country. For every well-
known polemical figure like Madelyn Murray O’Hair spearheading American Atheists, 
history also finds a surrealist painter or a deist founder who takes that same religious 
doubt and connects it to a different set of activities and affinities. Public anxiety about 
salvation and sustained prejudice against nonreligious groups often led doubters and 
apostates to join different civil society groups such as interfaith organizations, artistic 
movements, or philosophical and spiritual discussion groups like the Ethical Culture 
movement, rather than organize solely around their shared religious skepticism alone 
(Fuller 1995; Gin Lum 2014; Schmidt 2016; Turner 1987; Porterfield 2012). 
 What is new today is the thirty-year shift in religious affiliation across the United 
States. Many more Americans now feel comfortable openly claiming no religious 
affiliation on surveys. Amid declining religiosity across birth cohorts (Voas and Chaves 
2016 cf. Schnabel and Bock 2017), the combined number of self-identified atheists (now 
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about four percent of the U.S. population ), agnostics (also about four percent), and 1
people who say they are “nothing in particular” has grown to a total of twenty-three 
percent of the general population, twenty percent of registered voters, and thirty-seven 
percent of individuals under 30.  Emerging nonreligious interest groups such as The 2
Secular Coalition, the Center for Inquiry, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, and 
the American Humanist Association have also achieved public visibility through the early 
2000s as a result of renewed organizing and advocacy efforts, online and in-person social 
outreach, and advertising campaigns (Baker and Smith 2015; Blankholm 2014; Cimino 
and Smith 2014; García and Blackholm 2016; LeDrew 2015; Kettell 2014, 2013).  
 These demographic and institutional changes accompany a variety of notable 
cultural changes as well, and these show the varied roles that religious dissent can play in 
political culture. In 2006, Richard Dawkins publishes The God Delusion and Sam Harris 
publishes Letter to a Christian Nation. These are popular polemics, the first a direct 
challenge to arguments for the existence of god and the second an indictment of the 
George W. Bush-era political agenda of the early 2000s stemming from conservative 
Christianity. Both books argue that a central cause of many contemporary social problems 
is irrational religious belief. These bestsellers lead the authors, along with other public 
 See Chapter Two for a detailed account of why the substantive differences between self-identified atheism 1
and non-belief in god matter for studies of nonreligion. Briefly, persistent social stigma toward atheist 
identification (Edgell, Hartmann, Stewart, and Gerteis 2016) introduces social desirability bias that 
depresses rates of atheist self-identification relative to reported non-belief in god, especially for already-
marginalized groups (e.g. Edgell, Frost, and Stewart 2017; Gervais and Najle 2018). 
 Current estimates of the aggregated group with “no religion” drawn from the first release of the 2018 2
General Social Survey. Estimates of unaffiliated registered voters are drawn from the Public Religion 
Research Institute. 
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intellectuals such as Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Schermer, to 
return critical accounts of religion and religiosity to the mainstream public sphere in a 
trend known as “New Atheism.”  
 New Atheism is perhaps the most well known recent example of nonreligion in 
popular culture, but it is not the only example of nonreligious repertoires at work. In 
2011, Kanye West and Jay-Z release the single “No Church in the Wild.” Against a 
backdrop of protestors in the accompanying music video, a lone figure hurls a molotov 
cocktail at a wall of riot gear as Frank Ocean sings: 
Human beings in a mob, 
What’s a mob to a king? 
What’s a king to a god? 
What’s a god to a non-believer? 
 In 2015, with the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, Ta-Nehisi Coates 
publishes Between The World and Me, a letter to his son reflecting on race relations in the 
context of Coates’ own autobiographical experience.   
But some time ago I rejected magic in all its forms. This rejection was a gift from 
your grandparents, who never tried to console me with ideas of an afterlife and 
were skeptical of preordained American glory…how do I live free in this black 
body? It is a profound question because America understands itself as God’s 
handiwork, but the black body is the clearest evidence that America is the work 
of men…I could not retreat, as did so many, into the church and its mysteries…
and so I had no sense that any just God was on my side (2015:12, 28). 
 Later in 2015, following a mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, amid a 
chorus of public figures offering throughs and prayers to the victims, The New York Daily 
News runs a cover emblazoned with the headline: GOD ISN’T FIXING THIS. Politicians 
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on social media suddenly drew the ire of pundits and constituents for offering these 
condolences in the absence of tangible gun control policies.  
 In 2018, four members of the U.S. House of Representatives launch the 
Congressional Freethought Caucus dedicated to “science and reason-based policy 
solutions” and protecting the separation of church and state.  Later that year, Kyrsten 3
Sinema—the first House Representative with no stated religious affiliation—is elected to 
the Senate to fill the seat vacated by the late John McCain.   
 The sentiments across these events are not all the same. New Atheism often 
concerns itself with “culture wars” questions about the proper relationship between 
science and public policy, the place of religion in the public sphere, and tolerance for 
extremist views in society (Kettell 2014; LeDrew 2015). Openly identified atheists tend 
to be white, male, well educated, and wealthy—often taking on that stigmatized identity 
against a backdrop of robust social privilege (Baker and Smith 2009; Hout and Fischer 
2002; Stewart 2016; cf. Baker and Whitehead 2016; Edgell et al. 2017). The Black Lives 
Matter movement and accompanying public intellectual discourse about racial inequality 
speaks from a different social standpoint. Organizers and activists dealing with racial 
inequality also engage nonreligious perspectives, even though this engagement is often 
missed when research focuses on predominately white secular groups (for important 
exceptions, see, e.g. Cameron 2019; Hutchinson In Press; Pinn 2012). What is notable 
 For more information, see (2018) “Reps. Huffman, Raskin, McNerney, & Kildee Launch Congressional 3
Freethought Caucus.” Congressman Jared Huffman. Retrieved January 28, 2019 (https://
huffman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-huffman-raskin-mcnerney-kildee-launch-
congressional-freethought).
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here is the salience of religious skepticism to political discourse across each of these 
perspectives. We often assume that nonreligion is defined by a lack of beliefs in the 
supernatural. In each of the above cases, nonreligion is not just the absence of a belief; it 
is defined by the way people leverage claims about religious skepticism to make a 
different, more substantive claim about some part of public life, linking that skepticism to 
a broader statement about community, authority, or politics. 
 Scholars studying secularization often emphasize that one of the defining features 
of late modernity is cultural pluralism, especially as fewer social institutions have a 
monopoly on fundamental questions of purpose, ethics, community, and authority in 
society. They hold the United States up as an interesting counter-example to strong 
secularization theories, one that could simultaneously keep pluralistic values while 
maintaining a robust commitment to a wide variety of religious belief systems (Putnam 
and Campbell 2012; cf. Schnabel and Bock 2017; Voas and Chaves 2016). As more 
people disaffiliate from religious institutions, we can now evaluate whether these 
demographic changes also yield cultural changes in how the electorate considers political 
questions once shaped by religious engagement. We can also account for the rich variety 
in how people understand themselves outside of religious institutions. If nonreligion 
provides a different set of cultural frameworks for thinking about political issues, we may 
be on the cusp of a dramatic restructuring in fundamental assumptions about the cultural 
conditions that encourage civic engagement, opinion formation, and policy advocacy. On 
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the other hand, religious disaffiliation could also just be another example of people 
drifting away from strong institutional commitments in late modern life. 
 Throughout this work, I use the specific terms “nonreligion” and “nonreligious,” 
rather than the more general “secular.” While a bit cumbersome, these terms draw 
attention to the fact that a defining feature of nonreligion is how people make sense of 
their position in relation to religious institutions and belief systems. Following Lee (2012, 
2015), Quack (2014), Sumerau and Cragun (2016), LeDrew (2015), and others, this 
approach highlights the distinctly sociological way that people construct their beliefs and 
identities in reference to others in society, rather than assuming that nonreligious people 
simply have a lack of cultural engagement with religion altogether.  
 This definition has an important advantage for researchers interested in the full 
range of nonreligious beliefs and perspectives: it does not force us to treat nonreligion as 
a single identity category, but rather as a package of beliefs and behaviors in both 
personal and public life. As we have seen so far, the structural conditions that ultimately 
produce religious disaffiliation pull in two different directions. For some, nonreligion is 
active; it produces a coherent set of beliefs, practices, and affinities that structure how 
people engage in the social world. For others, nonreligion is anomic; it is a product of 
institutional “drift” in which people generally distrust, and disaffiliate from, longstanding 
institutions in American civic life. As I detail in Chapter Two, much of the existing 
research on nonreligion treats it as a single identity category. Treating the nonreligious as 
a single demographic group alone, the way researchers are used to treating Catholics, 
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evangelicals, or other religious denominations, risks obscuring this difference and 
masking important differences in political outcomes within this group.  
 The left panel of Figure 1.3 illustrates the stakes of this problem by plotting the 
self-reported strength of belief in god and church attendance for all of the individuals 
with no religious affiliation in the cumulative General Social Survey. There is a 
discernible pattern of low or infrequent church attendance across this group, but also 
substantive variation in how much the nonreligious report believing in god. Many 
unaffiliated respondents actually look substantively similar to low-attending affiliated 
respondents, and it is also possible that many affiliated respondents are substantively 
nonreligious themselves. This preliminary descriptive look illustrates the merit of 
investigating variation within the nonreligious to explain the presence of different 
religious commitments and orientations, rather than simply comparing the affiliated and 
the unaffiliated alone.  
 Using only these three measures of identification, attendance, and beliefs, we can 
already see that the unaffiliated have a variety of potential repertoires of nonreligion 
when it comes to personal expressions. In addition to the conventional expectation that 
the unaffiliated would report low scores on each measure, a sizable proportion “belong 
without believing” (Davie 1990), and others “believe without belonging” (Kasselstrand 
2015) The preceding examples also show that there are a also a variety of public 
nonreligious repertoires available to people, ranging form New Atheism to a broader 
progressive vision for secular social justice. This variation produces different contexts for 
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how nonreligious individuals understand themselves in relation to others in the public 
sphere. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate how we can distinguish two examples of these 
different cultural repertoires of nonreligion: a personal repertoire primarily concerned 
with low individual engagement with religion (Pearce and Denton 2011), and a public 
repertoire concerned with beliefs about the role religion should play in the public sphere 
(Delehanty et al. 2019). Measuring these repertoires separately captures substantive 
variation in nonreligious beliefs and behaviors without relying on respondents’ self 
identification alone. It also allows us to parse out the aspects of political life where 
religious disaffiliation is likely to have the greatest impact. 
The Political Stakes of Nonreligion 
 Social scientists have an aversion to studying “nothing.” We want to see people 
developing movements and working together to forge communities. Much of the political 
action in the U.S. over the past fifty years has come from movements tied to identity 
politics. Civil rights, women’s rights, the New Christian Right, the LGBTQ movement, 
and Black Lives Matter are all illustrative examples of organized demands for political 
change in the interests of people who share a particular social location (e.g. McAdam 
1986, Taylor 1989, Fetner 2008, Milkman 2017). In response to these movements, 
scholars often turn to demographic change as a leading indicator for political analysis, 
forecasting changes based on which groups are gaining and losing in the population and, 
therefore, stand to become key players in new coalitions (e.g. Jang 2009; Jones 2016, 
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Leighley and Nagler 2013; Ramakrishnan 2005). The rise of nonreligion raises questions 
about whether unaffiliated people will cohere into a similar voting bloc—a secular left to 
compliment the religious right. To do so, most research expects that nonreligious 
Americans would need to show up consistently, express coherent interests on political 
issues, and generate a sufficient institutional infrastructure to sustain that activity. In 
short, we would need to see coordinated trends in their political engagement, opinion 
formation, and organized advocacy.  
 Research on each of these fronts for nonreligious people shows mixed results that 
I discuss in detail in each of the following chapters. Briefly, current work suggests that 
nonreligious people are less engaged than their religious counterparts, consistently liberal 
in their opinion formation, and looking primarily to challenge religious policymaking in 
their advocacy. These trends provide mixed evidence for the backlash and drift 
hypotheses. Studies of voting and volunteering suggest that religious disaffiliation 
generally correlates with other kinds of civic disengagement, supporting drift theories of 
disaffiliation. Conversely, studies of public opinion find nonreligious respondents are 
consistently more liberal across a variety of political issues, supporting the backlash 
theory. Finally, research on the organizing and advocacy practices of secular groups in the 
U.S. finds that these organizations are closely tied to the presence of religious advocacy
—many of these groups’ stated missions focus on maintaining the separation of church 
and state and reducing the political influence of interest groups on the Religious Right. 
These findings beg the question of whether such groups have developed a sufficient 
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nonreligious policy agenda of their own, or are merely seeking to influence a narrow 
range of issues in specific, local contexts and court battles.  
 Both the backlash and the drift theories share a common assumption about 
nonreligion: they assume that the choice to leave religious institutions is an outcome of 
other structural considerations. For the backlash theory, religious affiliation is 
endogenous to political identities such that disaffiliation follows from progressive 
political affinities (Hout and Fischer 2014; Margolis 2018; Putnam and Campbell 2012). 
For drift theories, religious disaffiliation is endogenous to economic considerations such 
that increased time pressures, precarious labor, and the disruption of small communal 
living all produce environments in which bonds to religious communities are weaker and 
more difficult to maintain (Putnam 2001). Because both of these accounts treat 
disaffiliation as an outcome of other social forces, they minimize the relevance of 
nonreligion to future political concerns after a person disaffiliates. But this leaves mixed 
findings about engagement, opinion, and advocacy unexplained—we do not necessarily 
understand the deciding mechanism for which social force ultimately “wins out” for 
nonreligious people in political life. What explains the hold of the backlash theory in 
some cases and the drift theory in others? 
 The right panel of Figure 1.3 shows why this question is important. Like the left-
hand panel, this plot looks at the distribution of unaffiliated respondents on measures of 
self-reported political ideology and party identification. The thick black square in the 
bottom left is expected by current research in the backlash theory. However, it is also 
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important to note the sizable number of unaffiliated respondents who identify as 
moderate and politically independent, trends that we would expect to fit the drift theory. 
The political variation within the unaffiliated is not explored as often in this literature, 
and it provides a starting point to justify updating current theories of religious 
disaffiliation.   
 Research in political sociology warns us that demography is not destiny. 
Demographic changes are filtered through institutional cultures—powerful social forces 
that shape everything from who can vote (e.g. Manza and Uggen 2008; Wang 2012), to 
who is motivated to vote by a compelling story that links their beliefs to political 
behavior (e.g. Bean 2014), to who ultimately has their voices heard in the public sphere 
and by policymakers (Bartels 2009; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Perrin 2014). The political 
beliefs of demographic groups are not uniform, as we can see in political subcultures like 
Black Republicans, Log Cabin Republicans, and leftist evangelical monastic groups 
(Fields 2016; Markofski 2015; Rogers and Lott 2016). Without attention to these 
institutional and cultural mechanisms, theories that see religion only as endogenous risk 
missing the fact that interest groups have to do a lot of work to maintain a shared sense of 
identity, and that institutions can exploit identity categories to stymie reform efforts 
(Gamson 1995; Giddens; 1991; Goldstein and Rayner 1994; Massengil 2008).  
 Most importantly, the work that goes into maintaining an identity-based 
movement or community organization can fail, because perfectly normal people do a 
whole lot of nothing. They don’t care about politics all the time, they don’t always join 
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formal organizations, and they don’t always worry about whether or not they have a rich 
sense of community in their lives. This reality means the political culture of non-activists 
often gets the short shrift in research, because the average citizen often falls short on 
measures of engagement, opinion formation, and organized advocacy. First, the average 
citizen does not seem to show up very often, and low rates of voter turnout, volunteering, 
and other forms of civic engagement raise questions about the viability of new political 
movements (Brady et al. 1995; Putnam 2001; Smets and Van Ham 2013). Second, the 
average citizen does not necessarily express consistent, ideologically sophisticated, and 
informed opinions on specific issues (e.g. Converse 1962; Fiorina et al. 2005; Kinder 
1983). Third, the rise of moneyed interest in politics leads institutional-level analysis to 
focus on more immediate, material concerns as the primary structuring forces of political 
life (e.g. Domhoff 1967; Walker and Rea 2014). This assumes that questions about where 
the money and power lie pre-determine who will wield cultural influence. Culture, 
especially mass culture, is often seen as endogenous to political systems—a 
superstructure that the economic or institutional base will control (e.g. Aldrich 2011; 
Carsey and Layman 2006; Knight 1992). 
 The problem with these theories is that they rely on what Lizardo (2017) calls the 
“declarative” aspects of culture, expecting it to produce conscious, agenda-driven 
narratives that spur political engagement and that respondents can talk about in a 
sophisticated way. They also expect a particular kind of declarative statement: specific 
affinities that people link directly and consistently to policy interests. In the case of 
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religion and politics, these theories take a “belief-centered” approach to religion that 
expects citizens and activists to directly translate their view of religious doctrine to policy 
prescriptions, aided by the elite influence of religious institutions and leaders (e.g. 
Chaves 2010; Edgell 2012). This risks missing other declarative political statements that 
might be relevant to respondents’ political engagement, such as their substantive 
understanding of who can legitimately participate in public life as a citizen (e.g. 
Alexander and Smith 1993; Smith 2003) or their inferred knowledge about what policies 
actually do (Martin and Desmond 2010). It also risks missing the way culture shapes non-
declarative aspects of political engagement, such as feelings of political efficacy or latent 
evaluations of candidates or policies that are driven more by implicit “snap" judgements 
than deliberative cognition (e.g. Lizardo et al. 2016; Vaisey 2009).  
 In the study of engagement, opinion, and advocacy, recent work across the social 
sciences is challenging our conventional assumptions about the nature of political 
activity. For example, where some scholars argue that civic engagement is declining, 
others ask “what kind of civic engagement are we talking about?” As Patricia Hill Collins 
(2010) argues, concern about declining participation in formal community organizations 
may miss a whole range of informal organizing practices in poor communities and 
communities of color. Political apathy is not just the absence of awareness, mobilization, 
or activity; it takes a substantive amount of collective cultural work to maintain an 
apathetic stance toward politics. Nina Eliasoph’s research with local community and 
volunteer groups (1990, 1998) shows how apathy about politics is a distinct style of 
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political engagement that requires actors to police non-partisan spaces in their church or 
around the dinner table, and they nonetheless still produce ways of thinking about 
politics. In this work, patterns of civic action are much more variable and context-
dependent, rather than simply declining (Lichterman and Eliasoph 2014).   
 On the opinion front, research is demonstrating that people who are not 
necessarily experts on the intricacies of public policy are nonetheless able to express 
views that are coherent and consistent with their broader assumptions about the nature of 
community and authority in public life. Political ideology serves existential, epistemic, 
and relational needs (Jost et al. 2009, 2013), and people are capable of giving answers to 
survey questions that express their identities, elective affinities, and received assumptions 
about the nature of the political world (Perrin et al. 2014; Perrin and McFarland 2011). 
Recent work demonstrates how culture is influential in shaping how elites and everyday 
citizens engage in politics and express their interests, rather than just providing them with 
a common list of preferred policies to achieve (e.g. Becker 1998; Bean 2014; Binder and 
Wood 2013; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski and Gidron 2016; Eliasoph 
1990; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Lichterman 2008; Smilde and Zubrycki 2016). In 
short, understanding public opinion as the expression of different cultural affinities opens 
up the possibility to identify useful and coherent trends in opinion formation, even if 
those trends are limited by respondents’ factual knowledge of any given issue.  
 Finally, at the institutional level, work on social fields and networks shows how 
cultural and emotional considerations diffuse into institutional arrangements, structuring 
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how actors operate in relation to one another (e.g. Bourdieu 1991; Dromi 2016; Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012; Kucinskas 2014; Medvetz 2012; Small and Sukhu 2016) and how 
practices from the fringes of fields can come to dominate the mainstream (e.g. Bail 
2014). Material resources do structure these relationships, but the development of a field 
is fundamentally one of struggle across multiple fronts—both material and cultural—
where socially skilled actors can also forge new cultural strategies for advantage, 
organizations copy one another, and once obscure or fringe interpretations of the social 
world can quickly become mainstream.  
 These three bodies of research converge on a key insight: since social life is about 
relationships, it is a dramaturgical process as people perform their roles for others. Social 
actors forge performances for others in different contexts, according to different 
repertoires, and with varied levels of success (Alexander 2004, 2013; Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012). Studies of political life that emphasize these dramaturgical processes are 
distinctly sociological and represent a place to bring culture back into our analysis. For 
identity politics, this insight helps explain why the link between identity and interests is 
slippery, and not every group can successfully forge a shared repertoire of action 
(Gamson 1995; Goldstein and Rayner 1994). For religion, this pushes us past a belief-
centered understanding of religion as a set of ideological commitments to focus on how 
religion produces multifaceted repertoires through which people use beliefs, identities, 
and relationships with others to make sense of everyday life (Edgell 2012).  
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 By integrating insights from cultural sociology, social psychology, and political 
science, we find that an absence of declarative activism does not necessarily indicate an 
absence of coherent cultural repertoires that people can use to make sense of politics. 
There is more work to be done for researchers to map both instances of political 
engagement and non-engagement across different groups to better explain the 
institutional and cultural forces that shape those choices. In cases of apathy or 
inconsistency, just like physicists studying dark matter, social scientists can delve into the 
“nothing,” interrogate the assumptions behind that nothing, and often find something 
noteworthy that can help us better understand the reality of social life. Because 
nonreligion means different things to different people, a theory that is sensitive to 
different cultural repertoires of nonreligion can help to explain divergent outcomes across 
engagement, opinion, and advocacy across this group. 
Outline of the Project 
 This dissertation uses nonreligion as a case to advance our understanding of the 
role of cultural change in American politics at the micro level among individuals and at 
the meso level among organizations and advocacy groups. One of the key insights of a 
cultural approach for this work is that being nonreligious does not necessarily indicate a 
lack of substantive beliefs or preferences. Those without religious beliefs or identities are 
not lacking culture; they have their own sets of cultural repertoires that they use to make 
sense of the social world. There are also different repertories of nonreligion—not every 
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unaffiliated individual agrees on the nature of community, religious authority, or religious 
practice. Unlike other, more well established movements, however, nonreligious 
Americans are rarely targeted by political elites as a key coalition to mobilize in the 
electorate (Domke and Coe 2008).  The field of nonreligious organizations is still 
nascent, showing the most dramatic growth over the past fifteen years (Cimino and Smith 
2014; García and Blankholm 2016). This means that nonreligious repertoires are still 
emergent and less coordinated by elite signaling than other religious repertoires and 
ideologies (e.g. Massengil 2008).   
 As a result, I argue that nonreligious Americans provide a key boundary case to 
study how substantive cultural differences can create divergent political trends from the 
same demographic group, and how scholars can take a better approach to studying the 
political culture of non-activists. Many popular observations and predictions about the 
political impact of this group are still, at best, conjecture. By rigorously evaluating 
empirical patterns in political engagement, public opinion, and collective organizing, we 
can better understand how emerging coalitions develop political ideologies. By focusing 
on different nonreligious repertoires of political engagement, we can find a renewed role 
for culture in studies of identity politics and mobilization. 
 Chapter Two reviews the research to date on religious disaffiliation, explains why 
we need a new approach to studying it, and outlines a method for that approach. While 
many Americans do leave religious institutions for political reasons, those are only one 
set of possible motivations. Many more are also being raised entirely outside religious 
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institutions and growing up with more secular social networks. Additionally, nonreligion 
is not necessarily a stable identity category in the U.S. population. Because of both 
stigma and social drift, many “nones” change their religious affiliation over time. All of 
these factors create an important measurement problem for the study of nonreligion: 
misclassification. Since much of the research to date considers nonreligion a discrete 
identity category much like a religious denomination, this work risks missing a sizable 
portion of respondents who are substantively nonreligious, but identify as something else. 
Instead, Chapter Two argues that we need to move past the typical survey categories to 
substantively define and measure different aspects of nonreligion using as wide a variety 
of measures as possible. I define and validate two distinct cultural repertoires of 
nonreligion, one focused on personal affinities and one focused on public life, and I 
empirically validate those repertoires in three survey data sets.  
 Chapters Three, Four, and Five then take the insights of this measurement 
approach and apply them to three questions at three different points of the political 
process. Each chapter uses nonreligion as a specific empirical case study to address a 
broader questions of interest to the study of political culture. In Chapter Three, I examine 
whether civic disengagement “spills over” across different institutional domains, or 
whether people who opt out of one kind of institution can renew their participation in 
another. This theoretical question begins with a simple empirical question: are 
nonreligious Americans more or less likely to vote than their religiously affiliated 
counterparts? Rather than simply comparing categories of respondents, however, I use an 
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approach that can examine the effects of different kinds of religious non-affiliation and 
non-identification on validated measures of voter turnout. Doing so raises important 
findings that challenge existing theories of religion and political participation.  
 Chapter Four examines public opinion, and investigates whether the increased 
partisanship of religious identification corresponds with alignment on policy views 
(Baldassari and Gelaman 2008). Do people simply lean on non-religious identities for 
political signals, or do their group identifications provide cultural repertoires that 
constrain issue preferences? This chapter uses the personal and public nonreligious 
repertoires developed in Chapter Two to examine whether respondents in two nationally-
representative surveys comport their policy views on three core issue domains in line 
with these repertoires. Doing so allows me to map substantive differences in how 
respondents evaluate questions about the social safety net, racial inequality, and 
immigration policy, and provides new insight into how cultural repertoires of nonreligion 
may influence each of these core policy domains, even in the absence of targeted elite 
framing efforts.  
 Chapter Five turns to examine the political work of nonreligious advocacy groups. 
While we are used to observing the role of the Religious Right as a contentious social 
movement operating at the “front stage” of political life, recent research suggests that it 
has had the most success at policy reform through “back stage” processes of conventional 
lobbying in what Kucinskas (2014) calls “unobtrusive organizing” (Sager and Bentele 
2016). Past research has also examined the front stage of secular political organizing (e.g. 
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Blankholm 2014; García and Blankholm 2017; Kettell 2014; LeDrew 2015). Using a 
mixed method analysis of lobbying data and tax records from 40 nonreligious advocacy 
groups, I trace the back stage development of a national network committed to advancing 
particular cultural repertories of nonreligion. The relationships in this organizational 
network illustrate how many groups have cultivated a focus on identities through 
personal repertoires of nonreligion. However, this focus closes off connections to larger 
organizations that focus on a broader agenda of public nonreligion committed to lobbying 
on a range of issues related to the separation of church and state. As a result, new 
nonreligious organizations often fall short in shaping policy as they currently lack the 
back stage institutional infrastructure of their religious counterparts. 
Moving Forward 
 Together, these chapters show how focusing on cultural repertories of nonreligion 
can illuminate distinct trends in contemporary political life. Research on nonreligious 
organizations and advocacy groups suggests that trends in public opinion are not 
necessarily the result of elite organizers pushing a political agenda—in fact many of these 
organizations analyzed in Chapter Five never touch the core issues in Chapter Four. As a 
result, studying nonreligious Americans provides us with a unique case study to examine 
how political changes emerge from cultural changes independently of the efforts of 
movement leaders and partisan elites. This has implications for scholars interested in 
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culture and public opinion, civic engagement, religion and non-religion, and organizing 
efforts to spur political movements.  
 For scholars of culture and political psychology, this study synthesizes recent 
insights across both fields to advocate for a more culturally sophisticated approach to the 
study of public opinion. Rather than narrowly considering policy preferences and 
political interests, this approach understands survey response as respondents’ stylistic 
expression of identities and affinities (e.g. Goren 2013; Goren and Chapp 2017; Federico, 
et al. 2013; Perrin and McFarland 2011; Perrin et al. 2014). Taking such an approach 
improves our understanding of how political preferences align with respondents’ moral 
foundations, but also how different social arrangements condition variation in the 
expression of those moral foundations.  
 For political scientists and researchers interested in political institutions, this 
study offers a look into the emergence of a new advocacy network and the diffusion of 
culture across relationships and advocacy practices in nonreligious organizations. 
Building on research on religious advocacy work (e.g. Hofrenning 1995; Kucinskas 
2014; Lindsay 2008; Sager 2011; Sager and Bentele 2016) and early explorations of 
nonreligious advocacy (e.g. Blankholm 2014; Kettell 2013; 2014), this comprehensive 
examination of the emerging national field of nonreligious organizations demonstrates 
how cultural factors—such as varied repertoires of nonreligion—affect the emergence of 
organizations drawing on multiple forms of social capital. 
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 For scholars of religion, this work highlights the importance of a core theoretical 
distinction between private religious commitments and the expression of religion in 
public life, one that has important implications for the way research explains the 
relationship between religion and public opinion, prejudice and tolerance, and civic 
engagement (Whitehead and Perry 2015; Perry and Whitehead 2015; Stewart et al. 2018). 
Throughout this work, we will see that public religious repertoires offer improved 
explanatory power over considering private religious engagement alone. By drawing on a 
cultural sociology of religion (Edgell 2012), many of these findings about nonreligious 
Americans also provide generative insights that will improve measurement and theory for 
studying the role of religion in public life.  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Chapter 2: Measuring Nonreligion 
Personal & Public Repertoires 
 Religious disaffiliation has spurred interest across social science—in sociology (e.g 
Edgell et al. 2006, 2016; Hout and Fischer 2002; 2014; Manning 2015; Schnabel and 
Bock 2017; Smith and Cragun 2019; Sumerau and Cragun 2016; Zuckerman 2011), 
political science (e.g. Brockway 2018; Layman and Weaver 2016), psychology (e.g. 
Gervais and Najle 2018; Silver et al. 2014), and history (e.g. Schmidt 2016). This interest 
has produced a range of qualitative and quantitative work on the demographic 
characteristics and culture of people who are not religious, including their lived 
experiences, community and identity formation, and participation in social activism.  
 Social science benefits from this variety of methodological approaches and 
theoretical interpretations of what nonreligion means in different contexts—for debates 
about secularization and social change (e.g. Gorski and Altinordu 2008), for international 
comparative work (e.g. Voas and Chaves 2016; Wilkins-Laflame 2017), and for 
understanding how people piece together religious belief, belonging, and behavior in an 
increasingly pluralistic religious landscape (e.g. Ammerman 2014; Marshall 2002; Pearce 
and Denton 2011; Wilcox 2009).  
 In light of these benefits, however, the study of nonreligion also faces a 
methodological problem: do we define people who are not particularly religious as an 
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identity category (indicating a difference in kind) or focus on measuring their substantive 
beliefs and affinities (indicating a difference of degree)? In this chapter, I argue that much 
of the current research on religious disaffiliation treats the unaffiliated as a category. 
When research in this field innovates, it often does so by calling for data disaggregation
—splitting the broad category of “none” or “nothing in particular” into more finely 
grained categories that can highlight atheists,“spiritual but not religious” respondents, and 
more.  
 This categorical approach creates useful knowledge about these subgroups, but it 
is also limited by two problems. First, it creates an increasingly complicated terrain of 
terminologies and typologies to categorize nonreligion that is not harmonized across 
subfields (Lee 2012). For example, some studies separate people who identify as atheists 
and agnostics from those who choose “nothing in particular” on a self-identification 
survey item. Others make similar distinctions, but use self-reported belief in god. These 
studies are using the same terminology to label different categories, and each can 
generate different results from studies that consider “nones” as a single group. Social 
science also benefits from research that synthesizes these fine-grained distinctions to 
provide clear concepts that can capture different kinds of nonreligion and apply those 
measurements coherently across disciplines (Guhin 2014; Steensland 2009).  
 Second, categorical approaches to studying nonreligion invite a classification 
problem. As we saw in Chapter One, nonreligion is not just the absence of religious 
culture or socialization. It means different things to different people, and so researchers’ 
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decisions about identity categories are susceptible to three challenges that I detail below: 
social desirability bias where people underreport nonreligion, classification error where 
people are excluded from analysis because their identity categories contrast with 
researchers’ categories, and respondent switching where people change their religious 
affiliation over time. All three of these problems create a situation in which people who 
are substantively nonreligious are excluded from analysis, potentially biasing results.  
 Researchers are used to treating religiosity as a spectrum of different beliefs, 
behaviors, and identities. To address these challenges, research on nonreligion also needs 
to capture substantive variation in beliefs and practices (Baker and Smith 2015). Cultural 
approaches to the study of religion help to address this problem, because they emphasize 
the way beliefs and practices intersect with each other and with broader assumptions 
about the role of religion in social life (Edgell 2012) to inform different repertoires of 
religious experience. By taking a cultural approach to nonreligion, this chapter provides a 
method that can help research across social science subfields. I argue that research needs 
to implement two changes: first, it need to supplement categorical analyses with 
continuous measures of substantive religious engagement whenever possible to address 
the challenges outlined above. It is perfectly fine to compare different categories of 
religion and nonreligion, but research also needs to address the robustness of those 
comparisons by using alternative measures that cut across these categories. Second, these 
continuous measures need to incorporate a key theoretical distinction: the difference 
between personal and public repertoires of nonreligion. Analysis below demonstrates that 
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public and personal nonreligious repertoires are related to one another, but also 
analytically distinct measures that capture different aspects of respondents’ religious 
commitments. 
 First, I anchor a cultural approach in an interdisciplinary review of literature on 
nonreligion, arguing that many of the theoretical models currently offered hint at a broad 
distinction between different kinds of personal and public nonreligion. To address this 
theoretical possibility and evaluate it empirically, I modify a strategy from work in 
sociology and political science that distinguishes low religious engagement from 
respondents’ active endorsement of secular beliefs (Delehanty et al. 2019; Layman and 
Weaver 2016; Stewart et al. 2018). Following work on the cultural turn in the sociology 
of religion, my approach treats nonreligion not as a difference in kind the way one would 
discuss denominational affiliation, but as a difference of degree across two different 
cultural repertoires: personal nonreligion focused on personal beliefs and practices and 
public nonreligion grounded in how respondents understand the role of religious 
authority in the public sphere (Caplow et al. 1983; Lee 2015; Sumerau and Cragun 2016; 
Quack 2014). Results from three survey data sets show that a distinction between public 
and personal nonreligion is present across different response patterns to different items, 
that there is substantive variation in each measure among both religiously affiliated and 
unaffiliated respondents, and that the personal repertoire is more closely associated with 
nonreligious identities while the public repertoire is more closely associated with a basic 
measure of political ideology. Attending to the public/personal distinction is one way to 
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harmonize findings about nonreligious populations and to advance social scientific 
research by clarifying measurement constructs and making them explicit. These results 
also caution researchers not to infer political positions directly from personal 
nonreligious repertoires.  
Typologies of Nonreligion 
 Research offers different ways to measure religiosity as a spectrum, typically 
distinguishing certainty of religious beliefs, frequency of behaviors such as prayer and 
attendance at religious services, and strength of commitments through personal salience 
and religious belonging (Cornwall et al. 1986 Davidson and Knudsen 1977: Wimberley 
1989; Marshall 2002; Pearce and Denton 2011). More recently, additional work on 
Christian Nationalism and the public expression of religiosity has also introduced a new 
measurement dimension that attends specifically to how people feel religion should be 
integrated into public life (Delehanty et al. 2019; Whitehead et al. 2017; Stewart et al. 
2018). 
 With such a variety of measures to capture different aspects of religiosity, what 
defines nonreligion? Early work on the topic uses a simple definition with a categorical 
measure focused on the religiously unaffiliated who select “none” on survey items 
inviting religious identification. Prior to 2000, this number was smaller than fifteen 
percent of the U.S. population. While it has risen steadily since, the relatively small 
number of respondents in this category encouraged early research to move in one of three 
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directions: to compare affiliated and unaffiliated respondents on outcome measures of 
interest to assess the nature of religious disaffiliation alone (e.g. Hout and Fischer 2002, 
Vargas and Loveland 2011), to include nonreligious respondents along with other smaller 
religious minority groups in a catch-all categories for “other” religion, or to focus on 
smaller, more targeted subsamples of the unaffiliated, such as atheists (e.g. Cimino and 
Smith 2012; Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006; LeDrew 2015).  
 More comprehensive studies of nonreligion include a variety of measures for 
belief, belonging, and behavior (e.g. Keysar 2014; Sherkat 2008). However, many of 
these approaches in survey research focus on using these measures to create more 
categorical distinctions for different “types” of nonreligion based on some combination of 
beliefs and practices. For example, Hout and Fischer’s (2002, 2014) pioneering analysis 
of religious disaffiliation finds that many people who choose no religious affiliation 
nonetheless express belief in god or other religious commitments. In their approach, 
religious disaffiliation is primarily about leaving religious institutions, leading them to 
describe the group as “unchurched believers.” Baker and Smith (2009, 2015) build on 
this category and demonstrate how research can find many substantive differences 
between unchurched believers, atheists, and agnostics. In contrast, Sherkat (2008) focuses 
on explicit distinctions in theistic certainty, rather than self-identification, comparing the 
demographic predictors of atheism, agnosticism, and doubting belief in god. The contrast 
between identification and beliefs also overlaps, as self-identified atheists exhibit 
different sociodemographic traits from non-believers who do not identify as atheists 
!34
(Stewart 2016). Most importantly for this project, such work finds that atheists and 
agnostics express stronger progressive political views that unchurched believers. These 
identity sub-categories within the unaffiliated as a whole have meaningful stakes for 
political research, as they may be proxies for other ideological considerations.  
 When research considers other measures outside of these conventional metrics for 
religiosity, it often finds good reason to further subdivide the unchurched believers. For 
example, researchers have also identified a growing number of people in the United 
States who self-identify as “spiritual, but not religious” (McClure 2017). While SBNRs 
and unchurched believers share a similar skepticism of religious institutions, SBNRs also 
pursue alternative practices and meaningful community ties that can provide comparable 
social goods to conventional religious communities (Besecke 2014; Mercadante 2014). 
Other work in political science interested in the mobilization of nonreligious people 
raises a distinction between “active” or “committed” seculars and “passive” seculars 
(Brockway 2018; Layman and Weaver 2016). In this typology, active seculars treat 
nonreligion as an “affirmative identification with and commitment to secular views of the 
world” (Layman and Weaver 2016:276), agreeing with survey items that emphasize the 
role of factual evidence, philosophy, science, and reason in making moral decisions. 
Passive seculars, on the other hand, exhibit low engagement on conventional measures of 
religious belief, belonging, or behavior without expressing these ideological affinities.     
The Problem With Typologies 
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 These typologies have been quite useful for scholarship that is interested in 
nonreligion as a new and growing set of identities outside of conventional religious 
institutions. However, they also invite challenges for researchers who are interested in the 
full range of people who choose not to affiliate with religious institutions for two reasons. 
First, not everyone who disaffiliates develops a coherent and salient personal identity 
around that disaffiliation. Second, identity-based claims are not the only mechanism 
through which religious considerations impact other aspects of social life. One important 
takeaway from the research reviewed here and in Chapter One is that the nonreligious are 
not a single, unified identity group, but a large and diverse body of people with a variety 
of religious experiences.  
 This variation is especially important when we start to try to harmonize findings 
across social science subfields. Lee (2012) outlines a number of problems for social 
science when these subfields do not use consistent terminology to refer to people without 
a religious affiliation. For example, survey items indicating “active secularism” for 
Layman and Weaver (2016:280) and Brockway (2018) include prompts such as “factual 
evidence from the natural world is the source of true beliefs,” and “the great works of 
philosophy and science are the best source of truth, wisdom, and ethics.” Other work on 
secular social movements (e.g. Cimino and Smith 2014; LeDrew 2015; Kettell 2014) 
supports this measurement strategy, but with one important caveat: these ideological 
statements emerge from the discourse of movement atheism. The organizations that 
advance these views integrate them into their construction of what it means to identify as 
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an atheist (Smith 2013), producing a distinct package of personal nonreligious beliefs, 
moral philosophy, social authority, and communal identity that is not widely shared 
among the majority of religiously unaffiliated respondents. If this operationalization is 
tied to the packaging efforts of movement atheism, “active secularism” can be a useful 
proxy for this kind of group affinity and ideology, but it does not necessarily capture the 
considerations that the majority of nonreligious respondents may bring to bear on their 
political decisions. Putting research on the nonreligious from sociology and political 
science into conversation shows us how using different measurement strategies risks 
capturing only a distinct and limited subset of the full range of nonreligious respondents. 
 In addition to the theoretical challenge of speaking across different fields and 
measurement approaches, a categorical approach to studying nonreligion creates three 
empirical challenges that can bias results. The first is social desirability bias, and research 
on atheism presents a classic example of this challenge at work. In the United States, 
anti-atheist sentiment is persistent and durable, and research demonstrates that negative 
attitudes toward atheists can also “spill over” and structure respondents’ views about 
nonreligion more broadly (Edgell et al. 2016). Researchers have long suspected that 
many kind of nonreligious identification, especially atheism, are underreported. Basic 
descriptive statistics bear this out; approximately 10% of the U.S. population reports that 
they do not believe in god, while only about 4% of the population self identifies as an 
atheist (Pew 2014). Experimental studies assessing this possibility with unmatched count 
techniques demonstrate this underreporting and estimate that the actual proportion of 
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people who do not believe in god could be as high as 26% (Gervais and Najle 2018). 
Other observational studies indicate that women and people of color, for example, are 
more likely to take on a less-stigmatized nonreligious identity such as nothing in 
particular or spiritual but not religious than a more stigmatized identity like 
“atheist” (Edgell et al. 2017; Hutchinson In Press). Given this work, studies that rely on 
self-identification questions to establish their nonreligious categories risk missing or 
misclassifying a large number of respondents who do not feel comfortable identifying as 
such, even if their substantive religious beliefs or behaviors are more closely aligned with 
more stigmatized identity categories. 
 The second challenge for research is respondent misclassification due to the gap 
between categories that are researcher-defined (etic) and respondent-defined (emic). A 
core example here is scholarly debate about the validity of the category “spiritual, but not 
religious.” Nancy Ammerman (2013, 2014) presents an empirical challenge to this 
category with interview data that demonstrates how people actually combine a wide 
variety of “spiritual” and “religious” considerations in different ways; some closely align 
the two in a conventional theistic package, while others focus on manifestations of 
spirituality in the natural world or in everyday compassion that are not necessarily 
replacing religious engagement. However, other work suggests that the defining feature 
of SBNRs is their skepticism of organized religious institutions, where respondents use 
the identity term itself to convey a very specific meaning about their relationship to those 
institutions (Besecke 2014; Mercadante 2014). Moreover, the belief systems and lived 
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experiences of respondents may be converging with their identities. McClure (2017) 
identifies coherent patterns in survey data in which SBNR-identified respondents exhibit 
unique views of god and moral authority that distinguish them from respondents with 
other religious identifications. Together, this work demonstrates how research can use the 
category SBNR meaningfully, but also that researchers need to carefully consider the use 
of this term for their specific analytic goals, rather than assuming both they and their 
respondents agree on what the term conveys.  
 The third and perhaps most important problem for categorical studies of 
nonreligion is religious switching and the presence of what researchers call “liminal 
nones” (Hout 2017; Lim et al. 2010). Liminal nones are people who change their 
identification back and forth from affiliated to unaffiliated over time and across waves of 
survey panel data. Using panel data from the General Social Survey, Hout (2017) 
estimates that liminals comprise up to 20% of the U.S. population. The presence of this 
group reduces the proportion of unaffiliated respondents that research can treat as a 
substantive identity group, because it raises the possibility of both actual religious 
switching (Sherkat 2014) and error in respondents’ reporting of their religious identities. 
If many nonreligious individuals are indeed liminal and change their unaffiliated status 
over time, it may not always be appropriate to classify the nonreligious as a coherent 
group the way one would speak about Catholics or Mormons. 
 All three of these potential errors demonstrate the limitations of treating 
nonreligion as a category and relying on survey measures of religious identification that 
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offer “none” as an option. The core methodological problem across all of these examples 
is that research risks missing people who are substantively nonreligious in their beliefs or 
behaviors, but do not necessarily check the proper box on survey questions about identity. 
In Chapter One, we saw the potential stakes of this classification error by looking at the 
range in religious belief and attendance among people in the “none” category. Chapter 
Three will further highlight the empirical stakes of this problem in cases like voter 
turnout, where similar issues with selection bias in who gets labeled as a “voter” can 
change our understanding of patterns in civic engagement. Here, I present a solution to 
these classification problems. By focusing on a cultural approach to measuring 
nonreligion—one that can take the packaging of different beliefs, affinities, and behaviors 
seriously and foreground it analytically—we can alleviate this problem.  
A Cultural Approach to Studying Nonreligion 
 The sociology of religion has been defined by different paradigms over the years, 
many of which concern what people believe and how they choose their religious 
communities. For example, the secularization paradigm concerned itself with whether 
people would lose their religious beliefs and commitments as societies became more 
wealthy and more highly educated (see Gorski and Altinordu (2008) for a comprehensive 
review), rational choice theories of religion focused more on the benefits of religious 
adherence and religious choice, including mutual social commitment and the existential 
benefits of “strict” religious communities (e.g. Finke and Stark 1989, Iannaconne 1994), 
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while other paradigms focus on the unique institutional flexibility of American religious 
groups to innovate and meet the needs of social change and individual religious seeking 
(Madsen 2009; Warner 1993).  
 The challenge for many of these paradigms is that they ultimately end up trying to 
adjudicate “authentic” religious commitments. The secularization paradigm, for example, 
becomes invested in empirically determining whether people are actually showing up at 
church (Hadaway et al. 1993) or whether sufficiently “strong” religious commitments are 
actually on the decline (see recent debates between Schnabel and Bock (2017, 2018) and 
Voas and Chaves (2016, 2018)). This problem drives the theoretical conflict outlined in 
Chapter One: scholars focused on religious disaffiliation have become very invested in 
two competing theories of breaking and drifting, and figuring out which one is correct 
requires establishing what people “really believe” about their religious commitments. 
Break theory proposes that people have substantive commitments that inform their choice 
to break from religious communities, while drift theory assumes that people lack 
sufficient and substantive commitments to remain tied to those communities.  
 In contrast to these authenticity questions, other work draws on perspectives in 
the sociology of culture that focus on how and when people use shared meanings in their 
lives (e.g. Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Sewell Jr. 1992; Swidler 1986). In this 
perspective, culture is not a static doctrine to which people adhere, but a set of available 
repertoires of action that they can apply in different social contexts. Research on lived 
religion, for example, takes as its analytic focus the way that people enact their religious 
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identities and perspectives in everyday life, sometimes inconsistently applying their 
beliefs, behaviors, and identities (e.g. Ammerman 2014; Riesebrodt 2010). Other research 
brings in work on culture and cognition to argue that this inconsistency in religious 
expression is the norm, and that to expect consistency and congruency between religious 
beliefs, affinities, and practice is a fallacy (Chaves 2010). Theories of religious 
complexity argue that religion intersects with other social locations—such as race and 
social class—and that these intersections substantively change religious expression in 
social life (Wilde and Glassman 2016; Yukich and Edgell 2019).  
 In a review of much of this work, Penny Edgell (2012) calls these approaches a 
“cultural sociology of religion”—one that foregrounds how both elites and everyday 
people package together different combinations of religious beliefs, affinities, and 
practices into repertories of action that fit the context of different institutions and 
different social locations. People use these different repertoires to make sense of the 
world around them, and their religious commitments are always in conversation with 
their other social locations. This paradigm expects inconsistency in religious expression, 
and it understands that the task of research is to map that complexity in a coherent way, 
rather than taking it as evidence of weak or inauthentic religious expression. 
 This approach is especially useful for the study of nonreligion, because it can 
advance a theoretical synthesis between the drift and break theories that research has 
traditionally used to make sense of religious disaffiliation. Rather than assuming 
disaffiliation indicates the presence of specific ideological traits or the lack of substantive 
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social ties, cultural approaches concerned with packaging invite us to map how people 
with low religious commitments bring together different aspects of identity, practice, and 
belief into different repertoires for social action (Becker 1999). Thinking about 
repertoires can help us map the cultural complexity of nonreligion outlined in Chapter 
One, get around the potential classification errors outlined above, and produce a more 
substantive understanding of the situations in which nonreligion can shape political 
action.  
 Qualitative research on nonreligion based on interviews or ethnographic work 
provides multiple examples of this kind of approach at work. This research focuses on 
different practices through which nonreligious individuals take on a variety of identities 
and act them out in social life (Beaman and Tomlins 2015; Cotter 2015; Lee 2015; 
LeDrew 2015; Smith 2011; Zuckerman 2011). For example, interviews and participant 
observations studies have identified multiple ways that nonreligious people perceive 
religious others (Guenther 2014; Guenther et al. 2013; LeDrew 2015; Sumerau and 
Cragun 2016), develop collective identities through in-group socialization (Cimino and 
Smith 2014; Smith 2011), and advocate for a secular public sphere (Blankholm 2014; 
Kettell 2014). Across all of this work, researchers have identified how some people 
fiercely advocate for nonreligious worldviews, preferring a confrontational or combative 
stance against religion in the public sphere. Other people are more accommodating of 
religious differences and view their nonreligion as secondary to other identities and social 
commitments.   
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 Since people who are not particularly religious are also embedded in social 
relationships with other individuals and institutions that are, nonreligion is not just 
defined by non-belief, infrequent religious practice, or disaffiliation from institutions. It is 
also defined by how people live out these relationships with others. Much of the research 
on nonreligion, both qualitative and quantitive, implicitly suggests a distinction between 
these practices and relationships, or the public and the personal dimensions of 
nonreligion. By making that distinction explicit and mapping both personal and public 
nonreligious repertoires, research can begin to identify substantive differences in degree 
that may provide more explanatory power in the study of religion and politics and help to 
harmonize findings across research disciplines.  
Personal and Public Repertoires 
 In The Sociological Imagination (1959), C. Wright Mills famously draws a 
distinction between personal troubles and public issues to illustrate two ways of thinking 
about one’s place in society. Personal troubles are the domain of individuals, where 
problems like the loss of a job are indicative of private struggles, while public issues like 
unemployment have social structural explanations that operate across different individual 
experiences. One of the core points in Mills’ work is that the link between personal and 
public considerations is not inevitable—it takes cultural work to align these 
considerations. Researchers can run into trouble when they use measures for one 
consideration as a proxy for the other. Classic debates in the social sciences about 
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“irrational behavior” or “false consciousness” often arise when research expects an 
alignment between these considerations but does not observe it. 
 Religion in the United States has always had public dimensions. As a colonial and 
frontier society without the strong influence of a single, state-sanctioned church, and with 
a federated state system that relied primarily on state and local government action, 
historical sociological work emphasizes how local religious bodies were a key element in 
attending to problems of social order. Theological debate became a means of settling 
conflicts over local political authority (Erikson 1963), religious institutions offered early 
solutions for managing social problems (Porterfield 2012; Wuthnow 2011), and 
religiosity became associated with the virtues of good citizenship (Caplow et al.1983; 
Tocqueville 2003; Weber in Kalberg 2009; Williams 1999, 2013). 
 Religious identities can inform a vision of the proper role of religion in public life 
when these two considerations are packaged together by leaders or institutions using 
cultural repertoires. Americans have long associated certain kinds of religiosity with civic 
virtue while holding minority religious others and non-religious others as illegitimate 
(e.g. Edgell et al. 2016; Herberg 1983; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). Recent 
research on public religious expression (Delehanty et al. 2019; Stewart et al. 2018) and 
the role of Christian Nationalism and evangelical activism in politics (Whitehead et al. 
2017) has drawn attention to the way religious and political leaders develop shared 
cultural frameworks to talk not only about personal religious commitments, but to link 
those commitments directly to propositions about community belonging, citizenship, and 
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political authority. While earlier research identified the process of “deprivatization,” 
where religious leaders or advocacy groups enter the public sphere to advance their 
political interests or social preservation (e.g. Casanova 1994; Regnerus and Smith 1998), 
this research highlights how public considerations are also integrated into the cultural 
repertoires that make up the religious expression of attendees and lay leaders in the 
general population as well (Bean 2014). 
 A cultural sociology concerned with different repertoires for expressing 
nonreligion can help to advance research past the challenges outlined above by 
incorporating a similar distinction between personal and public nonreligion. Existing 
typologies of nonreligion capture the heterogeneity in personal definitions of non-
religiosity based on beliefs and behaviors (e.g. Hout and Fischer 2002; 2014, Keysar 
2014; Layman and Weaver 2016), but often talk around the distinction between those 
personal aspects and the public implications of a nonreligious perspective. This can miss 
a key dimension of nonreligion; a person may never outwardly self-identify as 
nonreligious, and yet may neither believe in any god or higher power nor accept the 
legitimacy of religious claims in the public sphere. Another may wish to maintain a 
degree of spirituality in her personal life and may welcome the government support of 
religious charities, but also strongly support the separation of church and state when it 
comes to legislation over issues such as school prayer. It is possible and necessary for 
research to map this complexity. 
 Identifying different repertoires of personal and public nonreligion can help 
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research move past the argument between the drift and break theories outlined in Chapter 
One. Drift theories treat nonreligion as one particular cultural repertoire defined by 
reduced engagement with religious institutions and individual autonomy. In other words, 
drift theories weight the personal dimensions of nonreligion. In contrast, break theories 
focused on conflict with the Religious Right place more weight on the public dimensions 
of nonreligion by focusing on how disaffiliation represents a rejection of the link between 
religion and political authority. If a theory and method that centers these different cultural 
repertoires is correct, then the tension between these two perspectives starts to disappear. 
Instead, research can measure these repertoires separately to explain how different kinds 
of nonreligion relate to other kinds of social and political behavior. First, we have to 
establish whether a method that distinguishes between personal and public repertoires is 
reliable and valid.   
Testing the Method 
 Do substantive measures that capture personal and public nonreligion perform 
better than conventional measures that capture personal nonreligion alone? Below, I 
validate a measurement approach that can capture both personal and public nonreligion 
using parallel analysis in three survey data sets.   
 First is the 2014 Boundaries in the American Mosaic Survey (BAM), fielded by 
the University of Minnesota American Mosaic Project in partnership with GfK with 
funding from the National Science Foundation (grants #s 1258926 and 1258933) and the 
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Edelstein Family Foundation. GfK’s KnowledgePanel recruitment is based on online, 
probability-based sampling (Couper 2017), which assures that multiple sequential 
samples drawn from this rotating panel membership will each reliably represent the U.S. 
population (Callegaro and DiSogra 2008; Yeager et al. 2011). The BAM survey sample 
was drawn from panel members using a probability proportional to size (PPS) weighted 
sampling approach oversampled for African Americans and Hispanics. The response rate 
was 57.9%, a higher response rate than average comparable national surveys for a final N 
of 2,521 (Holbrook et al. 2007). 
 Second is a 2016 multi-investigator election panel study conducted by the 
University of Minnesota Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP), fielded by 
Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI employs a similar panel methodology to GfK, 
but recruits participants through online communities and social networks by focusing on 
demographic groups that are difficult to reach. The CSPP developed a survey weight to 
bring this sample in line with nationally representative benchmarks on race, age, 
ethnicity, income, gender, and educational attainment. Following other work using SSI 
data in political science, I treat this data set as a diverse national sample meant to 
supplement the representative probability sample drawn for the BAM 2014 survey (Kam 
2012; Malhotra et al. 2013; Margolis 2016). SSI sampled 6,320 individuals to complete 
the study, with 3,557 successfully completing Wave One between July 1st and July 18th, 
2016.  
 Third, I also use a convenience sample of respondents collected from Amazon’s 
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Mechanical Turk Service in October of 2016 (N=743). Respondents to this survey 
completed the religion battery from the above surveys, as well as a range of questions 
about political issues and social-psychological metrics. Research on the composition of 
MTurk samples finds that these panels of paid respondents do differ from population 
samples, but that these differences are significantly reduced by controlling for a basic 
suite of sociodemographic measures (Levay et al. 2016). Moreover, samples of MTurk 
participants tend to skew non-religious (Lewis et al. 2015). While this would be a 
methodological issue for other analyses, it is an advantage for this research because it 
provides an additional sample comprised of more secular individuals to test these 
assumptions. 
 All three surveys include the same set of items designed to measure both personal 
and public nonreligion. To capture one possible personal nonreligious repertoire, I use 
Pearce and Denton’s (2011) example of the “avoider” repertoire—a common example 
among religiously unaffiliated respondents in which respondents who disaffiliate from 
religion disengage from participating in religious groups and seeing religion as relevant 
to other spheres of their social lives. I use three items to capture this repertoire: personal 
religious salience (“how important is your religious identity to you”), attendance at 
religious services (“ how often do you attend religious services?”), and belief in god (in 
BAM 2014: “do you believe in god or a universal spirit?” in CSPP and MTurk 2016: 
“which statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about god?”). All of these 
items use Likert-type response scales, with the exception of the BAM 2014 belief in god 
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question, which used the Gallup’s dichotomous question wording. To improve upon this 
wording and provide a measure that is easier to standardize, both 2016 surveys used the 
General Social Survey's six-point scale for certain belief in god.  
 To capture public nonreligion, I use three survey items adapted from Delehanty et 
al.’s (2019) study of public religious expression to capture whether respondents disagree 
that religion should play a role in fostering good political leadership, good citizenship, 
and good social interaction with others. Each of these items employed a four-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree for the following 
statements: “religion is important for being a good American,” “a President should have 
strong religious beliefs,” and “society's standards of right and wrong should be based on 
god's laws.” All of these items are coded for analysis such that higher values indicate 
stronger nonreligious perspectives to assist interpretation alongside personal repertoire; 
respondents who prefer a secular public sphere by disagreeing with these items receive 
higher scores.  
 At issue is whether these items are all informed by the same latent construct—a 
general sense of religiosity—or whether they are better measured as two different latent 
constructs—one for personal and one for public nonreligion. To investigate this question, 
I first modify an analytic approach employed by Layman and Weaver (2016) to test 
differences between active and passive secularism using confirmatory factor analysis 
(Maruyama 1998). I test differences in fit between two CFA models: a counterfactual 
model in which all of these items are informed by one latent factor for nonreligion, and a 
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theoretical model with two correlated latent factors for personal and public nonreligion. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates these theoretical models. 
 After assessing differences in model fit, I turn to investigating whether these two 
measures together can do a better job mapping substantive differences across people who 
are religiously affiliated and unaffiliated. To do this, I use an additional categorical 
measure of religious identification that was included on all three surveys: “What is your 
current religious preference, if any?” Response options to this item included Protestant, 
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Some other 
religion, Spiritual but not Religious (SBNR), atheist, agnostic, or Nothing in Particular. 
The analyses presented below incorporate a measure for any nonreligious identification 
(SBNR, atheist, agnostic, and NIP combined), as well as a measure that disaggregates 
these categories following work that highlights substantive differences within the 
nonreligious (e.g. Baker and Smith 2015: Edgell et al. 2017; Frost and Edgell 2017). By 
comparing the predicted factor scores for each respondent’s personal and public 
nonreligion across these identification categories, we can determine whether there is 
systemic and substantive variation on these measures within the nonreligious.   
 It is important to clarify that this analysis is not intended to establish causal 
direction as to whether nonreligious repertoires inform disaffiliation or whether people 
develop these repertoires after disaffiliation. The intention here is measurement validation
—to establish whether these repertoires should be distinguished from each other and, 
given this distinction, whether they can do a better job describing differences in religious 
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disaffiliation.   
Results 
 Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the core nonreligion items 
across the three surveys. As expected, the MTurk sample does lean more secular than the 
representative surveys, with mean scores on each item that are higher than their 
counterparts. This convenience sample also has a higher proportion of self-identified 
atheists and agnostics than the representative samples, as expected by previous 
evaluations (Lewis et al. 2015). The core question is whether the first six items in Table 
2.1 should be combined or treated separately as indicators for both personal and public 
nonreligion. Figure 2.1 illustrates these two possibilities as a set of confirmatory factor 
analysis models to test.   
 Table 2.2 summarizes the results of these tests in each data set. Two important 
points emerge from this table. First, the two-factor model that distinguishes public and 
private nonreligion provides a substantively better fit to the data in each survey. There are 
multiple methods to evaluate the fit of a confirmatory factor analysis model. These 
include the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)—which 
indicate improvements in model fit relative to a null model as they approach 1—and the 
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR), which should both decrease as model fit improves (Hooper et 
al. 2008). While the single-factor model provides a reasonable fit to the data according to 
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the CFI and SRMR, the two-factor model improves the TLI and the RMSEA past the 
threshold for what the literature considers an excellent model fit (CFI & TLI > .96, 
RMSEA & SRMR < .09). Together, these results suggest that conceptualizing religious 
commitments as two sets of personal and public factors offers a more comprehensive and 
accurate view of the structure of those commitments that is reliable across three data sets.  
 Second, the factor loadings across these models show how separating personal 
and public nonreligion provides improved internal consistency on each measure. In each 
single-factor model, standardizing to church attendance creates high factor loadings for 
the other personal items , but comparatively lower factor loading for public items. Once 4
the two-factor model separates these items, however, factor loadings for the public items 
rise as they are standardized to religious citizenship—another public item.  These results 
suggest that the public and private factors are internally consistent, and they provide 
evidence for concurrent and discriminant validity of the measurement structure.  
 How do these measures map onto religious disaffiliation? Figure 2.2 explores this 
category using jittered scatterplots. These plots place each respondent according to their 
predicted scores for the two-factor model, with personal nonreligion along the x-axis and 
public nonreligion along the y-axis. People who selected a religious affiliation are colored 
gray, while people who selected atheist, agnostic, spiritual but not religious, or “nothing 
in particular” are highlighted in black. 
 The one exception to this pattern is the belief in god item in the BAM 2014 survey, which appears to have 4
lower factor loadings. This is due to the dichotomous coding of the item—a limitation of this particular 
survey data—and the general pattern holds for the likert-type items for belief in the CSPP and MTurk data. 
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 If religious disaffiliation were closely tied to both personal and public 
nonreligion, we would expect to see a fairly clean break in the plots. Black points should 
be clustered in the upper-right hand corner among respondents who score highly on both 
factors, while gray points should be clustered in the lower-left. This is not entirely the 
case in Figure 2.2. Instead, we see substantive overlap in affiliation across these scores. 
The upper-right quadrant contains respondents who scored above the mean on both 
factors—those who appear to be substantively nonreligious in terms of their personal 
preferences and in the vision of the public sphere. It is important to note that many of the 
respondents in this quadrant maintain a religious affiliation, despite expressing 
preferences on the factor items that are ostensibly secular. It may be the case that these 
people maintain a religious affiliation that they were raised in, despite not practicing 
frequently. They could also be avoiding an explicitly nonreligious identity label due to 
the social desirability biases discussed above (e.g. Edgell et al. 2017). Or, they may 
exhibit a pattern of religious expression in which they “belong without believing” by 
maintaining religious ties for community reasons despite their own skepticism of 
religious authority or doctrine (Kasselstrand 2015).  
 Conversely, the bottom-left corner contains respondents who express stronger 
religious commitments on the factor scores, and here we see a smaller proportion of 
respondents who report no religious affiliation. For some people, this could be due to 
simple errors in question response. However, it may also indicate a pattern where people 
who express strong religious commitments, but prefer a non-denominational affiliation, 
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reject the available identity options in the survey item. 
 Additionally, in the upper-left hand corner, we see another important subgroup of 
respondents who report both affiliation and non-affiliation—those who score below the 
mean on personal nonreligion (indicating higher religious salience and practice), but 
above the mean on public nonreligion (indicating a stronger rejection of religious 
authority in the public sphere). This quadrant indicates the presence of people who appear 
to have strong personal religious commitments, but also support a stronger implicit 
separation of church and state in their views on religious authority. 
 While the unaffiliated are concentrated in the upper-right hand corner, as we 
would expect, they are much more evenly dispersed across these three quadrants than the 
literature typically expects. Overall, figure 2.2 provides preliminary evidence for the 
presence of different nonreligious repertoires within the unaffiliated and within the 
affiliated, as each option for identification contains respondents who combine their 
personal and their public views on religion in different ways. Analyses that focus only on 
the categorical difference between the affiliated and the unaffiliated risk missing this 
underlying variation.  
 To explain the variation in this Figure, Table 2.3 uses logistic regression to 
examine whether these factor scores can effectively explain the binary difference between 
religious affiliation and disaffiliation. As the models in this table illustrate, both the 
personal and public repertoires are significantly associated with the probability of a 
respondent saying they are unaffiliated at the bivariate level. However, controlling for 
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both at the same time demonstrates that personal nonreligion explains more of the 
variation in the probability of affiliation. Table 2.4 extends these models using 
multinomial logistic regression for a variety of nonreligious identification options. Each 
model in this table compares a nonreligious subgroup (atheists, agnostics, spiritual but 
not religious, and nothing in particular) to a baseline of affiliated respondents. In most 
cases, personal nonreligion again explains more of the variation in the probability of each 
response. The models in these tables suggest that while there is substantive variation in 
public nonreligion among the unaffiliated, that variation does not necessarily explain the 
choice to take on any particular nonreligious identity label. This choice is best explained 
by lower levels of personal nonreligion, such as less frequent attendance at services, 
lower personal salience, and lower belief in god.  
 However, this pattern is reversed when we examine the relationship between 
nonreligious repertoires and political views in Table 2.5. Here, linear regression models 
test the relationship between each repertoire and how respondents place themselves on a 
seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Again, both 
personal and public nonreligious repertoires are separately associated with stronger self-
reported liberalism. In a model that controls for both, however, public nonreligion has a 
stronger bivariate relationship with political ideology, explains more of the variation in 
political ideology, and negates the effect of personal nonreligion on political ideology 
(even reversing the sign of the coefficient estimate in the BAM 2014 data).  
 Together, these preliminary models indicate that people who avoid their religion 
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in their personal lives are not necessarily developing a comparable repertoire of 
nonreligious perspectives on public life. These two constructs are related to one another, 
but they are theoretically and empirically distinct, and each can provide different 
information about respondents’ identities and political considerations.  
Moving Forward - Applying the Method 
 Research has identified a wide range of nonreligious identities, beliefs, and 
practices. If future work does not attend to this variation by focusing only on a 
categorical measure of religious disaffiliation, it risks misclassifying respondents due to 
respondent switching, social desirability bias, and measurement error. A cultural approach 
to the study of religion and nonreligion is helpful to map out this variation and to specify 
specific repertoires of nonreligion—packages of beliefs, practices, and affinities that 
people develop to express their commitments and apply them to their lives. It also 
reminds us that different religious and nonreligious repertoires are not necessarily 
interchangeable. People who are staunchly committed to their personal religious 
standpoints may not necessarily translate those views into support for religion in the 
public sphere, while moderately nonreligious partisans who do not attend church often 
may nonetheless show stronger support for a political candidate with strong religious 
commitments. Research needs to map repertoires in order to better parse the relationship 
between religion and political considerations and, in turn, to better infer and explain 
political trends among the growing nonreligious population in the United States.  
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 To test the theoretical proposition that repertoires of nonreligion matter, and to 
assess the methodological approach that suggests we can and should measure them 
separately, I selected two main examples of a personal nonreligious repertoire of avoidant 
religion (Pearce and Denton 2011) and a public nonreligious repertoire of support for 
secular authority in the public sphere (Delehanty et al. 2019). There are of course other 
repertoires of personal and public religion and nonreligion present in the U.S. and around 
the world that suggest different combinations of beliefs and practices. Some examples 
include the cultural work in religious progressive movements (e.g. Braunstein 2017; 
Delehanty 2016), secular organizing for racial justice (e.g. Hutchinson in press), a trend 
toward mindfulness in personal spiritual practice (e.g. Kucinskas 2014, 2019) and a focus 
on the religious provision of social services that motivates religiously-affiliated political 
movements in Egypt and Turkey (e.g. Davis and Robinson 2012). Future research should 
focus on the conceptualization and measurement of these repertoires, but here the focus 
on avoidant nonreligion and secular public expression provides a measurement strategy 
for two of the most common nonreligious repertoires among the religiously unaffiliated 
in the U.S. identified by the literature. Measuring these example repertoires with multiple 
items across three survey samples highlights three points.  
 First, there is variation in both personal and public nonreligious repertoires among 
respondents who are both religiously affiliated and unaffiliated. This suggests that 
categorical comparisons of religious affiliation need to be supplemented by using 
continuous measures—where available—that cut across these identity groups and can 
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provide a robustness check for potential measurement error. Chapter Three uses this 
approach to better explain trends in voter turnout among the religiously unaffiliated.  
 Second, because of this variation, measures of public and personal nonreligious 
repertoires are empirically associated with one another, but also distinct measurement 
constructs. Chapter Four takes on this point in detail by using both the repertoire scales 
developed here to parse trends in public opinion formation on major policy issues.   
 Finally, the choice of a nonreligious identity category is most closely associated 
with a personal nonreligious repertoire, while a basic measure of political ideology is 
most closely associated with a public nonreligious repertoire. As in Mills’ theory of 
private issues and public troubles, the gap between these two associations illustrates the 
cultural work that is necessarily to achieve a confluence between these cultural 
repertoires—one that should caution researchers and practitioners against inferring 
political considerations directly from measures of personal nonreligious practices or 
identities. Chapter Five shows the stakes of this assumption by investigating whether the 
field of nonreligious advocacy groups can effectively forge a connection between 
personal nonreligious identities and public nonreligious practices to advocate for secular 
policy reforms.   
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Chapter 3: Engagement 
Nonreligion and Voting 
 Low and declining rates of civic engagement in the United States are a key 
concern for both researchers and the general public. There is good reason for scholars to 
study the behavioral trends that inform our normative expectations for a democratic 
society, and to better understand why people opt out of social institutions by declining to 
vote, volunteer, or participate other civic organizations. Research on this topic outlines a 
theoretical puzzle: is civic disengagement a cumulative process where changes occur 
across different institutions, or is it a domain-specific process where change is 
concentrated in specific institutions? When people opt out of participating in one social 
space, are they more likely to opt out of others?  
 One body of work supports a theory that civic disengagement is diffuse across 
institutions and driven by larger structural forces such as economic change (e.g. Putnam 
2001) or the cultural conditions that foster a general civic spirit (e.g. Tocqueville 1835). 
Declining rates of voting, volunteering, and other communal activities all tend to 
correlate, and so civic disengagement in this view comes from broad social pressures that 
reduce both the motivation and the available resources that people need to engage with 
their communities.  
 On the other hand, additional work suggests this perspective may be too broad 
and too eager to highlight a crisis in declining civic engagement. This research argues we 
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cannot ignore the specific, contextual factors that foster engagement in a variety of 
organizations that may or may not typically be considered “civic groups” (e.g. Collins 
2010; Lichterman and Eliasoph 2014; Klienenberg 2016; Pugh 2015; Joseph 2002). In 
the theoretical view supported by this work, civic engagement is a domain-specific 
process that requires unique considerations of different institutional spheres and 
interactional styles within those spheres. Disengagement in one domain does not 
necessarily invite disengagement in another. 
 There are stakes to this theoretical debate, because the answer can inform 
normative social policy aspirations about democratic socialization. If cumulative theories 
are correct, the answer is to target larger social forces that depress many different kinds of 
civic engagement, such as precarious employment or affective political polarization 
(Kalleberg 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). If the domain-specific theories are 
correct, then the more appropriate solutions are specific reform efforts to address why 
people lose trust in particular institutions such as government services, educational 
institutions, or religious organizations.  
 This chapter addresses this theoretical debate with analysis of a particularly useful 
empirical case: the secular voting gap. In the United States, religious engagement and 
political engagement are tightly coupled (Putnam and Campbell 2012). However, the 
U.S. also has a growing number of religiously unaffiliated citizens who now comprise 
nearly a quarter of the population (Hout and Fischer 2014; Voas and Chaves 2016). 
Despite increased organizational efforts of secular advocacy groups (Blankholm 2014; 
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Cimino and Smith 2014; Kettell 2014), research highlights lower levels of political 
engagement among the unaffiliated. Surveys and exit polls find that voter registration and 
turnout rates among nonreligious Americans consistently lag behind the religiously 
affiliated by about ten percentage points (Baker and Smith 2015; Jones et. al 2016). This 
leads to the proposition that nonreligious Americans do not vote frequently enough to 
yield substantial political influence, and low levels of non-religious representation in the 
U.S. Congress support this view (Sandstrom 2017). If disengagement is cumulative 
across domains, disaffiliation from religious institutions may set the stage for other 
declines in civic participation, and it may mean that these civic skills are becoming 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of an elite few. Investigating political participation 
among the unaffiliated addresses this theoretical puzzle and advances social scientific 
understanding of whether civic skills transfer across institutional domains (Perrin 2005). 
 However, we have to validate the basic social fact of lower civic engagement 
among the nonreligious. There are both methodological and substantive reasons to be 
skeptical of this gap. Methodologically, this conclusion is based on bivariate descriptive 
statistics from self-reports on public opinion surveys and exit polls. This is a problem 
because nonreligious individuals fit a particular demographic profile; as a whole they 
tend to be young, white, male, liberal, and skeptical of social institutions (Baker and 
Smith 2015; Hout and Fischer 2002, 2014; Kasselstrand et al. 2017). These factors also 
correlate with lower voter turnout and civic engagement (e.g. Groves et al. 1992; Silver et 
al. 1986), and it is possible that the secular voting gap is spurious to these demographic 
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traits. A diffuse theory of civic engagement world argue these demographic factors could 
motivate both disaffiliation from religious institutions and reduced participation in 
political institutions. Moreover, evidence from studies of validated voter turnout suggests 
that self-reports of voting may also exaggerate differences between voters and non-
voters, leading to biased conclusions about substantive differences in voting behavior 
across demographic subgroups (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012).  
 Substantively, nonreligion is a multidimensional cultural construct (Keysar 2014), 
and not all unaffiliated respondents are the same. Research distinguishes ideologically-
committed nonreligious respondents from “unchurched believers” and “liminal” 
respondents who change their religious affiliation across survey waves (Baker and Smith 
2015; Hout 2017; Hout and Fischer 2002; 2014; Lim et al. 2010). In line with the 
domain-specific perspective outlined above, these substantive differences in beliefs and 
practices among the nonreligious matter for different social and political outcomes, 
including civic engagement (Stewart 2016; Frost and Edgell 2017; LeDrew 2015). If 
citizens who would otherwise be religious are simply leaving religious institutions, 
disaffiliation could be a symptom of a more general decline in civic engagement that 
reinforces lower political participation. If citizens are ideologically motivated by their 
nonreligion, however, low attendance is a sign of consistency and commitment, and they 
could therefore be more likely to participate as motivated partisans (Layman and Weaver 
2016). If turnout varies within the unaffiliated, it would provide more support for the 
domain-specific theories of civic engagement which argue that these cultural 
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particularities matter.     
 This chapter addresses these substantive and methodological questions by 
investigating gaps in voter turnout in multiple data sets with measures that improve on 
exit polls and self-reporting. Using measures of validated voter turnout from five national 
elections (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016) across five data sets, I present three 
findings that advance our understanding of the relationship between disengagement from 
religious institutions and disengagement from political institutions. First, the secular 
voting gap in validated turnout has shrunk in recent elections. At the descriptive level, 
this gap is smaller than previous research has reported. Second, because it is smaller, the 
gap largely disappears in later election years after controlling for basic sociodemographic 
measures suggested by the literature on voter turnout. Third, differences in turnout are 
explained not by the difference between religiously affiliated and unaffiliated respondents 
alone, but rather by variation within each group. Less frequent attendance at religious 
services—an indicator often associated with lower general civic engagement—actually 
associates with higher odds of turnout for unaffiliated respondents. These findings 
provide support for domain-specific theories of civic disengagement, and they suggest 
researchers should take into account substantive practices that different social institutions 
provide for political behavior.  
Two Theories of Civic Engagement 
 Is civic engagement diffuse or domain-specific? Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic 
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Democracy in America (1835) highlights the elements of a diffuse theory in reporting a 
unique civic mindset in the early United States—one where a frontier society and shared 
religious commitments fostered robust commitments to civic engagement. This 
perspective, supported by well-known research such as Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone 
(2001), emphasizes parallel declines in civic engagement across multiple institutional 
domains such as lower rates of volunteering, reduced political participation, and weaker 
social ties with neighbors. These parallel declines are driven by broader social and 
cultural changes that reach across these institutional domains, such as economic precarity 
(e.g. Kalleberg 2018), the rise of professionalized advocacy in politics (e.g. Medvetz 
2012), and changes in trust and confidence in institutions (e.g. Twenge et al. 2014). This 
work suggests that participation in civic institutions is cumulative, such that engagement 
in one institutional domain supports engagement in another. For example, research 
highlights the particular role that participation in religious institutions can play in 
providing structural opportunities to develop skills for political mobilization (e.g. Bean 
2014; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Beyerlein and Vaisey 2013; Brady et a. 1995; Braunstein 
2017; Brown and Brown 2003; Brubaker 2015; Djupe and Grant 2001; Eliasoph and 
Lichterman 2003; Lichterman 2008; Manza and Brooks 1997; Smith 1998; Wald et al. 
1988). In this account, disengagement should be correlated across institutions. People 
who opt out of one set of institutions should be more likely to opt out of others.  
 However, other work suggests this perspective is too broad, because civic 
engagement is not spurred by a general “spirit” or single set of resources that easily 
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transfers across institutions. In this work, civic engagement is a domain-specific process
—a set of coordinated actions that come from specific styles of interaction within social 
groups (Becker 1999; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2015:809). For example, accounts of 
declining neighborhood engagement often overlook specific practices like voluntary 
childcare (Collins 2010). While we would expect people who live alone to be socially 
isolated, and therefore less engagement, this group is actually more likely to volunteer 
and spend time with friends (Klinenberg 2016, 2013). While we often expect to find 
variation in voting and volunteering between different demographic groups, often the 
most substantive variation within those groups  (e.g. Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012; 
Berent et al. 2016; Frost and Edgell 2018). In this account, disengagement does not 
necessary happen across institutions. Instead, engagement and disengagement are both 
contingent on the material and cultural conditions of specific institutions.  
 The case of voting among religiously unaffiliated Americans presents a useful test 
of these two theories. If diffuse theories are correct, we would expect unaffiliated 
respondents to be generally less likely to vote than affiliated respondents as similar social 
forces encourage people to opt out of both religious and political institutions. If domain 
specific theories are correct, however, we would see more substantive variation in turnout 
within the unaffiliated, and research would need to specify a measurement approach for 
that variation that could parse out which unaffiliated respondents stay engaged in politics 
and which do not.  
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The Secular Voting Gap  
 Claims about the secular voting gap are based on two sources of evidence: exit 
polls and self-reported voting on surveys. Exit polls indicate 9% and 10% of voters were 
unaffiliated in the 2000 and 2004 elections, 12% were unaffiliated in 2008 and 2012, and 
15% were in 2016 (Smith and Martinez 2016). Population estimates indicate that non-
religious Americans were about 14% of the population in 2000 and grew to 22% by 2016 
(Hout and Fischer 2014). Gaps in rates of self-reported voting between affiliated and 
unaffiliated respondents in the General Social Survey are of a similar magnitude, 
narrowing from nineteen percentage points in 1968 to ten percentage points since 2004 
(Baker and Smith 2015, Jones et al. 2016).  
 This gap appears robust in both self-reporting and exit polling, but some 
skepticism is warranted in light of the fact that respondents tend to over-report voting on 
surveys (Anderson and Silver 1986; Granberg and Holmberg 1991; Katosh and Traugott 
1981; Presser and Traugott 1992). Over-reporting is a motivated response, and those who 
misreport are often demographically similar to voters (Berent et al. 2016; Bernstein et al. 
2001; Burden 2000; Silver et al. 1986). By combining actual voters with respondents 
with similar demographic profiles who did not vote, but say they did, self-report 
measures bias our analyses toward finding sharp demographic and cultural distinctions 
between “voters” and “non-voters” where they may not actually exist (Ansolabehere and 
Hersh 2012). At the same time, other work raises concerns about non-response bias and 
the representation of minority populations in exit polling (e.g. Barretto et al. 2006; 
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Klofstad and Bishin 2012). It may be the case that religiously-affiliated voters are more 
likely to over-report, rather than more likely to vote, or it may be the case that exit polls 
are less likely to obtain a representative sample of nonreligious respondents. To properly 
assess the presence of a secular voting gap with a sufficiently conservative test, analysis 
requires both a sufficient number of nonreligious respondents and a valid measure of 
voting behavior in a dataset that allows for statistical controls.  
 I address these problems by using an improved measurement approach that cuts a 
middle path between exit polls and self-reports: vote validation. In validation, survey 
respondents are matched to known government records to confirm voting, voter 
registration, and/ or voting method. This can be done in person (as with the American 
National Election Survey’s validation approach discontinued in 1990), or through 
database matching using commercial voter files (as in the data sets discussed in detail 
below) (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012; Granberg and Holmberg 1991; Katz and Katz 
2010). These measures allow for the assessment of nonreligion in actual voting behavior 
with models that can address substantive and methodological concerns with existing 
accounts.  
Religion, Nonreligion, and Voting  
 The key assumption that leads researchers to expect a secular voting gap is the 
theory that religious commitments go hand-in-hand with higher political engagement, and 
therefore that religious disaffiliation accompanies a broader decline in civic engagement. 
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There are two primary mechanisms through which religion can affect political 
participation: structural opportunities and ideological motivations. Structurally, 
participation in voluntary associations is linked to higher voter turnout (Olsen 1972). 
Religion plays a unique role here, as attendance at religious services is closely linked to 
voter turnout in numerous studies (e.g. Cassel 1999; Gerber et al. 2008; Smets and 
VanHam 2013; Strate et al. 1989; Wald et al. 1988). Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) 
argue that churches (and, following their logic, other houses of worship) provide a unique 
opportunity for people of different social classes to socialize and work together, and so 
opportunities to develop civic skills in church groups are not limited to populations with 
higher income, education, or socioeconomic status.  
 More broadly, this relationship between religious participation and structural 
opportunities for engagement is not simply about showing up to church. Beyerlein and 
Hipp (2006) demonstrate that social context and conduct both matter as well—religious 
traditions moderate the relationship between religious and civic engagement, and it is 
often religious engagement beyond attendance that matters most for fostering civic 
engagement. Similarly, Putnam and Campbell (2012) argue that the social ties fostered by 
both religious attendance and membership in religious social networks foster more robust 
civic behaviors including voting, volunteering, and charitable donations. Of course, 
congregations are stratified along racial and socioeconomic lines, and the interaction of 
these factors produces notable variation in civic engagement as well (Brown 2006; 
Brown and Brown 2003). The problem is that current bivariate treatments of the secular 
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voting gap have not yet investigated this context, and it is possible that there may be a 
different relationship between nonreligion and political engagement fostered by the 
unique experience of either making a clean break with organized religion or remaining a 
“liminal none” or an unchurched believer (Hout 2017; Hout and Fischer 2002).  
 Religion also provides ideological motivations that can spur political 
participation. As a system of shared understanding related to matters of deep moral 
concern, religious ideology can become a means of “charging” political affairs to secure 
citizens’ commitment, engagement, or, in some cases, conflict (Brubaker 2015). 
Specifically, Christianity has also played a role in the historic development of civic 
engagement in the United States (e.g. Heclo 2007; Tocqueville 2003[1835]). For 
example, the rise of the New Christian Right spurred denominational effects on political 
engagement by mobilizing evangelical Christians into a powerful voting bloc and 
political subculture (Manza and Brooks 1997; Smith 1998). In politically active 
congregations, contact about particular issues spurs voter turnout (Djupe and Grant 2001; 
Wilcox and Sigelman 2001), and interactions between lay leaders and congregants can 
produce different styles of political engagement (Bean 2014; Braunstein 2017; Delehanty 
2016; Lichterman 2008).  
 However, different measures of religious beliefs and behaviors can have divergent 
relationships with political participation (Driskell et al. 2008). Here too, the propensity 
for voting among the growing nonreligious population in the U.S. is also ambiguous. On 
the one hand, they may be less likely to vote than religious respondents. The majority of 
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nonreligious individuals are primarily defined by their disaffiliation with religious 
institutions rather than theological non-belief (Baker and Smith 2015; Hout and Fischer 
2002). Most of this disaffiliation has come from moderate religious respondents, leaving 
a core of ideologically committed religious respondents holding steady in the U.S. 
population (Schnabel and Bock 2017). There is also evidence that the nonreligious tend 
to be skeptical of social institutions more broadly, a cynicism that may spill over into a 
lower sense of political efficacy and, in turn, a lower propensity to vote (Hout and Fischer 
2014; Kasselstrand et al. 2017; cf. Baker and Smith 2015).  
 On the other hand, it is possible that ideologically-motivated nonreligious 
respondents are actually more likely to engage in political life (Layman and Weaver 
2016). Research identifies a blossoming movement of nonreligious social organizations 
and advocacy groups that are working to mobilize members and shape social policy 
(Blankholm 2014; Cimino and Smith 2014; Kettell 2014), and one dominant explanation 
for religious disaffiliation is a political backlash to the Religious Right (Hout and Fischer 
2002; Putnam and Campbell 2012). Moreover, involvement in a number of alternative 
community groups, such as arts organizations, can also foster civic engagement (Baggetta 
2009). Committed nonreligious individuals in the United States, especially atheists, 
closely align themselves with pro-science advocacy, and concerns about religion in public 
life structure the choice to publicly self-identify as an atheist (Stewart 2016). Baker and 
Smith’s (2015) close treatment of descriptive analyses of the voting gap also finds that 
the kind of nonreligion matters; in their analysis, agnostics were more likely to report 
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voting than atheists or the generally non-affiliated. The same is true for specific 
volunteering practices (Frost and Edgell 2017). It is possible that the classic measure of 
church attendance—often referenced in the literature as a key mechanism that bolsters 
other kinds of civic engagement—works differently for unaffiliated respondents. 
Unaffiliated respondents with lower church attendance, for example, may be more like 
the consistent and ideologically-motivated respondents who we would expect to be more 
likely to vote.  
 The challenge for current work on the voting gap is that most demographic 
analyses of exit polls or self-reported turnout rely not on measures of religious 
participation but on measures of religious identification, comparing respondents with no 
religious affiliation to other religiously affiliated groups. Nonreligious identification is 
more common among young men (but see Edgell et al. 2017 for important deviations 
from this trend), a group distinctly less likely to vote. It is also more common among and 
the well-off and the well-educated, two groups that are more likely to vote. These 
demographic factors are among the strongest and most common correlates of voting 
behavior (Smets and VanHam 2013), and so much of the voting gap may be explained by 
their influence alone. Moreover, combining respondents who simply do not participate in 
religious groups with respondents who have made a committed ideological choice to 
disaffiliate risks obscuring differences between the structural and the ideological 
implications of religious disaffiliation for voting.  
 In sum, research needs to consider different measures of nonreligion and a range 
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of sociodemographic controls to properly evaluate whether nonreligious respondents are 
more or less likely to vote than religiously affiliated respondents. It needs to do this 
because substantively different measures of nonreligion may have a divergent 
relationship with voting; nonreligion suggests the presence of both drift from institutions 
for some and specific ideological commitments for others. Diffuse theories of civic 
disengagement would expect religious disaffiliation to “spill over” into other institutions 
and associate with lower political engagement. Domain-specific theories of civic 
disengagement, in contrast, would expect a more complicated relationship between the 
two that invites the possibility of unaffiliated respondents who are equally or more likely 
to turn out to vote than affiliated respondents. This is because domain-specific theories 
are sensitive to the different cultural repertoires of action that are available within any 
given social group.  
 Chapter Two showed that we can distinguish different repertoires of nonreligion 
in the population. In the data discussed below, measures are not present that would allow 
for a direct test of those public and personal repertoires. However, we also saw in Chapter 
One that part of the evidence for these repertoires is the variation in religious affiliation 
and practices within general population. While the literature on political participation 
notes that less frequent church attendance associates with lower political engagement, it 
could be the case that this relationship works differently in the context of a nonreligious 
repertoire. By using a measure of religious non-affiliation and a measure of church 
attendance, then using an interaction term for the two, the following hypotheses allow me 
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to test the two theories of civic disengagement across different combinations of 
nonreligious experiences.  
Diffuse Disengagement 
H1a: Net of sociodemographic controls, religiously-unaffiliated respondents will 
have lower probability of validated turnout than affiliated respondents. 
H2a: Net of sociodemographic controls, less frequent church attendance will be 
significantly and substantively associated with lower odds of validated turnout.  
H3a: The relationship between low church attendance and lower odds of turnout 
is uniform for both affiliated and unaffiliated respondents.   
Domain-Specific Disengagement  
H1b: Net of sociodemographic controls, religiously-unaffiliated respondents will 
be no different from religiously affiliated respondents in their probability of 
validated turnout.  
H2b: Net of sociodemographic controls, less frequent church attendance will not 
be significantly and substantively associated with lower odds of validated turnout.  
H3b: The relationship between low church attendance and lower odds of turnout 
is not uniform for both affiliated and unaffiliated respondents, but instead will 
associate with a lower probability of turnout for affiliated respondents only.    
  
 The analysis below tests H1 and H2 in multivariate models, and then proceeds to 
test interactions between these two main effects to investigate H3 in different social 
contexts.  
Data  
 Analysis tests these two hypothesis about the nonreligious voting gap using two 
data sets. The first data set employs four separate samples from the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES 2008, 2010, 2014 and 2016) that each contain a 
validated measure of general election turnout. The 2008 and 2010 waves were included in 
the 2006-2012 cumulative CCES data set release, while the 2014 and 2016 waves were 
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each drawn from separate releases. The CCES is an annual survey study of Americans’ 
views of Congress, electoral experiences, and political views conducted by YouGov/
Polimetrix with funding from the National Science Foundation. In addition to unique, 
contemporary measures of validated turnout, this data set is also useful for its range of 
measures of religiosity and sufficiently large sample sizes to disaggregate different 
nonreligious respondents and explore interaction effects. 
 The second data set is the 2016 release of the American National Election Survey 
(ANES), comprised of two independently drawn address-based probability samples—one 
for face-to-face interview administration (response rate 50%) and one for web 
administration (response rate 44%)—conducted by Westat, Inc. Following the guidelines 
provided by Enamorado et al. (2017), this data set includes a merged file of respondents’ 
validated turnout in the 2016, 2014, and 2012 general elections.  
Measures  
 Descriptive statistics for core measures are presented in Table 3.1. Validated 
Turnout: To measure validated turnout, analysis uses the CCES measure of validated 
general election participation in four general elections: the 2008 and 2016 presidential 
elections and the 2010 and 2014 midterms. These are the validated election years that are 
available in the CCES data along with necessary measures of religiosity, and they provide 
a balanced set of outcomes across different kinds of elections as turnout varies 
substantively during midterms. The 2016 ANES sample contains validation for 
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respondents’ participation in the 2016 and 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 
midterms  
 To obtain these measures, the CCES survey program collaborated with Catalist 
LLC—a private vendor of political data that regularly gathers state government voting 
records. Polimetrix provided Catalist with information about the respondents, which the 
firm used to match respondents to voting records using both government and consumer 
financial records. Polimetrix then de-identified the data, leaving indicator variables for 
respondents who were successfully matched to a record of having voted in a given 
election year. While this matching algorithm is proprietary (cf. Berent et al. 2016), 
Ansolabehere and Hersh (2012) provide a detailed account of the logic of the matching 
process and successful validations of the matched data. The ANES survey program 
collaborated with L2 Inc., a non-partisan firm supplying campaign voter data, to obtain a 
copy of the nationwide voter file. Enamorado et al. (2017) use a similar probabilistic 
record linkage model based on respondents names, ages, and addresses, along with a 
clerical review to remove potential false matches (also see Enamorado and Imai. 2018).  
 While these matching processes are similar, using both surveys provides a 
conceptual replication (Freese and Petersen 2017) that can serve as a robustness check for 
potential systemic differences in the matching processes. These measures are also 
particularly useful for providing a more conservative test of the existence of voting gaps 
across demographic groups, because they reduce the prevalence of respondents who 
match the demographic profile of voters and say they have voted when they have not 
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(Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). Validated vote measures have been used in a number of 
influential studies in political science on core issues such as redistricting, turnout across 
racial and ethnic groups, and voter ID laws (e.g. Fraga 2015, 2016; Franko 2015; Hajnal 
et al. 2017). 
 All measures of validated turnout are dichotomous such that validated 
respondents receive a 1 and non-validated respondents receive a 0. No recoding processes 
were necessary for the ANES measures. In the 2014 and 2016 waves of the CCES, 
respondents received a 1 if they had a validated record of voting, regardless of method 
(absentee, early voting, by mail, at polling place, or “unknown”) and a 0 if they had none 
of these conditions. In the 2008 and 2010 waves of the CCES, I recoded this measure so 
that respondents received a 1 if they had a validated record of voting and a 0 if they had a 
verified record of being unregistered, said they were unregistered, said they didn’t vote, 
or had a verified record of not voting.  Respondents who were non-citizens, were missing 5
a voter history file, or had “no evidence” regarding whether they voted in the survey 
codebook were dropped from analysis (11% of cases in 2008 and 13% in 2010). 
 Nonreligion: To measure nonreligion, I first employ a binary measure of 
nonreligious identification using the religious identification items in each survey. In the 
CCES data, respondents received a 0 for reporting any religious identification (Protestant, 
Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, 
 To ensure that additional non-voting classifications did not bias results, a supplemental logistic regression 5
model for the 2008 wave used an alternative coding scheme for the dependent variable where 1= validated 
voting and 0 = verified record of non-voting only. This model produced substantively similar results to 
those presented here, and so these models employ the full coding scheme to include the maximum possible 
number of observations. 
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or “Something else”) and a 1 for reporting atheist, agnostic, or “nothing in particular.” In 
the ANES data, respondents received a 0 for reporting any religious identification 
(Fundamentalist, Charismatic/Pentecostal, Born again, Evangelical, Traditional, 
Mainline, Progressive, Non-traditional believer) and a 1 for reporting secular, agnostic, 
atheist, or spiritual but not religious. This coding scheme is similar to the approach 
employed in foundational research on the religiously unaffiliated (Hout and Fischer 2002, 
2014), and it is also the measurement approach that underlies most reporting of the 
unaffiliated voting gap.  
 In addition to nonreligious identification, models also include a field-standard 
measure for attendance at religious services (a six-point likert type scale in the CCES and 
a five-point scale in the ANES). Each scale is coded such that higher values indicate less 
frequent attendance. This measure captures religious activity—the second key 
mechanism through which much of the literature expects religiosity to associate with 
civic engagement.  
 Finally, models incorporate a common suite of sociodemographic control 
variables for age, gender, race, marital status, education (highest degree attained), 
income, and political ideology. These are among the most common correlates of voter 
turnout (Smets and VanHam 2013; Wolfinger and Wolfinger 2008), and therefore provide 
a good test for whether the relationship between religious affiliation and voting is 
spurious.  
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Analytic Approach  
 With validated voting, analysis can offer a more conservative test of the presence 
of a secular voting gap net of controls. Analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I present 
descriptive visualizations of substantive differences in turnout over time and across 
religious affiliation. Second, I assess the robustness of these patterns net of 
sociodemographic controls using logistic regression models. I report fully specified 
models testing the relationship between turnout, nonreligious affiliation (H1), and low 
attendance at religious services (H2). Finally, to investigate the mechanisms behind these 
trends, I examine interaction effects between non-affiliation and low attendance in line 
with earlier approaches to studying religion and civic engagement (Beyerlein and Hipp 
2006) and visualize those effects with predicted probabilities of turnout in the CCES 
data.  All models employ survey weights and robust standard errors.   6 7
Descriptive Trends  
 Figure 3.1 presents weighted proportion estimates for turnout among religiously 
 The ANES sample is substantively smaller than the CCES sample. Identifying this interaction pattern 6
requires a sizable number of respondents who are religiously unaffiliated, but nevertheless report higher 
levels of church attendance. In the ANES data, religiously unaffiliated respondents are more clustered at 
response option “4” on the five-point scale (“a few times a year”), with about half of unaffiliated 
respondents (n=222) choosing this category and smaller cell counts at the more extreme ends of the scale. 
In the CCES data, by contrast, respondents are more evenly distributed across categories with, at minimum, 
109 unaffiliated respondents reporting the most frequent attendance. Thus, the ANES data is potentially 
underpowered to detect interactions effects properly.
 Analyses use list wise deletion for missing data. Checks for missing data on controls yielded 7
issues with two independent variables: political ideology and income were each missing more 
than 1,000 cases in each wave of the CCES. Sensitivity analysis using multiple imputation with 
chained equations to estimate these values from non-missing control variables yielded 
substantively similar results to the models presented here. Results are available from the author 
upon request. 
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affiliated and unaffiliated respondents across each election. Two important descriptive 
points illustrate the benefits of using validated voting. First, a secular voting gap does 
exist in validated turnout, confirming gaps in self-reported turnout observed by earlier 
work. In the 2008 general election, the gap was about ten percentage points, and it 
widened to sixteen percentage points in the 2010 midterms. Second, however, this gap is 
closing in both data sets. By the 2016 presidential election, estimates of the secular voting 
gap narrow to about six percentage points—about half the gap reported in earlier 
literature and nearing confidence interval overlap. These results suggest that the secular 
voting gap is substantively smaller than originally reported, and may be less robust to 
control measures, especially in more recent elections.  
Sociodemographic Controls  
 Is the secular voting gap robust to controls for other common predictors of 
voting? Table 3.2 presents the results from logistic regression models for validated voting 
in each election year sample of the CCES. Models in the first column of Table 3.2 
examine use religious identification to measure the voting gap. Net of controls for age, 
racial identification, gender, marital status, parental status, income, education, and party 
identification, the secular voting gap is only significant and substantively large in 2008 
turnout (p<.01, Odds Ratio: 0.85). Models in the second column examine church 
attendance—a core measure for literature that supports the diffuse theory of civic 
engagement. Net of these controls in separate models, the relationship between low 
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church attendance and lower odds of validated turnout is more robust in earlier election 
years (2008 p<.001, 2010 p<.01), but this relationship is also not statistically significant 
in later election years.  
 Table 3.3 reports the same models for the three validated turnout measures in the 
2016 ANES data, and results are substantively similar. The only robust relationship in 
these models is an association between lower church attendance and lower odds of 
turnout in the 2016 presidential election (p<.001). These results provide provisional 
support for the domain-specific hypotheses H1b and H2b, suggesting that the relationship 
between low religious engagement and low voter turnout is neither as strong nor as robust 
as expected by the literature.  
Interaction Effects: Nonreligious Repertoires and Turnout  
 Research on religion and political engagement suggests that less frequent 
religious participation and the absence of religious socialization would reduce the 
institutional and ideological motivations for political participation. However, this work 
also emphasizes that context matters—the relationship between religious engagement and 
civic engagement is also dependent on what kinds of religious engagement occur in 
different social contexts (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). Chapters One and Two suggest that 
there are different repertoires of nonreligion. In this theory, reduced religious 
participation does not mean the same thing to every respondent. For a religiously-
affiliated respondent, lower attendance may indicate a nonreligious repertoire grounded 
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in drift from institutions. For an unaffiliated respondent, however, low church attendance 
may be an indicator of consistency between affinity and practice—a trait we would 
normally attribute to engaged and active citizens. It is possible that nonreligious 
respondents who are more ambiguous in their identification and practice are less likely to 
turn out, while those who make a clear and distinct break from religious affiliation and 
practice exhibit the traits of motivated partisans. One approach employed by the literature 
to investigate this theory is to estimate interaction effects between religious affiliation 
and religious attendance.  
 The third column in Table 3.2 for the CCES data includes both religious 
identification and religious activity alongside sociodemographic controls, including an 
interaction term for both religion measures. Changes in the AIC and the log likelihood 
indicate that this measurement specification improves model fit, with some surprising 
results. Controlling for the interaction between affiliation and church attendance produces 
models in which the estimated direct effects of religious non-affiliation and low church 
attendance are both significantly and substantively associated with lower odds of 
validated turnout (p<.001 in each case except attendance in 2016). However, the 
interaction effect, which compares less-frequently attending unaffiliated respondents to a 
baseline of affiliated respondents, is significant and moves in the opposite direction of 
these direct effects (p<.001 in each case).  
 What does this interaction effect mean? By generating predicted probabilities for 
each model in the third column of Table 3.2, we can plot the relationship between less 
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frequent church attendance and the probability of turnout in Figure 3.2 for unaffiliated 
respondents (the solid lines) and affiliated respondents (the dashed lines). For religiously 
affiliated respondents, the relationship between church attendance and turnout behaves as 
the literature would expect—less frequent reported attendance corresponds with a flat or 
declining probability of turnout in each election year. However, this relationship is not the 
same for unaffiliated respondents in the CCES data. For unaffiliated respondents, the 
probability of turnout rises with less frequent church attendance. This pattern makes 
sense in the context of research on ideologically-motivated nonreligious respondents such 
as atheists, agnostics, and people who leave religious institutions as an expression of 
liberal political ideology (Hout and Fischer 2002; Layman and Weaver 2016). 
  This interaction effect presents stronger support for the domain-specific 
hypotheses outlined above, because it demonstrates how a core mechanism in the 
political participation literature (church attendance) works substantially differently for 
respondents who do not identify with any particular religious tradition. Rather than 
becoming less involved in voting as they reduce their religious participation, unaffiliated 
respondents appear either equally as likely or more likely to vote than their affiliated 
counterparts as their religious participation wanes.  
 In sum, results using validated voting measures provide three key takeaways that 
should motivate scholars to revisit the relationship between religion and political 
participation and account for different repertoires of religious and nonreligious 
engagement. First, the secular voting gap appears much more narrow in recent election 
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years than originally estimated. Second, much of this gap is spurious to common 
demographic controls. Third, contrary to expectations in the literature, the relationship 
between attendance at religious services and political participation works differently for 
unaffiliated respondents, and those who attended services less frequently are actually 
more likely to be politically engaged than their more frequently attending unaffiliated 
counterparts.  
Discussion & Conclusion  
 The implicit assumption behind much of the current research on religion and 
political participation is that religious disaffiliation is a net loss for civic engagement 
because involvement in these institutions is cumulative and diffuse across institutional 
domains. Religious institutions provide both resources and ideological motivations to 
remain connected to one’s community and society, and so religious disaffiliation is seen 
as one symptom of a broader decline in civic engagement and institutional trust in the 
United States (Hout and Fischer 2002, 2014; Kasselstrand et al. 2017; Putnam 2001; 
Putnam and Campbell 2012). One empirical example of this assumption at work is 
reporting on the secular voting gap; if religiously-unaffiliated citizens are less likely to 
turn out to vote, we should be concerned about the political implications of widespread 
declines in religious affiliation and practice.  
 However, this conclusion may be misleading. Substantive and methodological 
concerns about the quality of self-reported measures of voting and exit polling for 
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capturing differences across demographic subgroups suggest that the secular voting gap 
could be smaller than originally anticipated or even spurious to other basic controls. The 
mechanism that links participation in religious organizations to broader trends in civic 
engagement is also dependent on different social contexts (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; 
Putnam and Campbell 2012), and it could be the case that tried and true measures of 
religious engagement in the literature work differently for respondents who have actively 
chosen to leave religious institutions than for those who are unaffiliated, but waver in 
their commitment to religious practices or affinities (e.g. Hout 2017).We should expect 
this kind of variation because nonreligion is not monolithic, and it does not necessarily 
represent a state of low civic engagement for all respondents who are not religiously 
affiliated (Baker and Smith 2015; Frost and Edgell 2017). For some, low religious 
participation is part of a broader drift from institutional affinities, but for others, it 
represents an ideological commitment to differentiate oneself from religious institutions, 
and we would expect this later group to behave more like motivated partisans.  
 The current study employed some of the latest approaches to measuring voter 
turnout to test whether the secular voting gap persists when we account for social context 
and variation among different kinds of nonreligious respondents. Analysis of validated 
voting gives good reason to reconsider reports of the bivariate relationship between 
disaffiliation and low voter turnout—whether in self-reports or exit polling. First, the 
secular gap in validated voting in the CCES and the ANES have converged substantively, 
especially in general elections since 2012. Second, multivariate analysis suggest that 
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other demographic factors such as age, education, and income explain most of this gap. 
Finally, while much of the literature demonstrates how high religious involvement 
associates with higher rates of civic engagement, interaction effects in this study 
demonstrate that less frequent attendance at religious services associates with higher odds 
of turnout among respondents who are already religiously unaffiliated. These results 
show that unaffiliated respondents with clear and consistent distinctions from religious 
institutions (either in identification or practice) show a greater propensity to turn out, 
while unaffiliated respondents who are inconsistent in their nonreligion (with more 
frequent service attendance) are less likely to turn out.  
 This finding has important implications for our understanding of the cultural 
conditions that promote civic engagement. They challenge the assumption that religious 
engagement is an unqualified good for civil society that will be eroded in the context of 
religious disaffiliation (Brady et al. 1995; Cassel 1999; Putnam 2001 Smets and VanHam 
2013). Instead, they highlight that disengaging from one particular form of community 
life does not necessarily create the conditions for disengaging from other forms of 
community life. In terms of voting, at least, it appears that religious individuals who drift 
from institutions—what Hout and Fischer (2002) call “unchurched believers”—are 
slowly catching up to their affiliated counterparts.  
 Rather than viewing religious disaffiliation as part of a broader decline in civic 
life (e.g Putnam 2001; Skocpol 2003; Voas and Chaves 2016), it may be more appropriate 
to engage a theoretical perspective that treats civic disengagement as a domain-specific 
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process—one that is sensitive the cultural specificity of different institutional domains 
and able to articulate why some of core indicators work differently for different groups 
(e.g. Collins 2010; Frost and Edgell 2018; Klinenberg 2013). Such an approach invites 
future research to consider why people lose trust in specific institutions in detail, and how 
that distrust may not simply spill over to other domains without first interacting with 
respondents’ substantive cultural and social standpoints (see, e.g. Pugh 2015; Wuthnow; 
2010; Zuckerman 2011). It also may be more appropriate to view civic disengagement as 
the reorganization of interest groups and coalitions around different points of 
mobilization and motivation (e.g. Kettell 2013; Schnabel and Bock 2017). Such an 
approach requires returning to fundamental questions about how social scientific research 
is conceptualizing and measuring what “counts” as civic engagement (e,g. Collins 2010; 
Joseph 2002).  
 These results also affirm other research that calls for conceptualizing nonreligion 
as a multidimensional construct and paying attention to substantive cultural differences 
across nonreligious respondents (e.g. Baker and Smith 2015; Stewart 2016; Keysar 2014; 
Stewart et al. 2017). In line with emerging research on political elites (Layman and 
Weaver 2016), this finding suggests that scholars should distinguish ideologically-
motivated nonreligious respondents in the general population when assessing the 
potential political impacts of religious change and disaffiliation. However, it also 
suggests that a categorical measurement approach to doing this is not always appropriate 
and may in fact elide a larger number of unaffiliated respondents with a higher propensity 
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for voting. In Chapter Two, we saw how cultural repertoires of nonreligion allow the 
same kinds of beliefs, identities, or practices to mean substantively different things as 
respondents combine them in different ways. These results from the CCES show how 
those repertoires can matter: people who are religiously unaffiliated but inconsistent in 
their behavior (i.e. attending religious services frequently) are less likely to turn out than 
their counterparts who are unaffiliated and never attend religious services. This variation 
within the religiously-unaffiliated is especially important to consider in light of claims of 
the secular voting gap that seek to make comparisons between the affiliated and the 
unaffiliated.   
 There are of course limitations to this analysis, especially that these data sets are 
fundamentally cross-sectional and cannot offer any insight as to whether ideological 
commitments to nonreligion are instrumental in respondents’ decisions to vote or not 
(Jerolmack and Khan 2014). Other scholars are raise questions about the matching 
procedures used to generate validated vote data (Berent et al. 2016), and so replication in 
additional data sets using different voter-matching procedures will be necessary in the 
future. Given these limitations, however, the current study is especially important for 
establishing that the often-repeated observation of lower voting among religiously-
unaffiliated Americans may not stand up to basic confirmatory tests beyond descriptive 
cross-tabulation and may be hiding more positive trends toward increased civic 
engagement.  
 Finally, this work also raises two questions for future research. First, as 
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nonreligion closely associates with age, we do not know whether the youngest cohort of 
Americans will age into higher religiosity or into more robust civic engagement later in 
life. If religious disaffiliation continues, these results illustrate a mechanism through 
which an increasing number of Americans who leave religious institutions could become 
more politically engaged as they develop alternative civic commitments and drift further 
from religious institutions. More work focusing on nonreligious organizations and 
advocacy groups (e,g, Blankholm 2014; Cimino and Smith 2014; García and Blankholm 
2016; Kettell 2014), as well as additional qualitative work to address the mechanisms 
outlined above, can help to further establish the plausibility of a cultural infrastructure to 
motivate secular voters.  
 Second, given the low proportional representation of non-religious Americans in 
the U.S. Legislature (Sandstrom 2017), these findings also raise questions about the 
future of religion and political representation. Today, many visible nonreligious advocacy 
groups represent a minority of ideologically committed atheist, agnostic, and secular 
humanist groups among the broader disaffiliated population. However, if more 
unaffiliated individuals who do not identify with these groups do become politically 
engaged, new questions arise about how political leaders will respond to this trend. Will 
new strategies emerge to recruit this growing group of potential voters, given that appeals 
to religiosity are a dominant strategy among American politicians (Domke and Coe 
2008)? If not, the answer may not lie in voting constituencies alone, but in cultural norms 
instantiated in American political institutions and networks (e.g. Heclo 2007; Lindsay 
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2008).  
 The American religious landscape is changing, and the political landscape is 
changing with it. To better understand the implications of these shifts, scholars will need 
to attend to the substantive cultural features of different demographic groups. Trends 
among non-religious Americans provide a key example in which such attention can yield 
surprising findings that advance our thinking about political engagement.  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Chapter 4: Opinion 
Nonreligious Repertoires & Attitude Constraint 
 How do people evaluate political issues? Classic research in political science 
holds that attitude constraint—the expression of consistent opinions across different 
issues—is conditioned by their information, attention, and ideology (e.g. Zaller 1992; 
Converse 1962). While the U.S. has undergone political polarization over the past thirty 
years, in which people may identify more strongly with political parties and hold stronger 
negative sentiments toward the opposition party (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), this has 
not necessarily produced more people with more consistent preferences on specific policy 
issues. “Partisans without constraint” (Baldassari and Gelman 2008) are quite common, 
because while people are more accurately sorting themselves into political groups, they 
have not necessarily begun to pay more attention to specific issue domains.  
 However, there is a case in which attitude constraint is more consistent than these 
theories would expect. Research has demonstrated that religious experiences can shape 
how people think about a variety of issues, including conventional “culture wars” topics 
like abortion and same-sex marriage (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Hunter 1991; Lakoff 2002; 
Hart-Brinson 2018; Schnabel and Sevell 2017; Whitehead and Perry 2015), but also 
broader issue domains including the social safety net (e.g Steensland 2006), racial 
inequality (e.g. Emerson and Smith 2000), and immigration (e.g. Fussell 2014). Much of 
this research highlights how stronger religious commitments have a divergent 
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relationship with issue preferences, fostering stronger conservative and progressive 
preferences depending on how respondents package their religious commitments with 
their political considerations in different repertoires of expression.  
 Does nonreligion have a similar relationship with attitude constraint? The answer 
to this question is not immediately clear, because different theories of religious 
disaffiliation suggest different outcomes. The backlash hypothesis holds that liberal 
political views eventually lead people to leave religious groups, especially in times and 
locations of intense partisan conflict (Djupe et al. 2018; Margolis 2018; Hout and Fischer 
2002, 2014). If nonreligious people are motivated partisans, they may exhibit stronger 
attitude constraint with consistent liberal attitudes on a variety of issues. However, given 
trends in cohort change that support the drift hypotheses, and the fact that religious 
disaffiliation has been on the rise since the 1990s, it is also true that an increasing number 
of nonreligious people continue to evaluate new political issues long after they leave 
religious groups. While the initial choice to disaffiliate may be an outcome of 
partisanship, the different repertoires of nonreligion that people develop after they 
disaffiliate may not have a consistent relationship with their political views later on. As 
we saw in Chapter One, many unaffiliated respondents identify as independents or 
moderates. In Chapter Two, we saw that many affiliated respondents also look 
substantively similarly to unaffiliated respondents in terms of their repertoires of personal 
and public nonreligion. It is worth investigating in detail whether different cultural 
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repertoires that reach across these identity groups associate with trends in attitude 
constraint.  
 Evidence for the backlash hypothesis typically focuses on culture wars policy 
issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. These issues are useful for testing the 
relationship between elite framing and attitudinal constraint, because they focus on the 
coordinated messaging strategy of conservative religious and political leaders. We expect 
clergy, media figures, and other religious elites to package together different cultural 
repertoires and model them for the faithful (Domke and Coe 2008; Massengil 2008; 
Liebman and Wuthnow 1983). Studies then examine whether people observe 
conservative religious frames, reject them, and subsequently drop their religious 
affiliation (Djupe et al. 2018; Margolis 2018; Putnam and Campbell 2012). This approach 
focuses on the conventional model of public opinion as the taking up of explicit, 
declarative cultural messages (in this case, belief-centered religious appeals) to see 
whether respondents align their political and religious belief systems. 
 The cultural constraint of attitudes can also operate through an indirect pathway, 
in which people develop different, non-declarative evaluative frameworks to make 
decisions in the world. Religious socialization can provide people with a wide variety of 
cultural repertoires that they eventually use in political decision making transmitted by 
the efforts of lay leaders (e.g. Bean 2014) and interpersonal interactions with other 
congregants (Becker 1998; Delehanty 2016; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003). This is 
important because there has not yet been a concerted framing effort among mainstream 
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political elites to reach unaffiliated voters. Research can also pursue a more conservative 
test of attitudinal constraint by assessing the relationship between religious commitments 
and ideological alignment on issues in the absence of a direct framing strategy. 
 This chapter argues that religious and nonreligious experiences provide different 
cultural repertoires can constrain policy attitudes. First, I review literature on these 
conventional and cultural approaches to the study of public opinion. Following literature 
in political psychology (e.g. Jost et al. 2009, Federico et al. 2014, 2013a, 2013b), and 
cultural sociology (Martin and Desmond 2010; Perrin & McFarland 2011; Perrin et al. 
2014), I argue that the interpretative frameworks that different nonreligious repertoires 
provide align with different patterns in attitudinal constraint.  
 Second, I outline three broad issue domains —the social safety net, racial 
inequality, and immigration policy—that are among the most pressing issues of our time, 
but also outside the scope of conventional “culture wars” issues discussed in the literature 
on nonreligion. Across all three issue domains outlined here, the role of religion in 
attitudinal constraint is contingent on the specific repertoire of religious experience with 
which respondents engage these questions. In instances where respondents in religious 
communities develop repertoires of solidarity and care that package beliefs and practices 
with reconciliation and service, attitudinal trends suggest that people will be more likely 
to support progressive social policy across these issues. However, repertoires that 
package religious identities to assessments of individual moral worth and collective 
identity tend to reinforce conservative policy preferences. 
!94
 Third, using the measures developed in Chapter Two for public and personal 
nonreligious repertoires, I demonstrate similar divergent patterns for nonreligion in two 
survey data sets. Controlling for both repertoires demonstrates that the public 
nonreligious repertoire—a preference for secular authority in the public sphere—is more 
closely aligned with issue preferences in these policy domains than the personal 
nonreligious repertoire of low religious engagement. Where the literature has focused on 
questions about religious beliefs or pious commitments in public opinion, this analysis 
shows that trends in attitude alignment are driven more by religious and nonreligious 
repertoires that concern religious authority and cultural membership.  
Culture and Attitude Constraint 
 Conventional accounts of public opinion formation in political science and 
sociology highlight two analytical challenges for researchers interested in how people 
think about policy. The first challenge is that people are inconsistent in their issue 
preferences, because these preferences require more attention and prior knowledge than 
the average person has to devote to political life (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 
1962; Converse et al. 1965, Kinder 1983 provides an extended summary). The second 
challenge is that regular surveys, media coverage, and elite influence teach people how to 
have an opinion, so research focused on these inconsistent responses risks erroneously 
treating them as indicators of some underlying “real” preference when surveying itself 
manufactures those very preferences (Jeolmack and Kahn 2014; Bourdieu 1979; Blumer 
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1948). Trends toward political polarization in the U.S. would appear to challenge these 
assumptions, suggesting that more people are willing to “pick a side” in the debate. 
However, Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) emphasize that this trend may only create 
“partisans without constraint”—people who are better at labeling which political party 
shares their interests, but who do not necessarily show corresponding changes in their 
actual attitudes on political issues (also see DiMaggio et al. 1996). Given these 
challenges, studying nonreligion and public opinion formation could be a non-starter if 
political elites have not seen fit to explicitly appeal to nonreligious voters and foster 
attitudinal constraint based on secular identity claims (e.g. Chapp and Coe 2019). 
 However, the field of public opinion research has made several methodological 
advances that address the first challenge. By focusing on broad sets of issue domains that 
we would expect to influence multiple measures for different policy indicators (e.g. 
Goren 2004, 2013), and using multiple survey items that evaluate policy issues in 
aggregate (Achen 1975; Ansolabehere et al. 2008; Krosnick and Berent 1993), research 
can map underlying trends in how respondents evaluate policy questions that are less 
susceptible to varied information about any single policy issue. This approach takes gaps 
in respondent information seriously, but also gets closer to capturing the full range of 
information that people have received and sample from answer questions about these 
issue domains (Zaller 1992).  
 Research in political psychology and the sociology of culture helps to address the 
second problem. Rather than treating public opinion as merely the choice of issues 
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imposed by elites, this research pushes work to view public opinion as the expression of 
different elective affinities (Perrin and McFarland 2011; Jost et al. 2009). Policy views 
are performative; they are not necessarily indicative of what people want government to 
do in terms of specific or precise policy, but rather what they want government to 
represent and support with its policy endeavors.  
 This approach sets the unit of analysis at a person’s performative attempt to 
convey their judgement in the social context of a survey, rather than evaluating response 
patterns as indicators of “correct” information. For example, people use responses to 
normative behavioral questions about topics such as exercise or church attendance to 
convey their intended identities to researchers, often providing inaccurate reports of the 
behaviors that are nonetheless accurate reflections of their commitment to religion or 
their intention to live a healthy lifestyle (Hadaway et al. 1993; Brenner and DeLamater 
2016). By paying attention to this, the gap between talk and action becomes a useful 
analytic tool, rather than a source of error.  
 Political ideology provides people with existential resources to derive identities 
and meaning from political life, epistemic resources to understand the nature of the world 
and how it works, and relational resources to make senes of their group membership and 
relative social position to others (Jost et al. 2009, 2013, Martin and Desmond 2010, 
Perrin et al. 2014).  These cultural repertoires provide a set of evaluative criteria that 
people can draw on to make both conscious, declarative, and reasoned judgements and 
intuitive, non-declarative, “snap” judgements (Lizardo 2017). Survey research using 
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policy issues can target the mediated relationship between ideological positions on 
specific issues and pre-conscious, ad-hoc judgments grounded in deeper socialization 
(Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009). Researchers can use response pattens to policy issues to 
identify affinities between different cultural repertoires for thinking about a variety of 
political issues such as tolerance (Stewart et al. 2018), nationalism and populism 
(Albertson 2011; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016, Bonikowski and Gidron 2016), or 
symbolic boundaries and cultural membership (Edgell and Tranby 2010) and to map the 
expression of these cultural repertoires to specific policy preferences (e.g Edgell et al. in 
press).   
 A cultural approach to public opinion suggests that people use coherent cultural 
repertoires to make sense of political issues. This process can be the result of specific 
elite framing and packaging, as movement leaders provide members with explicit, 
declarative “scripts” that link their identities to movement goals and outcomes (e.g. 
Massengil 2008, Delehanty 2016). However, the theory also implies that people draw on 
the non-declarative aspects of their repertoires to make decisions about issues that fall 
outside of those explicit scripts. A sufficiently conservative test of these cultural 
repertoires can target the non-declarative aspects by selecting issues that have not yet 
undergone an elite framing process. Here, I apply this theoretical approach to a review of 
the literature on religion and public opinion in three issue domains and discuss how we 
can leverage these domains to study attitudinal constraint among the nonreligious.  
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Religion & Social Issues 
 I focus on three major issue domains: support for the social safety net, evaluations 
of racial inequality, and immigration policy. I focus on these three issue domains because 
they are some of the most important contemporary issues in the political conversation at 
the time this survey data was collected—amid high profile stories including Black Lives 
Matter, political battles over the Affordable Care Act, and debates regarding the DREAM 
act and immigration policy in the 2016 Presidential campaign. As I discuss below, 
research shows that public opinion on three issue domains can be conditioned by 
religious considerations.  
 I also focus on these issues because they can provide a sufficiently conservative 
test of attitude alignment around religious and nonreligious repertoires for three reasons. 
First, all of these issues invoke moral considerations that provoke respondents to consider 
their moral commitment to others in society. Thus, they are likely to provoke respondents 
to invoke their cultural repertoires for moral evaluation—be they religious or 
nonreligious. Second, the kind of repertoire invoked matters for each of these outcomes, 
because research finds the relationship between religion and each of these issue domains 
is divergent. Both liberal and conservative attitudes on these issues can be strengthened 
by particular religious repertoires in concert with partisan interests, and the same should 
be true for nonreligious repertoires. Third, these issues are not the primary focus on 
nonreligious advocacy groups, and they are not issues that the backlash theory would 
predict to produce disaffiliation, such as attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Attitudinal 
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constraint on these issues is unlikely to have been primed by nonreligious mobilization 
efforts. As I will discuss in Chapter Five, organizers and movement leaders tend to pursue 
an agenda specifically tailored toward issues concerning the separation of church and 
state and religion in the public sphere, and as a result they tend to gravitate toward the 
“culture wars” issues such as religious expression in public, scientific authority in the 
crafting of public policy, and legal battles for the rights of secular minority groups (see 
Kettell 2013, 2014, LeDrew 2015, and Schultzke 2013 for a detailed discussion of secular 
movement agendas). Without a readymade script associating nonreligion and these issues 
from movement leaders, these analyses provide a stronger test for evidence of attitudinal 
constraint around nonreligious repertoires.  
 Research on religion and attitudes toward the social safety net, racial inequality, 
and immigration policy observes a divergent relationship between religious commitments 
and political views, one in which religious commitments can foster both stronger 
progressive and stronger conservative views on these issues. This is not a “goldilocks” or 
“just so” story where religion produces the effects researchers want to see (Martin 2015). 
Instead, this research illustrates how religious experiences provide a set of different 
cultural repertoires that interact with partisanship to produce stronger views. Researchers 
can map these different repertoires at work under different contexts and observe different 
effects.  
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The Social Safety Net 
 Attitudes toward government support for the poor are not merely driven by 
economic factors, but also prior heuristics and biases such as partisanship (Brooks and 
Manza 2013), ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009), moral evaluations of the poor 
(Skitka and Tetlock 1993), and preferences derived from core personal values about 
conformity and authority (Goren 2013; 2004). Attitudes toward the social safety net rely 
on cultural constructions of the “deserving poor,” based on the assumption that poverty is 
the result of an immoral aversion to work (Gans 1995). Such categories are an example of 
the socially constructed moral classifications that undergird our thinking about inequality 
more broadly (Massey 2008). Studies of the U.S. welfare state trace its development as a 
conditional system designed to offer aid those deemed “more worthy” of support, such as 
veterans and mothers (Mohr 1994; Skocpol 1996). Political actors rely on these 
discursive constructions of moral worth to make decisions about safety net reforms 
(Steensland 2006), and much of the contemporary conversation about these policies 
focuses on defining who qualifies for services and how those services might instill 
particular attitudes toward work, the self, and family life (e.g. Soss et al. 2011; Gowan 
2010; Wacquant 2009).   
 Religion is a key institutional arbiter of moral classifications in the United States 
(e.g. Caplow et al. 1983; Edgell et al. 2016). Moral classifications are often contested, 
creating an ambivalent context where religion can both strengthen and limit support for 
social services. For example, the U.S. welfare state relies heavily on the efforts of faith-
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based groups working to improve social conditions, but also leans on these groups’ ability 
to “bypass the state” in the era of devolution and welfare reform to justify cutting back on 
social safety net provisions. (Davis and Robinson 2012; Katz 2008).  
 This means that the effects of religiosity on respondents’ policy heuristics can cut 
both ways, and denominational affiliation alone does not uniformly predict views on 
economic issues. Religious interpretations of the moral imperative to aid the poor can 
spur efforts for social reform (e.g. Markofski 2015; Regnerus and Smith 1998), and 
religiosity can prime altruistic behavior (Saroglou et al. 2005). Religious commitments 
can also reinforce ethnocentric distinctions, political intolerance, and conflicts over moral 
categories that can limit support for aiding the poor if respondents feel they are not 
sufficiently reformed (Wilson 2009; Froese et al. 2008; Rowatt et al. 2005; Barker and 
Carman 2000; Gusfield 1986). Malka et al. (2011) find both effects; high religiosity 
directly associates with higher support for social services, but also has a strong indirect 
effect through conservative political ideology that lowers support for social services. 
 A similar pattern may hold for nonreligious repertoires. For some people, lower 
engagement with religious groups is an individualistic experience that is grounded in 
autonomy from institutions, or even skepticism of institutions (Hout and Fischer 2002, 
Kasselstrand et al. 2017). It would not be surprising if these nonreligious respondents 
were less concerned with the role of these social policies, and it is possible that they 
would even be more skeptical of such efforts. On the other hand, other people who are 
more concerned with the moral authority of religion in the public sphere may also be 
!102
more skeptical of the conventional moral claims of “deservingness” that tend to follow 
the conversation about these policies. If a repertoire of nonreligion that focuses on this 
moral authority is more salient to those respondents, we might expect them to be more 
supportive of a stronger social safety net.  
Racial Inequality 
 A wealth of research finds that different aspects of religiosity structure attitudes 
about race and racial inequality (e.g. Becker 1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Hinojosa 
and Park 2004; Martí 2005, 2009; Tranby and Hartmann 2008; Johnson et al. 2010; Todd 
et al. 2015). One of the best known applications of this theory argues that Protestant 
theological systems and local church cultures intersect to bolster individualistic 
perspectives that limit the way congregations engage with racial and economic inequality 
(Becker 1998; Chaves 2004; Wuthnow 1988; 2012). For example, Emerson and Smith 
argue that the individualistic theological perspective advanced by evangelical 
Protestantism encourages believers to frame racial equality as “spiritually and 
individually based, not temporally and socially based” (2000: 58). This frame casts racial 
reconciliation as an outcome of individual and group commitments to religious 
engagement, rather than social systemic change. The individualism fostered by 
evangelical Protestantism thus limits the scope of explanations for racial inequality and, 
in turn, limits congregations’ capacity and desire to challenge the status quo.  
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 Other work extends this account with three points. First, religious toolkits for 
making sense of race are defined by more than doctrine alone (Brown 2009; Todd et al. 
2015; Edgell and Tranby 2007). Mainline Protestant and Catholic respondents can also 
obtain similar individualistic frames, (Eitle and Steffens 2009; Hinojosa and Park 2004), 
and controlling for congregants’ sociodemographic backgrounds can attenuate the effect 
of denomination on racial attitudes (Taylor and Merino 2011). Frost and Edgell (2017) 
demonstrate that it is the interaction of sociodemographic factors with religious beliefs 
that drives racial attitudes. Religious orthodoxy, involvement in a congregation, and 
personal religious salience all matter when interacted with these demographic factors. 
 Second, shared religious experiences can also build cultural toolkits that foster 
mutual understanding across racial and ethnic groups (Martí 2005, 2009). Research also 
highlights the centrality of religious experiences and institutions to movements for racial 
justice in the United States (e.g. Smith 2014; Morris 1986). Leaders of faith-based 
community organizing groups, especially liberal Protestant groups, use shared theological 
commitments both to challenge individualism (Braunstein 2012; Braunstein et al. 2014; 
Wood 1999) and reframe individualism (Delehanty 2016), in order to build coalitions 
committed to justice and equity.  
 Finally, certain religious toolkits do more than just reinforce a benign 
individualism; they can also bolster negative attitudes toward racial minority groups. 
Research employing critical whiteness theories finds that religious individualism can also 
covary with “laissez faire” racism (Bobo and Smith 1998; Bonilla-Silva 2006; Kinder and 
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Sanders 1998; Tranby and Hartmann 2008), and survey manipulations meant to prime 
Christian religiosity can raise the reporting of covert racial prejudice and general negative 
affect toward African Americans (Johnson et al. 2010). This work raises the possibility 
that certain common religious toolkits may not only make structural solutions to racial 
inequality less plausible to respondents—they may also strengthen racial inequality as the 
status quo by morally legitimizing racial boundaries.   
 The larger conclusion from this work is that religion is not monolithic and does 
not shape racial attitudes in a single way. Instead, religious groups’ local cultures and 
belief systems intersect to produce different cultural toolkits that respondents can use to 
make sense of their stances on various issues, including race (e.g. Bean 2014; Bracey and 
Moore 2017; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2012; Lichterman 2008; Noll 2008; Wright et al. 
2015).  
 Since laissez-faire racism is grounded in assumptions about the moral worth of 
individuals’ efforts to overcome inequality (Bobo and Smith 1998; Kinder and Sanders 
1998), a respondents’ propensity to moral pluralism or individualism, made salient 
through different nonreligious repertoires, may also associate with their tendency to 
evaluate other racial groups as deserving or undeserving of equitable treatment. For 
example, research has noted the centrality of white experiences and identities to 
movement atheism and how this racialized framework does not resonate with the 
experiences of secular activists of color (Hutchinson 2019; LeDrew 2015). Racial 
inequality is an issue domain with the potential to highlight variation in attitudes among 
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the nonreligious and to sharpen our understanding of the cultural frameworks that 
implicitly link religious experiences to other policy topics.     
Immigration  
 While views toward the social safety net and racial inequality use public policy to 
tap moral commitments to fellow citizens, immigration policy issues also act as a proxy 
for assumptions about who belongs as a citizen. While public opinion on immigration 
policy is often conditioned by material conditions, such as economic health and the 
demand for immigrant labor, it is also conditioned by cultural effects such nationalism, 
collective identity, and perceived group position and status (Fussell 2014). Here again, 
the effects of different combinations of religious beliefs, practices, and institutional 
efforts can pull in opposite directions on public opinion, because religion can provide 
different sets of repertoires through which people can make sense of these questions 
about cultural membership. 
 For example, religion is often instrumental to the acceptance and integration of 
immigrants into their new communities. Religious organizations often provide necessary 
social services to immigrant groups (Cadge and Ecklund 2007), even proving 
instrumental in the sanctuary movement to support undocumented immigrants (Wiltfang 
and McAdam 1991). There is evidence that exposure to information about these services 
and a faith-based commitment to help others may foster more accepting attitudes toward 
immigrants, as more frequent attendance at religious services associates with more 
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progressive views on immigration policy, especially among white congregants (Brown 
and Brown 2017; Knoll 2009).   
 On the other hand, religious commitments can also make religious identities more 
salient to respondents (Bail 2014; Brubaker 2015), and here there is evidence that strong 
symbolic boundaries can reinforce religious differences around immigrant groups and 
contribute to preferences for more strict immigration policy. Religion and national 
identity, especially Christian Nationalism, are associated with more strict opposition to 
immigration policy (Fussell 2014; McDaniel et al. 2011). Sherkat and Lehman (2018) 
find a similar pattern, as well as one in which respondents who adhere to a literal view of 
the bible and belong to sectarian Protestant denominations are more likely to express 
hostile views of immigrants. Support for religious authority can also foster a specific 
notion of citizenship, creating a situation in which immigrants from different religious 
backgrounds, especially Muslims, are more likely to face prejudice and intolerance 
(Gerteis et al. in press; Kalkan et al. 2009). 
 Here too, nonreligion can provide varied repertoires to make sense of 
immigration. It is possible that a similar skepticism of moral authority that drives 
inclusive attitudes toward social welfare and racial reconciliation may also undermine a 
strict adherence to the notions of “imagined community” that support exclusive 
definitions of citizenship and national belonging (Anderson 2006; Smith 2003). However, 
there is also evidence that a narrow vision of secular authority among some religious 
subgroups fosters a distrust of minority groups perceived to cling too closely to religious 
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commitments (LeDrew 2015). It is also possible that particular kinds of nonreligious 
experience foster attitudes that are ambivalent or even less accepting toward immigration.  
Why Nonreligious Repertoires Matter 
 Chapter Two outlined two different cultural repertoires of nonreligion—one 
grounded in personal commitments such as low attendance at religious services, low 
religious salience, and less-certain belief in god, and one grounded in public 
commitments such as a secular vision for the public sphere in which people disagree that 
good leaders or good policy should adhere to religious tenets. Both of these repertoires 
capture different dimensions of social experience. Each repertoire includes a different set 
of evaluative criteria for policy issues, and measures for one repertoire are not necessarily 
an effective proxy for the other.  
 Personal nonreligion is about low religious engagement. It is more closely aligned 
with the drift hypothesis of religious disaffiliation, and this helps to explain Hout and 
Fischer’s (2014) finding that unaffiliated respondents are higher in individualism and 
Kasselstrand et al.’s (2017) finding that they express stronger skepticism of social 
institutions. Nonreligion, manifested in one’s private life, is primarily about 
individualism and personal autonomy—a lack of committed ties to religious groups, a 
lack of adherence to theological systems, and a lack of investment in religious identities.  
 Not every unaffiliated individual experiences their nonreligion solely as a lack. 
The backlash theory draws our attention to how nonreligion is also substantively 
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ideological for some respondents, containing a set of tangible beliefs about community 
and authority in the modern world (e.g. Layman and Weaver 2016). The key difference 
demonstrated in Chapter Two is that these ideological commitments primarily have to do 
with the role of community and religious authority, public concerns about leadership and 
policymaking, and public issues rather than private troubles. Here, nonreligion is more 
about respondents’ tendency to affirm or reject certain core assumptions about authority 
rather than simply affirming their individualism, and it provides a set of tools to answer 
questions about the proper moral order of political life.  
 The issue domains outlined above all hinge on respondents’ conceptualization of 
moral authority—claims about deservingness and cultural membership. In each of these 
cases, we would expect respondents’ willingness to express skepticism of religious moral 
authority, fostered by a their adherence to public repertoires of nonreligion, to load on 
more progressive views on each of these issues. On the other hand, research has also 
highlighted how individualistic thinking can also load on more conservative views on 
each of these issues. Net of the effect of public repertoires, it is possible that private 
nonreligious repertoires associated with this individualism may only explain why some 
nonreligious respondents appear more politically centrist—people without a strong sense 
of attitudinal constraint from the public repertoires may be left only with the weaker 
attachments to social institutions fostered by private repertoires. If research does not 
control for both of these repertoires, it may miss this underlying variation in the cultural 
toolkits that respondents have at their disposal for evaluating political questions. In the 
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absence of controls for one set of repertoires, it is possible that the other may be 
misinterpreted.  
 In Chapter Two, preliminary analysis showed how respondents’ choice of 
nonreligious identification was most closely associated with a personal nonreligion 
repertoire comprised of low belief, behavior, and salience. Self-reported political 
ideology, however, was more closely associated with a repertoire of public nonreligion, 
net of controls for the private repertoire. The following analysis builds on these 
preliminary patterns to assess the role of these repertoires in attitudinal constraint, testing 
whether attitudes on these contemporary issues are more closely bundled with personal or 
with public nonreligion. The research outlined above suggests two expectations for the 
study: 
1. Because public nonreligion is a repertoire concerned with questions about religious 
authority and community, it will have a stronger and more robust positive 
relationship with progressive political views than private nonreligion.  
2. Because personal nonreligion is a repertoire concerned with individualism and 
autonomy from institutions, it will have a negative or null relationship with 
progressive political views, net of controls for public nonreligion.  
Because most research on the nonreligious employs measures of the personal repertoire
—relying on measures of identity or private religious practice—evidence that supports 
these expectations provide an important corrective to the literature. It would suggest that 
an approach using personal religious commitments as a proxy for public religious 
commitments provides less explanatory power for attitude constraint than one focused on 
public repertoires.  
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Core Measures 
 The following analysis uses the two nationally representative data sets from 
Chapter Two—the Boundaries in the American Mosaic Survey (BAM 2014) and the 
Center for the Study of Political Psychology election survey (CSPP 2016). To measure 
personal and public nonreligious repertoires, I use the same predicted factor scores for 
each respondent validated in Chapter Two. 
 Attitudes on the three core issue dimensions are measured by standardized 
composite scales from each survey data set, summarized in Table 4.1. To measure 
attitudes toward the social safety net, the BAM survey asked respondents about their 
government spending preferences—whether they sought to (1) fully fund, (2) fund at 
reduced levels, or (3) eliminate funding for four policies: social security, SNAP (food 
stamps), welfare, and public education (a = 0.78). The CSPP survey asked respondents 
four likert-type policy items ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly support) on 
four policy proposals: raising taxes on the wealthy to maintain support for Social Security 
and Medicare, raising taxes on the wealthy to help reduce income inequality, raising the 
federal minimum wage to $12.50 an hour, and requiring employers to offer paid family 
leave for new parents and caretakers (a=0.84).  
 The literature on religion and attitudes toward racial inequality suggests two 
important outcome measures to test: respondents’ positive or negative affect toward 
different racial groups and respondents’ attitudes about racial inequality. The BAM 
survey measured affect through a series of four, four-point likest-type response options 
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asking respondents whether they felt members of different social groups shared their 
vision of American society (1-strongly agree - 4- not at all agree). The BAM racial affect 
measure combines attitudes toward African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and 
Recent Immigrants  (a=0.84). The CSPP survey asked feeling thermometer questions in 8
which respondents rated a series of groups on a scale of 0-100, and the racial affect 
measure for this survey combines attitudes toward African Americans, Hispanics, and 
Recent Immigrants as well (a=0.81). To measure attitudes toward policies aimed to 
alleviating racial inequality, the BAM survey asked a series of four-point likert-type items 
(1-strongly agree - 4-strongly disagree), evaluating whether respondents thought African 
Americans should “receive special consideration in job hiring and school admissions,” 
“get economic assistance from the government,” and should receive more aid from 
“charities and other nonprofit organizations” (a=0.85). The CSPP survey used a truncated 
form of Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) racial resentment scale to tap attitudes toward racial 
equality and redistribution (“Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special 
favors,” “Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve,”  “It’s really 
a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as whites,” and  “Generations of slavery and discrimination have 
 The decision to include immigrations in two of these measures is grounded in both theoretical and 8
empirical patterns. Theoretically, a large body of research traces the history of U.S. immigration policy as a 
racialized process in which both the state and everyday citizens concerned themselves with the racial 
composition of the population (e.g. Jacobson 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003). Empirically, 
attitudes toward immigrants in these scales tacked closely to attitudes toward other racial groups in PCA 
and do not substantially change Chronbach’s Alphas when treated as an additive scale. Therefore, these 
questions allow the analysis to employ a diverse range of racial minority groups in order to tap generalized 
racial affect among respondents rather than relying on single, error-prone measures alone.
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created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower 
class.”) (a = 0.82). 
 Finally, the BAM survey measured three different attitudes toward immigration 
policy, rather than attitudes about recent immigrants themselves: preferences for federal 
spending on immigration enforcement, agreement for whether the U.S. should do more to 
limit immigration, and preferences for whether immigrants should have to learn english 
as a condition of citizenship (a = 0.61). The CSPP survey asked respondents whether 
they would favor an effort by the federal government to deport all undocumented 
immigrants, whether people immigrating to the U.S. legally is generally a good or bad 
thing for the country, and whether they favored automatically granting citizenship to 
children of undocumented immigrants if they are born in the U.S. (a = 0.65). These two 
composite measures are less internally consistent than the others, due to respondents’ 
substantive differences in attitudes toward documented and undocumented immigration 
(Wright et al. 2016). I maintain these composite scales to examines attitudes in general, 
though future research can also interrogate the legal/illegal distinction as a salient cultural 
construct that may covary with religious repertoires.  
Analytic Approach 
 Analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I present a descriptive overview of how 
these measures vary across conventional nonreligious identity groups: atheists, agnostics, 
“nothing in particular” respondents, and “spiritual but not religious” respondents. This 
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approach only provides minimal evidence of attitudinal constraint among nonreligious 
respondents, but, as discussed in Chapter Two, this also illustrates the limitations of using 
imprecise self-identification categories to infer nonreligious repertoires and political 
attitudes.  
 To formally test the expectations above, the second part of analysis moves to 
using a series of OLS models to test the relationship between personal and public 
nonreligious repertoires and the four attitude scales in each data set. I test these 
relationships both with and without a common set of controls across each survey for basic 
sociodemographic factors and political ideology: political party identification, gender, 
race, age, education (highest degree attained), and household income. While the use of 
these control variables is limited, it is intended to produce as close a replication across 
each of the data sets as possible.  
 Finally, I explore the mechanisms that underly these associations with a set of 
supplementary models in the third section of analysis. These include the possibility that 
each nonreligious repertoire acts as a proxy for other social psychological considerations 
such as authoritarianism or need for cognitive closure. While these data are 
fundamentally cross sectional and cannot provide the time-ordering necessary for causal 
inference, these supplemental analyses help to establish a conceptual ordering of personal 
factors, nonreligious repertoires, and issue preferences.  
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Descriptive Results - Nonreligious Identities  
 Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of each of the four core issue scales across 
the nonreligious identification measures in each survey. In each of these outcome 
measures, higher values indicate stronger progressive views, such as higher support for 
the safety net, more positive racial affect, stronger recognition of racial inequality, and 
lower support for restrictive immigration polices. Following previous research on attitude 
patterns among the nonreligious (e.g. Baker and Smith 2015; Hout and Fischer 2014; 
Stewart 2016), the most progressive distributions of attitudes appear among atheists and 
agnostics—the most distinct identity groups that clearly differentiate themselves from 
religious others. In many cases, “spiritual but not religious” (SBNR) and “nothing in 
particular” (NIP) respondents show similar attitude preferences to religiously-affiliated 
respondents. In most cases, the widest difference between average attitude scores of these 
groups is about half a standard deviation higher for atheists. 
 However, there are also some unexpected trends for this literature. SBNR 
respondents appear more supportive of the social safety net across both surveys. In the 
2014 BAM data, agnostics and NIP respondents express slightly lower positive racial 
affect than the other groups, expressing stronger social distance from racial minority 
groups. Overall, these descriptive differences suggest that there may be underlying 
heterogeneity within some of these nonreligious sub-groups, and they also help to 
illustrate how in the aggregate this group may appear more progressive on some issues, 
but also more centrist on others—NIP and SBNR respondents together far outnumber 
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self-identified atheists and agnostics, and their inclusion in an aggregate category may 
pull the average attitude score closer to the grand mean on some measures. To test 
whether nonreligion is significantly associated with attitude constrain net of controls, we 
also need to move beyond these identity-based patterns to include respondents who may 
be misclassified, but substantively nonreligious. To do this, formal tests for significance 
with control variables use the factor scores for personal and public nonreligious 
repertoires to assess how attitudes covary with these measures.  
Multivariable Results - Nonreligious Repertoires 
 The models reported in Table 4.2 test each of the four attitude measures with 
public and personal repertoires, both with and without sociodemographic control 
variables. Figure 4.2 summarizes and visualizes these results for ease of interpretation, 
plotting the regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals to summarize the 
strength and direction of the estimated relationships. This figure also includes 
supplementary analysis using a seven point scale for party identification. As in Chapter 
Two, where basic models suggested public nonreligion is more closely associated with 
self-reports of liberal political ideology, public nonreligion is also more closely 
associated with Democratic party identification and progressive attitudinal constraint. 
Across each of the models without control variables (the lefthand panel of Figure 4.2), 
public nonreligion is significantly and positively associated with each outcome measure 
in each data set. Controlling for public nonreligion in each of these models produces 
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estimates in which personal nonreligion is negatively-signed and significant in most cases
—in other words, respondents who are high in personal nonreligion but low on public 
nonreligion appear slightly less progressive across these issues. Wald tests for differences 
in the estimate of these coefficients were statistically significant in all cases (p<.05 for all 
cases, p<.001 in the majority of cases).  
 When control measures for common sociodemographic variables and party ID are 
introduced into each of the models (the right hand panel of Figure 4.2), these estimates 
begin to converge. Both public and personal nonreligion are rendered non-significant in 
some cases, such as in attitudes toward the social safety net and racial attitudes measured 
on the BAM survey. However, the general pattern in significance and direction of 
estimates persists across these models in Table 4.2. Wald tests for differences in the 
estimate of these coefficients also held in significance, especially for party ID in both 
data sets (p<.001), immigration views in both data sets (p<.001), and attitudes about 
racial inequality in the CSPP data (p<.001). Nonreligious repertoires are not necessarily 
the most important deciding factor in all cases of attitude constraint, but they do not 
necessarily need to be—the important pattern indicated by these results is that public 
nonreligion is more closely aligned with progressive attitudes then personal nonreligion. 
This finding helps to explain the patterns observed in Chapter One by demonstrating that 
personal nonreligion alone is not necessarily a sufficient condition for attitude alignment. 
While nonreligious respondents as a whole may appear more liberal, this is due more to a 
subset of respondents who have developed a secular vision of the public sphere. Without 
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the presence of this repertoire, respondents who are simply not religious in their personal 
lives are not necessarily any more progressive than their personally religious 
counterparts.  
 However, the two repertoires of personal and public nonrelgion are also correlated 
with one another, and this invites the possibility that these results are an artifact of 
multicollinearity. I assessed this possibility by examining the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) for the repertoire measures, which were 5.32 in the BAM data and 5.34 in the 
CSPP data. These VIF values approach the threshold at which multicollinearity becomes 
a concern, and they are due to the generation of factor scores from the CFA model in 
Chapter Two where the latent factors for each repertoire are allowed to correlate. To 
address this issue, I used an alternative model specification with simple additive 
composite indices for each repertoire. These indices employed the same measures, but 
were not allowed to correlate with one another as in the CFA specification. Models using 
these measures had substantively smaller VIFs (1.95 in the BAM data and 2.16 in the 
CSPP data), and they produced substantively similar results with the same pattern in 
divergent effects (results available upon request).  
Supplemental Analyses 
 One limitation of the data at hand is that these surveys are cross-sectional, and the 
design of the CSPP panel study limited the religion measures to a single wave. As a 
result, this analysis cannot address time-ordering to see if these preferences for a secular 
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public sphere follow from partisanship or inform partisan ideas. Future research will need 
to address this issue directly. Here, the choice of issue preferences that are not directly 
linked to partisan identities through the work of nonreligious leaders provides some 
evidence for a unique effect, but supplemental analyses can do more to establish the 
mechanism through which attitudinal constraint on these measures occurs.  
 If a preference for a secular public sphere is the core nonreligious repertoire 
through which attitudinal constraint occurs, we would expect it to behave in a similar 
manner to other repertoires such as partisan identification. The relationship between 
public nonreligion and issue preferences should be stronger for respondents with higher 
levels of political interest. Figure 4.3 demonstrates that this is the case for the outcome 
measures that were most robust in previous models. Respondents in group 1 with the 
highest self-reported levels of political interest show a stronger relationship between 
public nonreligion and each outcome measure, and these associations level off as the 
categories move to group 5 with the lowest self-reported interest.  
 The theoretical work above also suggests that preferences for a secular public 
sphere are associated with a particular set of assumptions about community and authority, 
rather than individualism. To demonstrate the presence of this mechanism, we can also 
test the relationship between each nonreligious repertoire and a set of indicators for these 
core assumptions that the research would expect to develop before adult religious 
preferences solidify. A large body of research in social psychology finds that personality 
metrics such as the Big Five (Gerber et al. 2011), moral foundations (Graham et al. 2009; 
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Weber and Federico 2013), need for cognitive closure (Johnston et al. 2017), and 
authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) influence how people establish political 
identities and evaluate political questions. While these traits are not necessarily 
immutable over the life course, they are relatively stable, and thus present a useful proxy 
measure to determine if these public and private repertoires relate to other, more 
fundamental constructs in how respondents perceive political life.  
 Table 4.3 assesses the relationship between public and personal nonreligion and a 
battery of personality indicators included in the 2016 CSPP survey. Most predictors are 
the same across both constructs, but a few core differences do appear that serve to 
validate public nonreligion as a feasible mechanism for attitude constraint. Respondents 
who are high in public nonreligion tend to express lower rates of adherence to the loyalty 
dimension of moral foundations, lower need for cognitive closure, and lower populism. 
None of these factors are significantly associated with personal religious commitments in 
this data set.  
 The opinion outcomes discussed above all concern social membership, 
particularly policy obligations to address social inequality and citizenship. Respondents 
who are less likely to view clear symbolic boundaries between themselves and others are 
also less likely to endorse policies that would sustain social inequality (Edgell et al. In 
Press). The results in table 4.3. suggest a similar mechanism may be at work among those 
who endorse a secular public sphere, as s lower need for cognitive closure and a reduced 
emphasis on loyalty both suggest an elevated tolerance for uncertainty and a less 
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stringent reliance on group identities or group boundaries. Social interactions that 
encourage a vision of a secular public sphere, such as the advocacy work of nonreligious 
groups, can therefore create a potential cultural environment in which these personality 
traits are more salient and easier to bring to bear on political considerations. These results 
also further support the assertion that a link between personal and public nonreligion is 
possible and present, but not inevitable, a unique set of personality dispositions may 
encourage respondents to take up public repertoires of nonreligion in particular social 
contexts.  
    
Discussion & Conclusion  
 Chapter Three suggested that nonreligious Americans may be more politically 
engaged than research would otherwise expect, because a core measure of low civic 
engagement (low church attendance), means something different to people who are 
religiously unaffiliated than it does to people who are affiliated. If this is the case, the 
next question is whether and how nonreligious Americans express coherent views on 
major political issues, because this determines whether political organizing efforts can 
mobilize the nonreligious as a coherent group. To provide a strong test for this question, I 
selected three issues in which we do see coherent patterns in religious commitments and 
attitudinal alignment, but have not seen explicit nonreligious mobilization: support for the 
social safety net, recognition of racial inequality, and attitudes about immigration 
enforcement.  
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 These results indicate three important points for understanding attitudinal 
constraint among people with low religious engagement. First, the attitudinal differences 
across major nonreligious identity groups on these issues are relatively small. While 
atheists and agnostics, the strongest nonreligious identity groups, do exhibit more 
progressive attitudes, the majority of respondents who identify as “spiritual but not 
religious” or “nothing in particular” do not appear very different from their affiliated 
counterparts. Chapter Two demonstrated that these identity labels closely correspond to 
personal repertoires of nonreligion, and so it is possible that these personal repertoires are 
not as closely tied to political considerations as backlash hypothesis in the literature 
would expect. Second, this analysis demonstrated that most progressive opinion 
alignment on these topics coheres around a public repertoire of nonreligion. Respondents 
who disagree that religion is important for citizenship, leadership, and a strong public 
sphere do tend to express stronger progressive views on many of these issues, though this 
relationship is attenuated by sociodemographic controls. Finally, supplemental tests 
suggest that this public repertoire behaves like other sources of attitudinal constraint: it is 
conditional on political interest and it associates with personality traits that emphasize 
inclusive visions of public policy such as a reduced need for cognitive closure.    
 The divergent estimates for public and personal nonreligious repertoires make 
sense given the literature discussed in Chapters One and Two. If these cultural repertoires 
focus on different considerations in social life, they provide respondents with different 
sets of conceptual tools and affinities that would in turn structure how they evaluate 
!122
issues. Research focusing on the public repertoire suggests it would provide a more 
robust set of tools concerned with authority and community in public life that would 
provide more attitudinal constraint, while the focus on individualism and autonomy from 
institutions fostered by the personal repertoires would not necessarily provide the same 
kind of progressive political alignment once we isolate the effects of the public repertoire. 
 These results have three important implications for research on religion and 
opinion formation, especially research assessing the political impact of religious 
disaffiliation. First, these results show that attitude alignment around a vision of a secular 
public sphere identified by Layman and Weaver (2016) among secular activists in the 
Democratic party is also present in the general population, and that it may help to align 
issues even if they are not typically addressed by secular advocacy groups and movement 
leaders. Following the expectations of the backlash hypothesis that nonreligion associates 
with stronger progressive political views, respondents high in public nonreligion express 
both personality traits and cultural affinities that suggest they are more open to inclusive 
visions of citizenship and social authority. As a result, we can expect them to be more 
skeptical of the moral claims of worth and deservingness that often underly conservative 
attitudes toward redistributive policies, racial inequality, and strict immigration 
enforcement. This evidence of issue alignment suggests immense potential to build 
coalitions among religiously-unaffiliated and less religiously-engaged  citizens with the 
proper messaging strategy and elite framing effects to build upon these initial 
relationships.  
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 Second, however, this issue alignment is not inevitable. Instead, these results 
emphasize an important distinction between private nonreligious repertoires and public 
nonreligious repertoires. When we control for public nonreligion, the effects of private 
nonreligion disappear from these models of attitude constraint. This suggests that the 
social drift hypothesis—that low religious engagement is related to reduced civic 
engagement—also has a role to play. Personal nonreligion, measured by reduced 
engagement with religious beliefs and practices, captures the individualistic aspects of 
religious disengagement. Individual nonreligious identities are associated with this 
personal repertoire, and so measuring these error-prone identity categories alone does not 
capture both personal and public repertoires at work. Only measuring private repertoires, 
or comparing identity groups such as atheists and “nothing in particular” respondents, 
risks understating the political potential of lower religious engagement by limiting the 
respondents who are included in the analytic sample.  
 More broadly, these results demonstrate a core analytic problem in much of the 
current research on religion and public opinion. By measuring only religious practices, 
beliefs, or identities, much of the research is using personal religious repertoires as a 
proxy to infer their public religious repertoires. Many people are inconsistent in their 
expression of religious commitments (Chaves 2010), and so this approach is potentially 
understating the explanatory power of religion in their analyses. Public religious 
repertoires are now entering the literature as a strong explanatory mechanisms for a range 
of political attitudes (e.g. Delehanty et al. 2019; Stewart et al. 2018), and these results 
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demonstrate their worth for studying nonreligion as well. A cultural approach focused on 
different nonreligious repertoires points to a synthesis of the backlash and drift 
hypotheses: by controlling for measures that capture both dimensions of the nonreligious 
experience, we can more completely map the conditions under which either one has a 
stronger bearing on social and political life. In the next Chapter, a study of nonreligious 
organizations and lobbying efforts will assess whether the field of nonreligious advocacy 
groups has been able to draw upon this distinction and harness this political potential. 
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Chapter 5: Advocacy 
The Field of Nonreligious Lobbying 
 Chapters Three and Four showed how different cultural repertoires of nonreligion 
matter for trends in the electorate. Once we account for these differences, we see that 
nonreligious respondents are more politically engaged than the literature would expect, 
and that different nonreligious repertoires can distinguish trends in opinion formation on 
several key political issues. These two findings suggest immense political potential 
among nonreligious Americans, but they also raise the question of whether and how that 
potential can translate into actual political influence.  
 Most political representation to elected officials is mediated by advocacy groups. 
Over the past twenty years, rising rates of religious disaffiliation in the U.S. have been 
accompanied by a steady growth in the number of organizations dedicated to representing 
different nonreligious groups in the public sphere (e.g. Blankholm 2014; Cimino and 
Smith 2014; Frost 2017). While many of these groups focus on maintaining a sense of 
social support and community for nonreligious individuals, an increasing number of them 
also take up the mission to defend the separation of church and state and to oppose the 
public influence of the Religious Right (García and Blankholm 2016; Kettell 2014; 
LeDrew 2015). These organizations advocate for a nonreligious policy agenda through 
media campaigns, legal advocacy, and formal lobbying activities. While this work has 
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brought visibility and influence to nonreligious coalitions at a local and state level, 
especially in the form of legal challenges to church and state violations, the national 
influence of these efforts pales in comparison to the political influence of the Religious 
Right. Nonreligious people remain severely underrepresented in Congress (Sandstrom 
2017), religious appeals remain a dominant strategy among political representatives 
(Chapp and Coe 2019; Domke and Coe 2008), and, despite the recent founding of a 
Congressional Freethought Caucus, religious organizations have arguably had much more 
sustained influence in the creation of social policy and legislation over the last thirty 
years (e.g. Davis and Robinson 2012; Sager and Bentele 2016).  
 Why is this the case? We would expect that representatives of one of the fastest-
growing minority groups in the country would be able to cultivate much more direct 
political influence than nonreligious organizations currently hold. In this chapter, I argue 
that cultural repertoires of nonreligion can help us understand the limited influence of 
these organizations, because repertoires can influence the operation of groups as well as 
the choices of individuals (Becker 1998; Lichterman and Eliasoph 2014). The social 
fields in which organizations operate produce “rules of the game” that people use to 
generate different kinds of capital, be it economic, political, or cultural (e.g. Bourdieu 
1990, 1997, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Fligstein and McAdam 2012), and the way 
that new groups situate themselves in a field can, in turn, determine the way their 
institutional relationships and organizational capacities develop to convert different kinds 
of capital (Medvetz 2012; Dromi 2015). 
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 In this chapter, I argue that the success of the religious organizing in U.S. politics 
comes from a strategy that balances the work of making coalitions visible through public 
appeals (what I call “front stage” advocacy from movements, members, and media) and 
legislative influence and lobbying (what I call “back stage” advocacy). While these terms 
typically denote individual behavior in the way people present themselves to others 
(Goffman 1959), it is helpful to use them to talk about organizational work because they 
emphasize how groups have to make choices about how and when to prioritize different 
cultural repertoires. A coherent and clear identity-based repertoire can motivate people to 
join an organization and remain active, but organizations may also have to compromise 
that repertoire in order to achieve success in policy-making (Gamson 1995). While 
groups in the Religious Right have benefitted from front stage work in media, 
mobilization, and high profile legal battles though the culture wars, they have also 
developed a successful set of back stage advocacy practices in which they translate their 
shared cultural capital from religious identities into political capital through “unobtrusive 
organizing” (Kucinskas 2014). 
 I then argue that nonreligious organizations have been particularly good at 
observing and understanding the front stage work of the Religious Right as an 
oppositional player in the field and emulating it themselves. This front stage work 
leverages personal repertoires of nonreligion to grow the organizations’ membership. 
However, this approach has only produced a secular simulacrum of the Religious Right, 
because nonreligious groups have neglected the back stage work of formal lobbying and 
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advocacy. Using an original relational data set of forty nonreligious nonprofit 
organizations and publicly available lobbying data, I demonstrate how these choices have 
produced a set of network ties and organizational practices that create unexpected 
boundaries which limit these groups’ capacity to build political capital. 
Frontstage and Backstage Advocacy 
 While Chapters Three and Four focused at the micro level by examining 
aggregate patterns in individual behavior and attitudes, this chapter uses networks and 
social fields to turn our attention to the meso-level by examining the relationships 
between organizations. Social fields are spaces where a set of actors, often nested inside 
multiple organizations or groups, share four traits: a common understanding of what is at 
stake in their relations, where they stand in relation to each other, common “rules of the 
game” for achieving success in the field, and a common interpretative framework for 
understanding each others’ actions (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:11). By focusing on a 
field of organizations, such as the academic field, the media field, or the field of college 
athletics, researchers can pay attention to the intersection of institutional structures and 
individuals’ agency to improvise within these structures. This identifies insider 
knowledge, patterns of habit, and moments of creative innovation and change that 
creating different kinds of social, economic, and moral capital (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992). Some fields are clearly defined, with a coherent and consistent set 
of practices that are rewarded with particular kinds of social capital. Academia is one 
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example, where the rules for publication, prestige, and the accumulation of academic 
capital are fairly clear to the actors involved and distinct from other fields such as 
banking or professional baseball.  
 Recent research suggests that political organizing and advocacy is different, 
however, because actors accumulate different kinds of capital from many fields to create 
political capital. Think tanks, for example, draw on media, academic, and economic 
capital, converting all three to foster political capital at different times (Medvetz 2012). 
While classic models of elite mobilization suggest corporations can simply create 
political change by directly paying lobbyists and making campaign contributions (e.g. 
Domhoff 2012), today we see organizations engaging in other kinds of advocacy, such as 
“astroturfing,” to accumulate different social capital and legitimize their advocacy efforts 
(Walker 2009; Walker and Rea 2014). Groups that exist at the fringes of social fields can 
suddenly take their messaging to the mainstream, and integrate their agendas into 
mainstream policy networks, by cultivating different kinds of media capital and using 
emotionally charged messaging (Bail 2014). 
 One of the core challenges for social movement organizations concerned with 
“identity politics” is the way that those organizations have to balance authenticity and 
efficacy as they work in this social space (e.g. Gamson 1995). Groups have to present a 
consistent and coherent sense of shared identity to recruit members and keep them 
committed the movement, but the everyday practice of political work entails compromise 
and adaptation to the needs of any particular policy debate—practices that can often 
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undermine that sense of coherence and authenticity. When groups bring together diverse 
coalitions of members, they have to navigate the use of multiple cultural repertoires to 
coordinate a common group style that can maintain emotional commitments and 
solidarity (Becker 1998; Delehanty 2016), and this can be in tension with the more 
pragmatic expectations that the professionalization of social movement leadership creates 
(Han 2014; Lee 2015).  
 This tension in organizational activity is analogous to the distinction Erving 
Goffman (1959) draws between front stage and back stage work in the way individuals 
present themselves to the world, and applying this language at the meso-level draws our 
attention to the way organizations conduct impression management through advocacy 
work. When a group recruits new members and cultivates their shared identity as activists 
(Massengil 2008; Delehanty and Oyakawa 2018), administers press releases or engages 
in social media campaigns (Bail 2014), or holds a public demonstration or rally 
(Karakaya 2018), it is engaging in front stage activism work. This activity gains political 
capital from a public claim to a shared demand, and so it requires a clear, compelling, and 
consistent messaging strategy to secure the proper motivation for action (Alexander 
2013). In contrast, back stage advocacy work gains political capital from the often 
inconsistent and potentially contradictory work of negotiation, compromise, and 
exchange that often defines policy creation within established political networks (e.g. 
Medvetz 2012; Villadsen 2011; White 2012).  
!131
 The challenge for any given political organization, as for individuals, is how to 
maintain a separation between front stage and back stage work so that the necessary 
friction between the two does not undermine the success of collective action in either 
domain. Excessive front stage work can create a rigid moral narrative that limits the 
agility of organizations to effect policy change in opportune moments, especially if 
political adversaries see them as unwilling to compromise their shared values. On the 
other hand, excessive back stage work and professionalization can undermine an 
organization’s claim to unconditionally represent their members’ identities or interests 
and potentially undercut support from constituents. Effective organizations balance the 
two, creating both new moral frames and maintaining savvy political ties (for a core 
example, see Page (2013) on the California Correctional Peace Officers Association).  
 Both religious and nonreligious advocacy groups share a similar challenge: they 
each claim to represent groups of people who have a variety of cultural repertoires to 
express their affinities and interests. Representing these different cultural repertoires 
effectively in the political field requires a fine tuned combination of front stage and back 
stage activity, and the core cultural assumptions that movement leaders develop with their 
constituents can in turn affect the organizational structure of their relationships with other 
movement groups and with the larger poetical field (e.g. Dromi 2015). Before turning to 
examine how nonreligious advocacy groups have undergone this process, it is helpful to 
look at the Religious Right to illustrate this theory and observe what happens when 
organizations cultivate a working balance between front stage and back stage advocacy.  
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Religious Advocacy: Moral Crusaders & Institutional Players 
 The best known example of religious advocacy in the United States is the New 
Christian Right’s work to forge connections between conservative Protestant and 
evangelical identities and Republican party politics (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983). This 
connection was not inevitable—it was the result of struggle and contestation within the 
field of evangelical organizations (Markofski 2015) and struggles in overlapping fields 
where political and business leaders sought a new framework for moral legitimacy (Kruse 
2015). By providing a framework through which voters could align their religious 
commitments to tangible political agendas (e.g. Bean 2014), religious appeals from 
candidates became a dominant strategy to gain electoral support (Domke and Coe 2008). 
 This familiar process converts the cultural capital from a shared religious identity 
into political capital at the front stage of movement organizing and advocacy work. It 
relies heavily on audience characteristics and context (Chapp and Coe 2019), as 
movement leaders package together different understandings of religion and current 
events to spur political engagement and voting among their constituents (Djupe and 
Calfano 2013; Massengil 2008; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). It motivates political 
engagement by making a claim to a coherent, common moral imaginary that legitimizes 
leaders and spurs people to activism.  
 Because many religious advocacy groups operate as 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations, which can not spend a substantive amount of money on direct lobbying, 
!133
front stage advocacy through media campaigns, mailings, and other kinds of constituent 
mobilization is a common and highly visible strategy. As a public-facing appraoch to gain 
political capital, however, this strategy for religious advocacy also necessarily invites 
contestation and backlash. The resulting “culture wars” encapsulated a range of conflicts 
about fundamental moral questions in public life—conflicts that structured both public 
discourse (e.g. Alexander and Smith 1993; Hunter 1998) and personal political 
preferences (e.g. Haidt 2001; Lakoff 2002), and contributed to religious disaffiliation 
(Hout and Fischer 2014; Schnabel and Bock 2017). Strategies to center religious 
classification in political and legal systems invited high profile court cases, including 
Engel v. Vitale (1962), Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015), many of which did not decide in favor of conservative/religious aligned 
interests (though there are notable exceptions such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 
2014). Organizations on the “religious left” are now employing comparable movement 
strategies to foster a connection between religious commitments and progressive political 
interests (e.g. Braunstein 2017; Braunstein et al. 2017 Delehanty 2016; Delehanty and 
Oyakawa 2018). 
 In light these trends, the case for success in front stage political organizing as a 
singular, dominant strategy for conservative religious organizations in the U.S. is limited. 
In addition to this approach, these organizations have also developed a second strategy to 
convert religious capital into political capital through back stage political work. 
Kucinskas (2014) calls this “unobtrusive” organizing within the existing context of 
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institutions through research on how corporate networks adopt mediation and 
mindfulness practices. For example, Bates (1991) illustrates how a network of religious 
home-schooling organizations originally created to provide social support to members 
transitioned to a lobbying and advocacy-driven coalition pushing for home-schooling 
legislation at the state level. Lindsay (2008) has identified and interviewed a large 
network of conservative and evangelical Protestants among the elite, holding positions on 
corporate boards, in the entertainment industry, and in political office. Many of these 
interviewees seek to enact reform in their organizations in accord with their religious 
values, but also emphasize how they aim to do this work in the context of their 
professional responsibilities, rather than directly challenging the existing institutional 
structure through contentious social movement tactics. Davis and Robinson (2012) 
identify a range of religious organizations in multiple countries that aim to “bypass the 
state” by creating parallel networks for social service provision outside of government 
policy. In the U.S., Sager and Bentele (2016) show how social service provision has been 
a key route for religious organizations to gain political influence by operating through 
faith based initiatives. By providing these services, religious groups do not have to 
openly advocate for policy reform in their interests. Instead, they gain resources and 
legitimacy from the devolution of social services and, in turn, gain increased capacity to 
shape legislation and policy execution without direct public appeals.  
 This pattern in back stage organizing is an important and recent turn in political 
advocacy among religious groups. Earlier research on religious lobbying emphasized a 
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general ineffectiveness, as lobbyists were seen as Washington insiders disconnected with 
the interests of religious organizations (Hertzke 1998)—groups that were more interested 
in maintaining moral legitimacy than chalking up political “wins” in actual legislation 
(Hofrenning 1995). With the presence of both front stage and back stage advocacy, 
however, religious organizations have addressed this problem by cultivating multiple 
routes to convert their cultural capital into political capital. In front stage work, religious 
claims provide the moral capital and motivation to elect leaders and demand policy 
reform (e.g. Bourdieu 1991). In backstage work, religious claims provide social capital in 
the form of closer network ties among elites that produce political change through 
conventional institutional operations.  
The Emerging Nonreligious Field  
 The rise of individual religious disaffiliation has been accompanied by a growing 
number of organizations devoted to representing and supporting nonreligious individuals. 
These include local atheist and freethought social groups (e.g. Smith 2013), alternative 
congregation movements seeking to provide secular community (e.g. Frost 2017), and 
political groups seeking to promote the separation of church and state and secular public 
policy (e.g. Blankholm 2014). Most research on nonreligious organizations and advocacy 
groups has focused on the front stage aspects of organizing in membership and 
messaging strategy.  
 Studies of these organizations find that local chapters are more likely be 
established and find a larger number of members in counties and states where 
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conservative religious groups are stronger and more publicly salient (Djupe et al. 2018; 
García and Blankholm 2016). These findings provide strong support for the backlash 
hypothesis in terms of movement organizing, not only in terms of personal religious 
disaffiliation. Qualitative studies with members of these groups focus on how they create 
a shared sense of nonreligious community and identity both on their own and in relation 
to religious others. Many of these studies focus exclusively on the cultivation of atheist 
identities in particular (e.g. Cimino and Smith 2014; LeDrew 2015; Smith 2011, 2013; 
Sumearu and Cragun 2016; Guenther et al. 2013). By participating actively in these 
organizations, people who share a common skeptical standpoint toward religious beliefs 
and institutions build a shared identity that they often define in terms of a skeptical or 
rationalist orientation—one that can in turn shape the way they think about many 
different social issues. However, this socialization is not necessarily uniform across 
groups. Different organizations and individuals can cultivate both a confrontational 
relationship toward religion and a more accommodating, tolerant view of interfaith 
acceptance, and both perspectives engage in active discussion and contestation within the 
field of nonreligious organizing (e.g. Hutchinson in press; Kettell 2013; LeDrew 2015).  
 In terms of public messaging, this contrast between adversarial and 
accommodationist views on religion within these groups creates an environment that 
encourages organizations to be multivocal. Broadly speaking, many groups advocate for 
upholding a strong separation of church and state, promoting the acceptance of atheism as 
an identity, and advocating for scientific authority in the formation of public policy 
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(Kettell 2014, 2015; Schulzke 2013). In practice, this invites a plurality of political 
messaging tactics and issue preferences. For example, in a study of the Secular Coalition 
for America (SCA), the predominant political advocacy group representing nonreligious 
Americans, Blankholm (2014) observes how the organization switches between four 
separate definitions of the word “secular” in its Congressional briefings to focus on the 
separation of church and state, a distinctly secular public sphere, non-belief as a political 
ideology, and secular as an identity group. This approach to messaging and public image 
also helps small and growing nonreligious organizations, especially those that might be 
embedded in other institutional fields where support for religious minority groups may be 
limited. For example, Konieczny and Rogers (2016) demonstrate how a changing (and at 
times ambiguous) messaging strategy helped the U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet 
Freethinkers Group to maintain administrative support and clearance to continue 
operating.   
 This research shows how trends in front stage organizing have allowed the field of 
nonreligious organizations to grow their membership and cultivate a common sense of 
identity among their members that is able to pursue public visibility and potentially 
garner political capital. However, as we have seen in previous chapters, the majority of 
religiously unaffiliated respondents do not necessarily view their nonreligion as an 
identity category, and the cultural repertoires of nonreligion that coordinate with their 
political views are not necessarily tied to the identity categories commonly employed by 
these organizations. Therefore, an ambiguous messaging strategy that helps small and 
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growing organizations maintain a basic level of member commitment may also backfire 
by failing to coordinate a sufficient number of nonreligious people to build a coalition 
comparable in size to the quarter of Americans with no religious affiliation. Current 
research has focused more on this ambiguous front stage organizing, and less on the 
backstage political infrastructure of these organizations. What is the genesis and structure 
of the nonreligious field (cf. Bourdieu 1991), and do organizations in this field have a 
sufficient infrastructure to create political capital through back stage work, such as 
lobbying and political donations? 
The Study 
 This analysis employs an original data set of nonreligious advocacy organizations 
designed to obtain a comprehensive sample of groups at the national level. Following 
Bail (2014), this approach aims to include a range of organizations—both those that are 
well established and those that hold limited influence in the field. I define nonreligious 
advocacy groups  broadly as two kinds of civil society organizations: those that claim to 9
advocate for the separation of church and state and those that claim to represent 
populations of nonreligious Americans. As in earlier chapters, this broad definition treats 
nonreligion relationally to include groups that orient themselves in a specific way toward 
religious authority in the public sphere.  
 As with the choice of the term “nonreligious” in earlier chapters, here nonreligious advocacy groups 9
denotes a specific kind of organization. Nonreligious advocacy groups are different from “secular” 
advocacy groups that operate without a religious identification or agenda, which necessarily includes an 
inefficiently broad set of organizations ranging from Planned Parenthood to the Cato Institute. 
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 Data collection employed a multi-stage sampling procedure to generate this 
comprehensive list of national organizations. First, I generated a pilot sample based on a 
known set of ten groups assembled by Kettell (2014) that explicitly claim to advocate for 
atheists and other non-religious groups in their mission statements. I then used the 
GuideStar database of nonprofit organizations to collect all publicly available IRS form 
990s for each organization in the pilot sample and conducted a word frequency analysis 
on each group’s mission statement to identify key terms and common language used 
across the organizations. I then broadened the sample by conducting five more searches 
in the GuideStar database using the most common key terms from this content analysis: 
“Atheis*” (to include Atheism, Atheist, and Atheists), “separation of church and state,” 
“nonreligious,” “non-religious,” and “secular.” New groups were added to the sample 
when they met the definitional criteria above during each search. As expected, each 
search was progressively more inclusive, with “secular” yielding the most results. This 
approach allowed me to capture groups that fall outside of the conventional public 
relations scope of the major organizations in the field, but nonetheless meet the criteria 
for inclusion. For example, Muslims for Progressive Values is included in the sample for 
their stated commitment to church/state separation. Though analysis will show that this 
group is isolated from the core network of nonreligious organizing, their inclusion in their 
sample helps to illustrate the relatively narrow scope of organizational affinities that 
defines this core network. In contrast, many listings for private religious schools and 
other faith-based organizations that arose from the search for “secular” did not merit 
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inclusion in the sample, and suggested I had reached a point of saturation for the field. 
Finally, I validated this list of groups against a list of umbrella organizations for local 
nonreligious groups assembled by García and Blankholm (2016), adding one additional 
organization not included in the search results. A lists of groups in full sample is available 
in Table 5.1, including abbreviations for each group used in this study and the range of 
years for which tax information was available and collected for these groups. 
 This sampling process yielded a data set of 40 organizations with available tax 
forms. With the help of a volunteer undergraduate research assistant, I coded the form 
990s for the groups’ basic financial characteristics and formally reported political 
spending. The unit of observation for the resulting data set was organization-years, 
yielding 397 observations. Basic financial data included the reported amounts (in U.S. 
dollars) of organizational revenue from contributions and donations, total revenue 
(including these contributions, services, membership dues, investment income, and sales 
of inventory), expenses for staff salaries, and total expenses (including staff salary). For 
organizations that reported any kind of political activity, I also coded the required Form 
990 Schedule C for political spending. On this form, electing organizations that engage in 
lobbying report dollars spent on grassroots lobbying, direct lobbying, and total lobbying 
expenditures, which I recorded into each observation-year. Non-electing organizations 
that did not engage in lobbying, but did contribute to political causes, are required to 
specify their political activities, including the use of volunteers, paid staff, advertising, 
mailings, publications, grants to other organizations, direct contact with legislators, 
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demonstrations, or other activities. I coded each of these as dichotomous indicators and 
notated the amount spent in total on each activity. 
 While these reports provide a general summary of political activity, they do not 
specify the issue agendas on which organizations lobby. To capture these agendas and 
validate organization-reported lobbying expenditures, I also collected data for available 
organizations in the LobbyView database (Kim 2017, 2018). These data provide issue-
specific lobbying disclosures including brief summaries of activities and issue codes 
established under the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act. Including this supplementary data 
allows me to compare the back stage issue agendas of different organizations within the 
field. 
Analytic Approach 
 Analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I present basic descriptive patterns 
regarding the development of organizations in the field and trends in political 
expenditures. I then turn to examining the structure of the field over time using network 
visualization. This visualization uses the list of board members and highly paid 
employees required on each IRS Form 990 to establish network ties through shared board 
members. These direct ties are the best measure for relationships between these 
organizations, because early organizational developments in the field (including the 
establishment of American Atheists and the American Humanist Association) were often 
driven through the founding of spinoff groups with close staff ties to their organizations 
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of origin. Later developments in the field, discussed below, often have to do with the 
founding of coalition groups that bring together existing organizations for an explicit 
purpose, such as front stage political organizing. As a result, shared board members 
indicate direct ties between these organizations and an effort to coordinate activity 
between them.  
 I illustrate the development of the field over time using four snapshots from the 
data set, selected for both the availability of organizations and their substantive position 
in the history of nonreligious activism. First, I use the year 2000 to indicate the state of 
the field before the rise of “New Atheism” to public prominence and establish a baseline. 
Second, I use 2006 to illustrate the field at the emergence of “New Atheism,” during 
which conversations about religious skepticism and social authority were particularly 
prominent in the media and among political pundits. 2006 was the year of publication of 
Sam Harris’ Letter to a Christian Nation and Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, both 
of which were key texts for movement activists and played a role in membership and 
recruiting to many of these organizations. 2012 represents a “post-New Atheism” state for 
the field at the midpoint of the Obama Presidency—a time during which concern about 
conservative religious influence in politics is less salient than the movement’s emergence 
during the George W. Bush administration. Finally, 2016 captures the field at the latest 
state for which comprehensive tax documents are available and at a time when the field 
faced a number of internal institutional challenges. From 2012 through 2016, stories of 
sexual harassment at secular conferences and controversial statements from New Atheist 
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leaders regarding Islam sparked debates among movement members about anti-Muslim 
sentiment, sexism, and other forms of inequality within organizational leadership. This 
unsettled period of internal conflict continues today, with recent accusations of 
harassment and financial malfeasance reported against some movement leaders, and this 
invites the potential for dramatic recent changes in the field for which analysis must 
account.  
 After examining the structure of the field over time, the third section of analysis 
uses patterns in network relationships to comparatively examine formal political activity 
among core and periphery organizations in the field using self-reported expenditures and 
the LobbyView data. These analysis demonstrate the stakes of the arrangement of the 
field and how cultural considerations can explain variation in backstage political 
organizing.  
Basic Trends 
 The number of nonreligious advocacy groups in the United States has grown 
dramatically in the past fifteen years. Over the period of available financial data shown in 
Figure 5.1, filing organizations have doubled from less than ten organizations prior to 
2000 to over twenty reporting for the 2015 fiscal year in 2016. During this period, total 
reported annual political spending across all organizations also rose dramatically, as 
shown in Figure 5.2. Among the forty organizations in total, eleven formally reported 
political expenditures. Six organizations reported lobbying expenditures: Americans 
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United for the Separation of Church and State (AUSCS), the Secular Coalition for 
America (SCA), The Center for Inquiry (CFI), the Freedom From Religion Foundation 
(FFRF), the Citizens Project (CP), and The Interdependence Project (IP). With the 
exception of CP and IP, four of these organizations reported the largest cumulative 
political expenditures over the period of data collection. Overall, this sample of 
nonreligious organizations is far smaller than the number of religious advocacy groups in 
the United States, but the proportion engaging in direct political spending is comparable. 
In 2010, for example, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated a total of 215 
religious advocacy organizations based in Washington D.C., but only 10 of those groups 
were registered 501( c)(4) organizations permitted to undertake substantial lobbying work 
(Hertzke 2011).  
 Five organizations reported only political expenditures for non-lobbying 
activities, such as mailing expenses for advocacy materials or cash transfers to other 
advocacy organizations like the SCA. These organizations included the American 
Humanist Association (AHA), the Atheist Alliance of America (AAA), the Secular 
Student Alliance (SSA), Internet Infidels (II), and the Military Association of Atheists and 
Freethinkers (MAAF). Most of these eleven organizations in total reported less than 2% 
of their total expenses as political expenditures.   
The Evolving Field of Nonreligious Advocacy 
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 Figure 5.3 uses four network diagrams to illustrate the growth and development of 
the field of nonreligious advocacy groups over the period of the data set. Ties in these 
networks represent common board members and highly paid employees listed on each 
group’s form 990. Triangular nodes represent organizations that reported any kind of 
political expenditure, and circular nodes represent organizations that did not report any 
political spending. Triangular nodes with darker shading represent organizations that 
report a higher proportion of their total expenditures on political work, because the 
AUSCS far outspends all other organizations in the field.  
 The period begins in 2000, six years before the movement known as “New 
Atheism” would bring many of these organizations into the public eye. During this time, 
network ties are limited to a set of four organizations that are all closely related to 
American Atheists (AA), founded by Madelyn Murray O'Hair. These include the Charles 
A Stevens American Atheist Library (CSA-an affiliate of AA with many common board 
members), The Society of Separationists (SoS-O’Hair’s original organization that would 
eventually split from AA), and the United Secularists of America (USA—a third spinoff 
organization founded by O’Hair). This set of ties represents movement atheism 
specifically, and it is isolated from two other sets of ties: one between the Center for 
Inquiry (CFI) and its development fund (CFID), and one between Americans United for 
the Separation of Church and State (AUSCS ) and the Citizens’ Project (CP). This later 10
 While the official abbreviation for Americans United for the Separation of Church and State is “AU,” I 10
use “AUSCS” throughout this chapter in order to clearly designate it from Atheists United (AU)—a smaller 
atheist advocacy organization that merited inclusion in the sample. 
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set is illustrative—Americans United is the the largest and most notable lobbying group 
for church and state separation, founded in 1947 as Protestants and Other Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State and renamed to Americans United in 1972. 
AUSCS devotes a relatively large proportion of their expenditures to political work, 
while the movement atheism groups report spending none. Despite their presumed shared 
political interests—O’Hair was a plaintiff in Murray v. Curlett  on school-sponsored bible 
reading that would be consolidated with Abington School District v. Schempp—these 
groups remain separate in the field and point to an early distinction between political 
lobbying for church-state separation and identity-based movement work for organized 
atheism.  
 By 2006, the launch of New Atheism, a new network of organizations has 
emerged. Founded in 2002, The Secular Coalition for America (SCA) reports its mission 
to “increase the visibility and respectability of non theistic viewpoints in the United 
States” and reports direct and grassroots lobbying “on issues affecting nontheists and the 
secular character of our government” as a core program service. As a self-identified 
political advocacy coalition for the secular movement, SCA sits at the center of a number 
of formerly-isolated organizations from 2000 including as the Secular Student Alliance 
(SSA) and the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), as well as organizations 
newer to the data such as the American Humanist Association (AHA). The SCA reports a 
substantive proportion of its budget as political spending relative to other groups and 
draws in contributions from its partners in the network. It is important to note here that 
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the movement atheism groups remain connected, but isolated from the SCA coalition, 
again with no reported political spending. Also notable is the isolation of AUSCS from 
this network despite mission overlap with the SCA. Instead, AUSCS developed shared 
connections with the Center for Inquiry (CFI) through one shared board member.  
 By 2012, the field has begun to coalesce. The SCA remains central and dominant 
in political expenditures, building connections with even more organizations, including 
the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAAF), and the International 
Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), Most notably, the main network now includes 
American Atheists, which has severed ties with many of its sibling organizations. A new 
unifying group also emerges devoted to front stage organizing: the Reason Rally 
Coalition (RRC).  
 According to its 2012 990 mission statement, the RRC “is a movement-wide 
event sponsored by the country’s major secular organizations. The intent is to unify, 
energize, and embolden secular people nationwide, while dispelling the negative opinions 
held by so much of American society.” The RRC hosted two major rallies in Washington, 
DC, one in 2012 (“Atheists and Secularists Gather”) and one in 2016 (“Speak Up for 
Reason”). According to the RRC website, both of these events were intended to illustrate 
the size of the nonreligious voting bloc and to advocate for “celebrating secularism” with 
speakers and entertainment to promote a positive message about “secular, atheist, 
agnostic, humanist, freethinking, and nonreligious identities.” With prominent celebrity 
speakers including Bill Maher, Richard Dawkins, and Penn Jillette, the work of the RRC 
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represents the largest and most prominent effort for front stage political organizing on the 
part of nonreligious advocacy groups.  
 One of the most notable traits of the RRC is how this front stage organization had 
an additional unifying effect on the network, bringing together many more organizations 
and acting as a mediating link between those groups and the SCA. Because the RRC 
incorporated ties to the Center for Inquiry, AUSCS has also entered the central network 
by 2012. However, it remains on the periphery and not directly tied to the SCA. 
Connections between the two predominant organizations most likely to provide back 
stage influence through lobbying remain mediated through the work a front stage 
organization.  
 By 2016, despite internal strife addressing sexual harassment and anti-Muslim 
sentiment, the dominant network has stabilized in the field of nonreligious organizations. 
It now includes a few additional groups, including Camp Quest (CQ)—a secular summer 
camp for nonreligious youth. SCA and AUSCS remain separate from each other, with 
only mediated ties through the CFI and the RRC. Across 2012 and 2016, it is important to 
note the increasing number of organizations that report in the data set, but hold no direct 
network ties to the center of the field. While additional groups that meet the selection 
criteria for inclusion in the field proliferate in the early 2010s, these groups remain 
relatively isolated from one another. The most notable exception to this trend is the 
appearance of the Center for Freethought Equality (CFE) at the center of the network. 
CFE describes itself as “a sister organization of the American Humanist 
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Association dedicated to lobbying and political advocacy,” however, this group did not 
report any expenditures on lobbying activity in any of the IRS form 990s for this time 
period. The following section returns to this group as a curious case study in the state of 
the field.  
 Overall, the structure of the field of nonreligious organizations and advocacy 
groups invites three key comparisons to better understand backstage political organizing. 
First, it suggests that we should examine differences in spending between the core and 
periphery of the network. Second, it suggests that we should examine differences in 
political spending patterns among the major lobbying organizations (AUSCS, SCA, 
FFRF, CFI, and CFE), and groups reporting non-lobbying political expenditures (AHA, 
MAAF, and SSA). Finally, the unique mediated relationship between the largest 
backstage political organizations in the field (AUSCS and SCA), suggests that comparing 
these two organizations directly may yield important insights into how the structure of 
the field may limit coordinated back stage political action.  
Core vs. Periphery Organizations 
 The isolated periphery organizations in the field reporting political spending 
include the Citizens Project (CP), The Interdependence Project (IP), and, in later years, 
the Atheist Alliance of America (AAA) and Internet Infidels (II). AAA and II, both 
explicitly atheist identity groups, reported political spending in the form of cash transfers 
to the Secular Coalition for America (SCA). In contrast, Citizens Project—a Colorado 
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nonprofit promoting the separation of church and state tied to AUSCS in earlier years—
reported regular lobbing expenditures throughout the duration of its financial data from 
1999 to 2014. The Citizens Project website details a number of advocacy commitments, 
including education about religious freedom in public schools, civic education and 
engagement, and equality and diversity. For example, in their latest legislative report 
card,  CP states that they oppose the right to refuse service for religious considerations, 11
tax credits for nonpublic schools, and limitations to sanctuary districts for immigration 
purposes. The Interdependence Project—a secular Buddhist center in New York—
reported grassroots nontaxable lobbying expenditures in 2014, 2015, and 2016. These 
organizations demonstrate the power of a cultural affinity with nonreligious identities in 
the field. Groups on the periphery that explicitly identify with movement atheism 
coordinate their political spending with the center of the field by sending their money to 
the SCA, while groups primarily concerned with church & state issues do not.  
Core Organizations - Non-Lobbying 
 The three core organizations in the field that report non-lobbying political 
expenditures are the American Humanist Association (AHA), the Secular Student 
Alliance (SSA), and the Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers (MAAF). Over 
the course of the financial data collected, the AHA reported political mailing and 
publication costs across 2004, 2005, and 2006 totaling $14,519 over the three years, 
 Citizens Project. 2018. "2018 Legislator Report Card.” Accessed April 1, 2019. (http://11
www.citizensproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-Scorecard-FINAL.pdf)
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which they categorized as using staff, mailing, publications and direct contact for 
political advocacy. Across 2012, 2015, and 2016, the group also reported transferring a 
total of $14,000 to the Secular Coalition for America. In 2015 and 2016, the AHA 
reported transferring $61,356 and $73,258, respectively, to the Center for Freethought 
Equality (CFE), which they registered as “grants to other organizations for lobbying 
purposes.” In the supplemental information for this transfer, the AHA described CFE as 
“an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization.” As stated previously, the CFE did not report 
spending any money on lobbying efforts in either 2015 or 2016. Both the SSA and the 
MAAF reported relatively smaller political contributions in the form of staff volunteer 
work and small cash transfers to the Secular Coalition for America. Here at the core of 
the field, organizations tend to follow the strategy of culturally-affiliated periphery 
organizations by channeling their money to CFE or the SCA for lobbying purposes, rather 
than AUSCS. Designations and supplementary information on these form 990s suggest 
that these organizations understand these cash transfers as contributions for backstage 
political advocacy through lobbying.  
Core Organizations - Lobbying 
 The five major lobbying organizations in the field of nonreligious advocacy 
groups are Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (AUSCS), the 
Secular Coalition for America (SCA), the Center for Inquiry (CFI), the Freedom from 
Religion Foundation (FFRF), and the Center for Freethought Equality (CFE). Curiously, 
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the two lobbying groups most central to the field—the SCA and the CFE—report almost 
no lobbying expenditures on the required Schedule C documents included with the Form 
990. Despite receiving sizable cash transfers reported as grants to other organizations for 
lobbying purposes, both of these organizations have left their lobbying expenditure 
reports blank. This is especially concerning because the Form 990s include an item 
(Schedule A, Part IV, item 4) where organizations must indicate with a yes or no response 
whether they engage in lobbying activities to include Schedule C. In the case of the CFE, 
which received over $100,000 from the CFI across 2015 and 2016, both the 
corresponding 990 forms have this question left blank. 
 This gap could be due to an error in tax reporting. To investigate this possibility, I 
searched the LobbyView database to obtain issue-specific lobbying disclosure records for 
these groups to validate the 990 reports. Three organizations were registered in the 
database: AUSCS, SCA, and CFI. Figure 5.4 illustrates the Form 990 reported lobbying 
expenditures and the LobbyView recorded expenditures over the same period. While the 
self-reported expenditures for CFI and SCA do tend to under-report the actual amount 
disclosed in LobbyView, these records validate the fact that these groups spend far less 
comparatively on lobbying than their mission statements or cash transfers would suggest 
the field expects them to. AUSCS’s lobbying expenses outpace all other organizations in 
the field. Again, the CFE did not have registered lobbying disclosures in either the 
LobbyView data or a supplemental search the U.S. House of Representatives Lobbying 
disclosure system.  
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 Lobbying expenditures can vary widely from year to year. For comparative 
context, AUSCS’s lobbying expenses are in line with other top-spending lobbying groups 
for religious interests. In 2008, for example, their total lobbying expenditures were 
$463,641. This is comparable to CitizenLink (a Focus on the Family affiliate spending 
$224,641 in 2008), PICO (Faith in Action, a progressive religious advocacy group 
spending $165,480 in 2009), and the Catholic Health Association (spending $821,634 in 
2008) (Hertzke 2011). While other religious lobbying groups report expenditures as little 
as a few hundred dollars, the reported spending from CFI and the SCA places them on the 
lower end of the distribution in spending.  
Lobbying Issues 
 What is the actual secular agenda among these groups? Table 5.2 summarizes the 
ten most common issues on which AUSCS, SCA, and CFI have disclosed lobbying 
efforts. While SCA and CFI each have a twelve year range of disclosures, AUSCS has a 
nineteen year range, producing a higher number of legislative issues addressed. Notice 
that the top five issues for each group are nearly identical, including Education, Civil 
Liberties, Religion, Health, and Civil Liberties/Constitutional Issues.  
 Investigating the specific legislative issues that comprise these codes, however, 
reveals important differences across these groups. Using the LobbyView database, I 
extracted the full list of legislative issues that comprised the education, civil liberties, and 
religion codes for AUSCS and SCA. In terms of education, SCA has lobbied in 
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opposition of vouchers for private schools, corporal punishment, and absence-only sex 
education. They have also advocated for expanding the definition of student protections 
to include atheist and non theistic students anti-bullying and harassment and after school 
extracurricular programming. While AUSCS has also opposed vouchers, they have 
targeted their educational lobbying toward religious liberty issues in a broader range of 
appropriations bills. They also directly lobbied to oppose the confirmation fo Betsy 
DeVos as secretary of education.  
 In terms of civil liberties, SCA has focused its efforts on discrimination against 
nonreligious minority groups, including advocating for global blasphemy protection laws   
and the protection of human rights in Bangladesh, and the inclusion of atheists and 
humanists in the military and non-discrimination acts. In one particularly interesting case, 
the SCA opposed the confirmation of Justice Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court, citing 
her weak support for church/state separation jurisprudence. While AUSCS also advocates 
for the rights of nonreligious minority groups, they do so on a much wider range of bills 
including the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, legislation providing social services 
to the people experiencing homelessness, and the workplace religious freedom act. They 
also explicitly opposed the confirmation of Jeff Sessions as attorney general.  
 Finally, in terms of explicitly religious issues, the SCA has lobbied on the 
explicitly religious-focused legislation such as the First Amendment Defense Act, and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. They have also advocated against what they describe 
as “religious privileging in child abuse and child care laws.” In contrast, the AUSCS has 
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pursued issues pertaining to religious freedom in a much wider range of legislation, 
including the participation by religious organizations in USAID programs, health 
coverage under the Affordable Care Act, HUD regulations, and the National Defense 
Authorization Act.   
 To summarize, AUSCS and the SCA look similar in terms of broad lobbying 
agendas devoted to religion, education, and civil liberties, but they have pursued those 
agendas with varied strategies. SCA favors a narrow strategy, focusing on a tailored 
agenda specifically concerned with protections for nonreligious populations and identity 
groups. These are typically progressive issues associated with the Democratic party, but 
they have even crossed conventional party lines in pursuit of this agenda, in the case of 
Elena Kagan’s nomination. In contrast, AUSCS pursues a much more general, and 
perhaps more professionalized and consistently partisan approach to defensing the 
separation of church and state across a broader range of issues, especially pursuing large, 
mainstream omnibus bills that often house the back stage aspects of policymaking in 
amendments and riders. By pursuing this broader strategy in line with a conventional 
progressive agenda, including the opposition of Republican nominees DeVos and 
Sessions, the AUSCS has arguably had a stronger aggregate political impact than the 
SCA.   
 These strategies mirror the structure of nonreligious advocacy groups in the 
United States. SCA and CFI are more central to the field of nonreligious advocacy groups 
given their identity-based claims to represent atheists, agnostics, and secular humanists. 
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In terms of institutional ties, these two organizations have more and stronger connections 
to the rest of the groups in the network and, in the case of the SCA, the network rewards 
those ties with contributions to put towards lobbying and advocacy. In terms of actual 
lobbying behavior, however, these organizations are more limited in their scope AUSCS. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Analysis of lobbying data in the context of the field offers two important 
conclusions. First, cultural issues, especially the conceptualization of nonreligious 
identities and front stage organizing efforts, are central to the relationships in the field of 
nonreligious organizing groups and how these groups go about back stage political 
organizing. The central organizations that provide the most institutional linkages in the 
field are the Secular Coalition for America - with a stated commitment to lobbying and 
backstage political advocacy to advance the interests of atheists, agnostics, and secular 
humanists, and the Reason Rally Coalition - with a stated commitment to front stage 
political advocacy for these groups through the Reason Rallies. The actions of other 
organizations support the SCA’s mission in line with this commitment to nonreligious 
identities. Groups on the periphery of the field that are primarily concerned with 
nonreligious identities tend to engage in political work by sending money to the SCA. 
Organizations closer to the core of the field that are invested in secular identities tend to 
do the same, while periphery groups that are more concerned with the separation of 
church and state engage more with independent advocacy in limited cases. 
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 Second, this emphasis on identity marginalizes Americans United for the 
Separation of Church and State among nonreligious advocacy groups, despite its status as 
the largest and most notable lobbying group for the separation of church and state. While 
the AUSCS may be central to the field of progressive organizations more broadly, and 
while the group clearly outspends all other nonreligious advocacy organizations in 
lobbying efforts, it is only marginally linked to this particular field through one shared 
board member with the CFI. No nonreligious advocacy group in this sample reported 
transferring money to the AUSCS.  
 This is particularly interesting because the lobbying work of the AUSCS, the 
SCA, and CFI as reported by LobbyView appears quite similar, though AUSCUS has 
lobbied on a much broader and more consistent set of legislation than the SCA’s narrow 
efforts to lobby for nonreligious identity groups in particular. Instead of leveraging 
AUSCS’s influence, These groups remain only tentatively connected, with mediated 
relationships in the case of the SCA. Instead of actively coordinating with AUSCS or 
sending money to this group, organizations in the field filter materials support to the SCA 
or the CFE, and the financial records in this sample indicate that they understand these 
transfers as contributions for the sake of lobbying and political advocacy. Despite this, 
financial records for the CFE and the SCA indicate that these receiving groups spend 
remarkably little on formal lobbying efforts.  
 The result is that the network of nonreligious advocacy groups has built little 
capacity in terms of back stage political influence on legislation, and therefore has 
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diminished capacity to convert the cultural capital of these shared identity groups into 
political capital. These shared cultural affinities for nonreligious identities shape the 
structure of the field and limit coordination with a long standing, influential backstage 
organization dedicated to the same substantive issues as many in the nonreligious 
movement. 
 Previous chapters illustrated how individuals who have different experiences with 
nonreligion, both through a personal cultural repertoire of behaviors, identities, and 
affinities, and through a public cultural repertoire emphasizing secular authority in the 
public sphere. However, these previous chapters have also shown that the connection 
between personal and public cultural repertoires is not inevitable, and people high in one 
repertoire of nonreligion are not necessarily high in the other. It takes cultural work to 
maintain a link between personal and public repertoires, and many of the progressive 
political views that research attributes to nonreligion are better explained by the public 
repertoire when controlling for both. 
 The findings presented here illustrate the stakes of this pattern at the 
organizational level, where organizations make assumptions about the link between 
public and personal repertoires without necessarily doing the work to coordinate the two. 
Much of the movement organizing among nonreligious groups has emphasized personal 
repertoires by building groups that focus on developing coherent nonreligious identities 
and fostering social support. This emphasis on identity and representation through front 
stage organizing has grown the field and led to a concentration of movement efforts. 
!159
However, this focus on identity has also led the field to establish a process of “do it 
yourself” representation by leaning on newer and less established organizations for 
political advocacy. Organizations in the field send their money to smaller and less 
impactful lobbying groups that explicitly claim to advocate for the nonreligious, as 
opposed to interfacing more closely with Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State, a group that shares a similar public repertoire of secular authority but serves a 
much broader coalition of members.  
  
 The case of nonreligious organizing provides an important illustration for the 
sociology of emerging movements and advocacy in the political field. The commitment 
to front stage political organizing and the building of cultural capital represented by the 
Reason Rally Coalition, the Secular Coalition for America (Blankholm 2014; LeDrew 
2015; Kettell 2013) and other groups clearly mirrors the advocacy work that 
organizations used to build the Religious Right with a strong, public facing message on 
issues of moral concern. This work to cultivate shared cultural capital from common 
religious identities is the result of concerted struggles in the field of religious organizing 
(Bourdieu 1991; Markofski 2015), and it demonstrates how the nonreligious movement is 
looking to established “rules of the game” from its movement counterparts. It could be 
possible that with the correct, emotionally resonant messaging strategy, future 
nonreligious mobilization efforts could enter the mainstream from the fringes, as other 
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groups have done (Bail 2014), and this fringe effect may eventually allow the movement 
to translate the shared cultural capital of nonreligious identities into political capital. 
 However, this analysis also illustrates the limitations of this movement strategy. 
The political influence of the Religious Right arguably comes from the translation of 
cultural capital into political capital through unobtrusive organizing in the political field 
(Kucinskas 2014; Sager and Bentele 2016). Like other organizations seeking to gain 
political capital, religious groups exist in a social space between legislators, nonprofit 
organizations, and religious groups (Medvetz 2015; Davis and Robinson 2016; Bourdieu 
1991). This analysis shows how the field of nonreligious organizations is still primarily 
reliant on front stage organizing alone, reproducing only a part of the full range of 
practices employed by its rivals. The shared cultural capital of personal nonreligious 
repertoires drives the organization of the nonreligious field (Dromi 2015) to the detriment 
of lobbying ties that more directly express public repertoires focused on secular public 
authority.    
 This case shows how the “rules of the game” in any given social field can be 
double-sided, and how responding only in part to habits of practice in a social field can 
be detrimental to new and emerging players. If the field of political engagement is truly 
interstitial and requires multiple kinds of cultural, economic, and social capital, actors 
who adhere to only one style of play, even in a very skilled way, will be uniquely 
disadvantaged.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.  We are a nation 
of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and non-believers…as the world grows 
smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in 
ushering in a new era of peace. 
-President Barack Obama, 2008 Inaugural Address 
 I watched this inaugural address live from a college dorm room in between 
classes. The nod to non-believers had me giddy; it was only a few years after I read The 
God Delusion in a state of teen angst and still a bit before I would reckon with the global 
rise of anti-Muslim sentiment that often spoke the language of secularism. At the time, I 
felt a sense of validation at finally having “my team” recognized as legitimate 
participants in the political process. With September 11th, the war in Iraq, and the public 
religious repertoires of the second Bush administration, growing up and growing into 
political awareness during the early 2000s was a time to be deeply entrenched in the 
backlash theory of religious disaffiliation—when it felt like there were deep political 
stakes to my religious commitments. 
 Looking back a decade later, that inaugural moment feels like less of a victory for 
my team and more of a calm reassurance. I was watching a political leader who simply 
acknowledged a basic social fact about his country that had been true since the beginning, 
and even more so since 1990. I am also an example of the drift theory of religious 
disaffiliation: was raised in a family so religiously accepting that I ended up nonreligious 
mostly by accident. I did not set foot in a church service until high school, well after 
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many of my peers had learned to see them as a normal part of everyday life. In this way, 
my own experience with nonreligion was not a coherent identity so much as it was the 
outcome of basic socialization—an ingrained feature of how I saw the world and my 
place in it. I still volunteered regularly despite never attending church; I learned to prefer 
brunch instead.   
 My own nonreligious biography is a patchwork, and so when I set out to study the 
political implications of religious disaffiliation both the backlash and the drift theories 
always seemed incomplete. Pundits who lauded the rise of nonreligion as the harbinger of 
a liberal political shift or derided it as unhealthy polarization where people “replaced” 
their religion with identity politics seemed to make so much out of what is, for many 
people, just a preference for brunch. Other arguments sounding the alarm about general 
declines in civic engagement seemed to ignore the real and legitimate reasons people find 
specific institutions unsatisfying and decide to leave them. We need a new theory to think 
sociologically about religious disaffiliation that adds a bit more complexity than either 
the backlash or drift theories provide—not so much complexity that it prevents us from 
saying anything substantive about this trend (e.g. Healy 2017; Martin 2015), but enough 
that we can sufficiently map when and how it comes to matter in political life.  
 It can seem too simple to say that a social phenomenon means different things to 
different people, but this is the bread and butter of cultural sociology. People use different 
interpretive frameworks to make sense of where they are in social institutions, and these 
frameworks structure both their explicit, carefully considered actions and their implicit, 
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snap judgements about the world (Lizardo 2017; Sewell Jr. 1992; Swidler 1986). Just like 
people live out different cultural repertoires of religious experiences (Edgell 2012; 
Chaves 2010), focusing on how people engage repertoires of nonreligion gives us a 
theoretical language to bring the drift and break hypotheses together, to formalize these 
varied experiences, and to directly measure their availability to people. Seen through a 
cultural lens, conventional political questions about engagement, opinion formation, and 
advocacy take on a new dimension and yield some surprising findings. Each of the 
previous chapters highlighted how paying attention to the varied meanings of nonreligion 
shows immense political potential in religious disaffiliation, but also specific ways that 
such potential is limited.  
 Chapter Two demonstrated the most important limitation studies of nonreligion: 
the way researchers are measuring it. By relying on survey items that invite people to 
identify as different kinds of nonreligious, researchers invite classification errors where a 
substantive portion of people with low religious engagement never enter the proper 
category for analysis, and many who are inside those categories actually exhibit rather 
strong personal religious commitments. Following the insights of qualitative research and 
classic sociological theory on the relationship between personal and public thinking, I 
demonstrated that we can create better measures that capture multiple repertoires of 
nonreligion: personal repertoires reflect reduced religious engagement and belief in terms 
of personal practices, while public repertoires translate that standpoint into different 
secular visions for political community and authority. People mix and match these 
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repertoires, and, while they are correlated, high scores in one repertoire do not inevitably 
lead to higher scores on the other.  
 Personal and public repertoires of nonreligion do different things. The most 
common nonreligious identification categories are more closely associated with the 
personal repertoire, while basic measures of political ideology associate with the public 
repertoire. This highlights an important point for studying political culture: it is risky to 
assume that personal identities and affinities are necessarily a proxy for public 
considerations. While cultural affinities do often map onto political considerations (e.g. 
DellaPosta et al. 2015), research can do more to focus on the specific mechanisms 
through which this happens. In the case of nonreligion, the available identity categories 
are so slippery for respondents that using a simple measure of non-affiliation or low 
personal engagement alone risks obscuring when and where people bring nonreligious 
experiences to bear on their political considerations.  
 Chapter Three extended the logic of these repertoires into secondary data analysis 
of validated voter turnout to investigate the secular voting gap. When I use an improved 
set of measures that can account for bias in self-reporting and exit polling, I find that the 
gap in voter turnout between religiously affiliated and unaffiliated voters is smaller than 
originally estimated and closing over time. Trends in validated voter turnout also speak to 
a distinct cultural logic among religiously-unaffiliated respondents. While the literature 
traditionally expects higher church attendance to associate with higher rates of voter 
turnout, these results indicate that the opposite is true for respondents who are religiously 
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unaffiliated. For these respondents, lower church attendance is more consistent with a 
nonreligious affiliation, and models demonstrate the probability of turnout is higher for 
unaffiliated voters who attend services less frequently. This is good news for research on 
civic disengagement, and it demonstrates the limitations of the drift hypothesis. These 
results suggest that civic disengagement may be domain-specific—opting out of religious 
institutions does not necessarily mean people will be more likely to opt out of political 
institutions. 
 Chapter Four used measures for personal and public repertoires of nonreligion to 
study public opinion and assess whether either repertoire could produce attitudinal 
constraint. Rather than testing conventional “culture wars” issues, I pursed a more 
conservative test to see if either repertoire was associated with core issues that are not 
typically tied to religious disaffiliation: support for the social safety net, recognition of 
racial inequality, and attitudes about immigration policy. As expected by the break 
hypothesis, nonreligious repertoires did associate with progressive attitudes on these 
issues. However, this attitude alignment is explained by public nonreligion, not personal 
nonreligion. In line with he drift hypothesis, personal nonreligion can act as a proxy for 
public nonreligion in a pinch, but it offers reduced explanatory power. Given the findings 
in Chapter Two, researchers focusing primarily on nonreligious identities or measures of 
personal nonreligion (or, conversely, religion) are potentially understating the role that 
religious standpoints may play in many dimensions of political life. Religious 
commitments will not always be the most important factor in opinion formation or 
!167
political decision making, but these findings suggest that we are using an imperfect, 
limited measure for the most important dimension of religious experience: how people 
link their religious or nonreligious commitments to a vision of public life.  
 Chapter Five demonstrated the stakes of making this theoretical mistake in real-
world practice. Using a sample of forty nonreligious community organizations and 
advocacy groups with lobbying and tax data, I demonstrated that the institutional 
arrangement of the field of nonreligious groups favors organizations that emphasize 
nonreligious identities first and foremost. Groups that publicly advocate for atheists, 
agnostics, and other nonreligious communities, such as the Secular Coalition for 
America, gain a dominant position in the network of organizations and draw cash 
transfers for political activity from a whole host of member groups based on the 
assumption that secular identities need explicit, public representation. However, just as 
we cannot assume that nonreligious identity categories are inevitably linked to a 
nonreligious vision of political authority at the individual level, these groups are not 
necessarily the best suited to advance their members’ interests in terms of back stage 
political organizing. These groups have far less institutional longevity, spending capacity, 
and lobbying influence than organizations exclusively committed to a secular public 
sphere, like Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. The network of 
nonreligious organizations keeps identity-focused advocacy groups at the center based on 
a logic of shared cultural capital for institution-building, but marginalizes the group best 
suited to directly translate that cultural capital into political capital through back stage 
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political organizing. As a result, the current nonreligious movement is only mirroring the 
front stage activism of the Religious Right, and potentially limiting their ability to match 
the Right’s capacity for back stage political influence.  
 Together, these results indicate great deal of political potential within the growing 
group of nonreligious Americans, more than literature engaging the drift hypothesis 
would expect. Nonreligious people actually do show up to vote, and they express 
coherent attitudes about a broad range of issues. However, the break hypothesis is not 
wholly correct either. At every turn, we see that it is not simply the state of being 
unaffiliated that shapes these political attitudes and behaviors. Nonreligion still requires a 
cohesive ideological system to engage with political life. Public repertoires of nonreligion 
provide this system—and the link between personal and public repertoires is not a given. 
The institutional structure of organizations that claim to represent nonreligious 
Americans, for example, has not yet cultivated ties that can effectively activate public 
repertoires and convert them into political capital.  A focus on cultural repertoires of 
nonreligion explains how this political potential requires a specific set of framing 
strategies and movement infrastructure that has yet to coalesce in the electorate.  
 This case study of an interest group “in progress” highlights three important 
conclusions for the social science literature. First, demography is not destiny. As the rise 
of religious disaffiliation is primarily acting on personal repertoires of nonreligion, the 
growth of this demographic group will not inevitably or necessarily provide the political 
will for the Democratic Party or for progressive groups. As we saw in Chapter One, a 
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sizable number of the unaffiliated identify as political moderates and independents. 
Demographic changes have to be filtered through cultural narratives, as people have to 
make sense of where they are and what they want from the political process. While the 
phrase “identity politics” is a useful concept for making sense of how people engage with 
this meaning-making process, there is also a risk of over-simplifying a theory of identity 
politics and overstating the extent to which someone’s sense of who they are will 
constrain whether and how they vote. Identity politics take cultural work to achieve and 
maintain, both from institutions and elites who can “package” identities with agendas and 
from individuals to who take up those packages and integrate them into their lives.  
 Second, cultural repertoires matter, especially repertoires that bring together the 
personal and the political. The relationship between personal nonreligion and liberal 
political views is a proxy for alignment is better explained by a vision of a secular public 
sphere—attitudes that do not inevitably follow from religious disaffiliation. By focusing 
on these repertoires in the general population, researchers can better explain why 
attitudes do not always coalesce or why social movements are sometimes limited. Rather 
than dismissing political shortcomings as the result of apathy or “low information,” we 
can better specify the conditions that actually produce limited engagement. Periods of 
cultural disjuncture can provide an improved explanation for why people leave some 
institutions and remain committed to others.  
 Third, the nones might have it in the future. There is very little evidence that the 
current levels of religious disaffiliation will recede, and they are even higher among 
!170
younger respondents. However, much of this disaffiliation comes from moderate religious 
respondents, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise if the growing population of unaffiliated 
respondents continues to look more politically moderate. The structure of the field of 
nonreligious organizations suggests that there is much more room for political 
innovation, especially coalition building across interfaith efforts and within more 
established advocacy fields. There are smaller signs of these efforts emerging, such as the 
establishment of the Congressional Freethought Caucus and the presence of new 
religiously-unaffiliated representatives at the federal and state level. By understanding the 
specific cultural repertoires that underly the nonreligious experience, perhaps a future 
entrepreneurial candidate or movement will find a new message and reap the rewards of a 
rapidly growing potential coalition. 
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Figure 1.1 - The Rise of “No Religion” in the United States
!  
Source: General Social Survey Cumulative File 1975-2018 
Notes: Weighted proportion estimates for the number of individuals selecting “none” on religious affiliation of choice. LOESS smoothing applied following the 
method of Hout and Fischer (2014).  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Figure 1.2 - Political Polarization by Nonreligion
!  
Source: General Social Survey Cumulative File 1975-2018 
Notes: Trends indicate weighted averages and 95% CIs for a six-point party identification score across religiously affiliated respondents (solid trend line) and 
unaffiliated respondents (dashed trend line). LOESS smoothing is applied to trend lines. After 1990, these trends and CI separation indicate political divergence 
between the two groups, with unaffiliated respondents exhibiting stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party.  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Figure 1.3 - The “Nones” Classification Problem
!  
Source: General Social Survey Cumulative File 1975-2018 
Notes: Jittered scatterplots indicate placement along religion and political ideology measures for all religiously-unaffiliated respondents in the cumulative file. 
Note the substantive variation in belief in god across the nonreligious, despite relatively low church attendance. Also note the presence of many more nones who 
identify as politically moderate than expected by the literature on political backlash.  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Figure 2.1 - Nonreligious Repertoires
!  
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Table 2.1 - Nonreligion Measures 
CSPP 2016 MTurk 2016 BAM 2016
N=3500 N=702 N=2375
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Personal Nonreligion (Low)
    Church Attendance 1 7 4.72 2.15 1 7 5.50 1.92 1 7 4.50 2.21
    Belief in God 1 6 2.19 1.66 1 6 3.08 1.97 0 1 0.11 0.32
    Religious Salience 1 5 2.59 1.43 1 5 3.28 1.48 1 4 1.91 1.07
Public Nonreligion (Disagree)
Important for being good American 1 4 2.50 1.09 1 4 3.11 1.03 1 4 2.41 1.03
A President should have strong religious beliefs 1 4 2.33 1.02 1 4 2.88 1.02 1 4 2.28 0.93
Society’s standards of right and wrong should be 
based on god’s laws
1 4 2.28 1.08 1 4 2.88 1.12 1 4 2.33 1.05
Religious Identification
Affiliated 0.74 0.57 0.70
Spiritual, but not Religious (SBNR) 0.06 0.07 0.08
Atheist 0.04 0.12 0.03
Agnostic 0.05 0.14 0.03
Nothing in Particular (NIP) 0.11 0.11 0.16
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Table 2.2 - Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results  
CSPP 2016 MTurk 2016 BAM 2016
N=3500 N=702 N=2375
Model Fit Statistics Single 
Factor
Two 
Factor
Single 
Factor
Two 
Factor
Single 
Factor
Two 
Factor
    CFI 0.94 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.93 0.98
    TLI 0.89 0.98 0.87 0.99 0.88 0.96
    RMSEA 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.15 0.09
    SRMR 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03
Factor Loadings
    attend            1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
    belief            0.88 0.87 1.18 1.20 0.13 0.13
    salience          0.88 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.61 0.66
    citizen           0.68 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.53 1.00
    president         0.65 0.97 0.71 1.03 0.49 0.96
    society           0.64 0.92 0.77 1.10 0.57 1.10
Note: Two-factor model provides an improved model fit in each data set according to 
cutoffs proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999): CFI & TLI>0.96, RMSEA < 0.06, SRMR 
<.09. 
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Figure 2.2 - Factor Scores for Public and Personal Nonreligion by Religious Affiliation 
!  
Notes: Jittered scatterplots place each respondent in each data set according to their predicted factor scores using the two-factor CFA 
models summarized in Table 2.2. Respondents who report no religious affiliation are shaded black, while respondents reporting a 
religious affiliation are shaded in gray. Note the overlap in each of these categories across the plotted space, indicating how both 
categories contain substantive variation along each measurement dimension.  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Table 2.3 - Odds of Non-Affiliation  
CSPP MTURK BAM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Public Nonreligion 1.503*** 0.049 2.249*** 0.430 2.044*** 0.220
(0.058) (0.121) (0.165) (0.261) (0.089) (0.170)
Personal Nonreligion 1.088*** 1.060*** 1.711*** 1.483*** 1.153*** 1.058***
(0.039) (0.079) (0.117) (0.178) (0.047) (0.087)
Constant -1.450*** -1.510*** -1.511*** -0.645*** -0.637*** -0.664*** -1.153*** -1.152*** -1.157***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.112) (0.116) (0.119) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061)
N 3,466 3,466 3,466 701 701 701 2,347 2,347 2,347
Log-Likelihood -1,505.251 -1,404.777 -1,404.693 -312.646 -271.729 -270.377 -1,050.287 -965.769 -964.937
AIC 3,014.503 2,813.554 2,815.386 629.291 547.457 546.754 2,104.574 1,935.538 1,935.873
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Logistic regression models for any religious non-affiliation against an affiliated baseline. All 
models employ survey sampling and post-stratification weights.
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Table 2.4 - Odds of Specific Non-Affiliation (Atheist, Agnostic, Nothing in Particular, Spiritual But Not Religious)  
CSPP-
SBNR
CSPP-
Atheist
CSPP-
Agnostic
CSPP-
NIP
MTURK-
SBNR
MTURK-
Atheist
MTURK-
Agnostic
MTURK-
NIP
BAM-
SBNR
BAM-
Atheist
BAM-
Agnostic
BAM-
NIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Public Nonreligion 0.195 0.127 0.057 -0.033 1.171** 0.362 0.151 -0.105 0.792*** 1.682** 0.776 -0.234
(0.185) (0.465) (0.278) (0.155) (0.366) (0.618) (0.417) (0.393) (0.239) (0.633) (0.482) (0.206)
Personal Nonreligion 0.410*** 4.122*** 2.110*** 1.040*** 0.048 3.748*** 2.205*** 1.852*** 0.483*** 2.232*** 1.594*** 1.277***
(0.123) (0.486) (0.203) (0.103) (0.250) (0.520) (0.299) (0.282) (0.121) (0.354) (0.243) (0.106)
Constant -2.515*** -9.844*** -4.834*** -2.225*** -1.997*** -4.711*** -2.277*** -1.973*** -2.184*** -7.416*** -4.823*** -1.744***
(0.076) (0.860) (0.255) (0.073) (0.177) (0.603) (0.244) (0.198) (0.088) (0.676) (0.320) (0.076)
N 3,466 701 2,347
AIC 4,676.106 1,252.060 3,345.223
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Multinomial regression models for specific non-affiliation options against an affiliated baseline. 
All models employ survey sampling and post-stratification weights.
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Table 2.5 - Nonreligion and Political Ideology 
CSPP MTURK BAM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Public Nonreligion -0.280*** -0.302*** -0.269*** -0.330*** -0.346*** -0.530***
(0.012) (0.029) (0.021) (0.046) (0.019) (0.044)
Personal Nonreligion -0.163*** 0.016 -0.149*** 0.046 -0.137*** 0.105***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.015) (0.030) (0.010) (0.022)
Constant 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 3,466 3,466 3,466 701 701 701 2,347 2,347 2,347
R2 0.133 0.106 0.133 0.186 0.128 0.188 0.119 0.072 0.127
F Statistic
532.384*** 
(df = 1; 
3464)
408.796*** 
(df = 1; 
3464)
266.554*** 
(df = 2; 
3463)
159.591*** 
(df = 1; 
699)
102.853*** 
(df = 1; 
699)
81.059*** (
df = 2; 
698)
315.840*** 
(df = 1; 
2345)
181.439*** 
(df = 1; 
2345)
170.542*** 
(df = 2; 
2344)
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Linear regression models for self-reported political ideology along a seven point scale 
ranging from 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 7 (Extremely Conservative). All models employ survey sampling and post-stratification 
weights.
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Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Core Measures 
CCES 2016 CCES 2014 CCES 2010 CCES 2008 ANES 2016
N=44,175 N=44,907 N=39,900 N=25,368 N=1816
Average Church Attendance 4.07 3.94 3.93 3.71 2.5
(6 pt scale CCES, 5 pt scale ANES)
Proportion Unaffilaited 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.24
Proportion with Validated Turnout
2016 0.58 0.77
2014 0.52 0.49
2012 0.62
2010 0.61
2008 0.76
Notes: All proportion estimates incorporate respective surveys’ sampling and post-stratification weights. Church attendance is 
coded such that higher values indicate lower reported attendance to ease interpretation of models in Table 2. Analytic N's 
account for list wise deletion for missing data.
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Figure 3.1 - The Closing Secular Voting Gap 
!  
Notes: Figure indicates weighted proportion estimates and 95% CIs for validated turnout in each data set and election year by religious affiliation. 
In both data sets, the gap in turnout between affiliated and unaffiliated respondents closes in later election years, approaching confidence interval 
overlap in the 2016 general election.  
!183
Table 3.2 - Logistic Regression Results for Validated Turnout (CCES) 
2008
Unaffiliated -0.157 ** (0.049) -0.868 *** (0.246)
Low Attendance -0.063 *** (0.012) -0.070 *** (0.014)
Unaff x Low Attend 0.155 *** (0.046)
N 25,368 25,368 25,368
Log Likelihood -14,949.800 -14,934.880 -14,923.440
AIC 29,939.610 29,909.760 29,890.880
2010
Unaffiliated -0.084 (0.046) -1.128 *** (0.218)
Low Attendance -0.036 ** (0.012) -0.058 *** (0.014)
Unaff x Low Attend 0.215 *** (0.042)
N 39,900 39,900 39,900
Log Likelihood -21,213.490 -21,208.380 -21,165.200
AIC 42,466.990 42,456.760 42,374.400
2014
Unaffiliated 0.015 (0.039) -0.895 *** (0.203)
Low Attendance -0.017 (0.011) -0.049 *** (0.012)
Unaff x Low Attend 0.187 *** (0.038)
N 44,907 44,907 44,907
Log Likelihood -25,748.100 -25,749.220 -25,704.510
AIC 51,536.190 51,538.450 51,453.030
2016
Unaffiliated 0.005 (0.036) -0.597 *** (0.172)
Low Attendance 0.005 (0.010) -0.013 (0.012)
Unaff x Low Attend 0.118 *** (0.032)
N 44,175 44,175 44,175
Log Likelihood -28,455.520 -28,455.000 -28,435.760
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Table 3.3 - Logistic Regression Results for Validated Turnout (ANES) 
AIC 56,951.050 56,950.010 56,915.530
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. All models also control for age, race, gender, marital status, parental status, income, 
education, and party ID.
2012
Unaffiliated -0.190 (0.166)
Low Attendance 0.033 (0.057)
N 1,816 1,816
Log Likelihood -994.445 -995.491
AIC 2,032.889 2,034.983
2014
Unaffiliated -0.094 (0.164)
Low Attendance -0.201 (0.057)
Unaff x Low Attend
N 1,816 1,816
Log Likelihood -992.057 -981.777
AIC 2,028.115 2,007.554
2016
Unaffiliated -0.221 (0.175)
Low Attendance -0.147 *** (0.063)
N 1,816 1,816
Log Likelihood -845.922 -844.905
AIC 1,735.845 1,733.810
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. All models also control for age, race, gender, marital status, parental status, income, 
education, and party ID.
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Figure 3.2 - Interaction Effects for Religious Disaffiliation & Low Church Attendance  
!  
Notes: Each panel employs predicted probabilities of voter turnout estimated from the interaction models in Table Two. Linear fits indicate the 
relationship between lower church attendance and probability of turnout for religiously affiliated respondents (dashed lines) and unaffiliated 
respondents (solid lines). 95% CI’s are shaded, but small due to the large number of respondents in each data set. For affiliated respondents, the 
relationship between less frequent church attendance and lower probability of validated turnout corresponds with the literature on religion and 
political participation. However, for unaffiliated respondents, less-frequent church attendance corresponds with a higher probability of turnout, 
contrary to the literature’s expectations.  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Table 4.1 - Description of Core Measures 
BAM 2014 CSPP 2016
Attitude Scales   N   Alpha  Mean   
St. 
Dev.  Min    Max   N   Alpha  Mean   
St. 
Dev.  Min    Max 
Safety Net Scale 2,247 0.79 0.01 0.77 -2.49 0.88 Safety Net Scale 3,108 0.82 0.01 0.81 -2.01 1.05
(Govt. spending on Education, ACA, SNAP, Welfare) (Social security, reducing income inequality, raising minimum wage, requiring 
paid family leave)
Racial Affect Scale 2,247 0.84 0.02 0.81 -1.55 2.02 Racial Affect Scale 3,108 0.81 0.01 0.85 -2.39 1.54
(Shared vision with African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, 
Recent Immigrants)
(Feeling thermometers for African Americans, Hispanics, and Recent 
Immigrants)
Racial Inequality Scale 2,247 0.85 0.01 0.87 -1.13 2.26 Racial Inequality Scale 3,108 0.82 -0.00 0.82 -1.34 1.73
(Support for affirmative action, government aid, and charitable aid to 
alleviate racial inequality)
(Racial resentment: recognizing racial inequality, disagreement with 
individualistic solutions to inequality)
Immigration Scale 2,247 0.61 -0.00 0.75 -0.94 2.35 Immigration Scale 3,108 0.65 0.00 0.78 -1.69 1.48
(Opposition to govt. funding immigration enforcement, govt. limiting 
immigration, immigrants having to learn english)
(Opposition to deporting undocumented immigrants, positive view of legal 
immigration, favor granting citizenship to undocumented children born in US)
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Figure 4.1. - Nonreligious Identities & Attitude Scores
!  
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Figure 4.2 - Nonreligious Repertoires & Attitude Constraint 
!  
Notes: Plot indicates the coefficient estimates and 95% CIs for public nonreligion (black) and personal nonreligion (gray). In the left panel, Wald tests for 
difference in coefficient estimates are all significant at the p<.05 level or greater. In the right panel, coefficient estimates are significantly different for party 
identification in both data sets (p<.001), immigration in both data sets (p<.001), CSPP racial affect and inequality (p<.001), and BAM safety net (p<.05). Control 
measures include party ID, gender, race, age, education (highest degree attained), and household income.    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Table 4.2 - Nonreligious Repertoires & Attitude Constraint 
BAM 2014
Safety Net Racial Affect Racial Inequality Racial Affect
No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls
Public Nonreligion 0.251*** 0.094 0.137** 0.017 0.170** -0.004 0.582*** 0.430***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.048) (0.048)
Private Nonreligion -0.095*** -0.056* -0.114*** -0.089*** -0.104*** -0.045 -0.164*** -0.118***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247
R2 0.012 0.111 0.011 0.057 0.006 0.164 0.097 0.195
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.105 0.011 0.052 0.005 0.159 0.096 0.190
F Statistic 13.063
*** (df 
= 2; 2244)
21.363*** (df 
= 13; 2233)
13.033*** (df 
= 2; 2244)
10.412*** (df 
= 13; 2233)
6.733** (df = 
2; 2244)
33.743*** (df 
= 13; 2233)
119.939*** (df 
= 2; 2244)
41.482*** (df 
= 13; 2233)
CSPP 2016
Safety Net Racial Affect Racial Inequality Racial Affect
No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls
Public Nonreligion 0.129*** 0.009 0.359*** 0.286*** 0.297*** 0.175*** 0.422*** 0.324***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
Private Nonreligion -0.020 0.020 -0.243*** -0.222*** -0.119*** -0.076*** -0.179*** -0.158***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Observations 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108
R2 0.014 0.195 0.029 0.094 0.032 0.288 0.066 0.209
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.191 0.028 0.089 0.032 0.284 0.065 0.205
F Statistic 21.833
*** (df 
= 2; 3105)
46.775*** (df 
= 16; 3091)
46.067*** (df 
= 2; 3105)
20.035*** (df 
= 16; 3091)
51.752*** (df = 
2; 3105)
78.110*** (df 
= 16; 3091)
109.156*** (df 
= 2; 3105)
50.971*** (df 
= 16; 3091)
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Control measures include party ID, gender, race, age, education (highest degree attained), and household income.
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Figure 4.3 Public Nonreligion & Political Interest 
!  
Notes: CSPP 2016 - Plot indicates the linear fit between public nonreligion and each outcome measure at levels of self-reported 
political interest ranging from group 1 (highest interest) to group 5 (lowest interest)  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Table 4.3 - Nonreligious Repertoires & Political Predispositions 
Public Personal
Moral Foundations
     Harm 0.03 (0.020) -0.00 (0.020)
     Fairness 0.12 *** (0.019) 0.08 *** (0.020)
     Loyalty -0.09 *** (0.019) -0.01 (0.019)
     Authority -0.08 *** (0.018) -0.07 *** (0.019)
     Purity -0.32 *** (0.017) -0.25 *** (0.018)
Big 5 (3 major indicators)
     Intellect 0.08 *** (0.020) 0.05 * (0.021)
     Conscientiousness 0.03 (0.021) 0.04 (0.021)
     Agreeableness -0.12 *** (0.021) -0.18 *** (0.021)
Need for Cognitive Closure -0.11 ** (0.034) -0.02 (0.035)
Authoritarianism -0.31 *** (0.022) -0.27 *** (0.022)
Populism -0.12 *** (0.024) 0.00 (0.025)
Cynicism 0.14 *** (0.022) 0.12 *** (0.023)
Threat 0.06 ** (0.020) 0.07 *** (0.020)
Constant 0.02 (0.013) 0.02 (0.014)
Observations 2,991 2,991
R2 0.363 0.244
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.240
Residual Std. Error (df = 2977) 0.722 0.744
F Statistic (df = 13; 2977) 130.647 *** 73.788 ***
Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source - CSPP 2016
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Table 5.1 - Nonreligious Advocacy and Community Organizations 
Organization ID Year Start
Year 
End
Average Political 
Spending Obs.
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State AUSCS 1997 2016 $339,320.30 20
Secular Coalition for America SCA 2004 2016 $102,259.77 13
Center for Inquiry CFI 1999 2017 $29,011.42 19
Freedom from Religion Foundation FFRF 1998 2017 $9,593.20 20
American Humanist Association AHA 2003 2016 $11,720.36 14
Citizens Project CP 1999 2014 $2,422.88 16
The Interdependence Project IP 2008 2016 $2,627.56 9
Atheist Alliance of America AAA 2006 2013 $880.75 8
Secular Student Alliance SSA 2000 2016 $418.85 16
Internet Infidels II 2001 2015 $166.67 15
Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers MAAF 2011 2017 $352.86 7
American Atheists AA 1997 2016 20
Atheist Alliance International AAI 2006 2006 1
Atheists and Other Freethinkers AOF 2006 2008 2
Atheists United AU 1997 2015 14
Black Atheists of America BAA 2011 2011 1
Camp Quest CQ 2009 2017 9
Center for Freethought Equality CFE 2013 2016 4
Center for Inquiry Development Fund CFID 1999 2016 18
Charles E Stevens American Atheist Library and Archives Inc CSA 1997 2009 13
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty Inc CPE 1997 2005 9
Council for Secular Humanism CSH 2014 2014 1
Foundation Beyond Belief FBB 2010 2016 7
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Free Minds Inc FM 1998 2012 15
International Federation of Secular Humanist Jews IFSHJ 2004 2007 4
International Humanist and Ethical Union INC IHEU 2003 2016 14
Muslims for progressive values MPV 2014 2017 4
Partners for Secular Activism PSA 2014 2016 3
Project Reason PR 2008 2016 9
Reason Rally Coalition RRC 2011 2017 6
Richard A Busemeyer Atheist Foundation Inc RBA 1999 2017 19
Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science RDF 2006 2015 9
Secular Coalition for America Education Fund SCAF 2009 2016 8
Society of Separationists SoS 1997 2009 13
The Brights Net BN 2006 2012 7
The George Washington Institute for religious freedom GWI 2010 2016 7
The Secular Society inc TSS 2013 2017 5
United Coalition of Reason UCR 2015 2017 3
United Secularists of America USA 1997 2009 13
We are atheism inc WAA 2012 2014 3
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Figure 5.1 - Summary of Organizational Reports  
!  
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Figure 5.2 - Total Reported Political Expenditures  
!  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Figure 5.3 - The Field of Nonreligious Advocacy  
!  
Notes: Organization abbreviations correspond with list of IDs in Table 5.1. Organizations reporting any political expenditures are 
designated by triangular notes and shaded darker according to the proportion of their total operating expenditures spent on political 
work.  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Figure 5.4 - Validation of Reported Lobbying Expenses via LobbyView
!  
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Table 5.2 - Summary of Lobbying Issues via LobbyView 
AUSCS SCA CFI
1999-2018 2005-2017 2006-2018
Issue Designation Count Issue Designation Count Issue Designation Count
Education 57 Civil Liberties      43 Health                      33
Civil Liberties      44 Education      33 Civil Liberties                      31
Religion      43 Religion      18 Religion                      27
Health      19 Constitutional Issues      17 Education                      25
Tax Policy      8 Health      14 Constitutional Issues                      19
Defense      6 Defense      11 Science/Technology 19
Disaster Planning      5 Foreign Relations      10 Budget                      14
Alcohol & Drug Abuse 3 Tax Policy      9 Government Issues                      14
Bankruptcy 2 Family Issues      8 Foreign Relations                      11
District of Columbia 2 Science/Technology      6 Environment                      10
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